Russia Continues Conservative Pivot in Arctic (Part One)

Executive Summary:

• In response to what Moscow labels the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s militarization of the Arctic, Russia has significantly restructured its Arctic policies.
• Russia has expanded the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and enacted symbolic legislative and institutional changes to cement federal control and legitimize future territorial claims in the Arctic.
• Moscow created a  Maritime Collegium to preserve Russia’s status of a great naval power, signaling Russia’s intent to reclaim its imperial maritime stature.
• The Kremlin’s Arctic policy underscores defense supremacy, resource extraction, population incentives, and expansion of the Northern Sea Route, while downplaying ecological integrity.

In a recent speech at the Eurasian International Socio-Political Hearings in Perm, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that Moscow sees “overt attempts to militarize the Arctic” by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as pretexts for constructing new infrastructure (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, May 29). Irrespective of the validity of this claim, Russia’s internal response to a changing Arctic security environment has considerably evolved since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.  This is reflected in administrative and institutional changes in the Russian Arctic, as well as shifts in decision-makers responsible for implementing Russia’s Arctic policies, and ideas articulated by members of the Russian defense and security communities regarding the Arctic region.

The two main administrative developments in Russia’s Arctic policy since February 2022 are legislative acts and symbolic institutional changes. Russia introduced several legislative acts aimed at expanding the territorial-administrative boundaries of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF). On March 23, 2024, a new decree further expanded the AZRF, adding two new municipalities of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug–Yugra to the AZRF (RIA Novosti, March 20, 2024). Moscow aims not only to further consolidate federal control over local natural resources, which is a matter of critical importance for financing the war against Ukraine and balancing the budget, but also to solidify its position in the region. Russia also seeks to expand its Arctic zone as part of legitimizing its claims for a special status in the region. This is likely to serve as a justification for further territorial claims in the Arctic shelf in the future.

This move is not coincidental. Since 1991, Moscow has attempted to redraw the territorial boundaries of the AZRF, which have usually coincided with worsening political relations with the West. In 2008, Russia adopted its first, since the pre-1991 period, strategic Arctic-related document titled “Foundation of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Until 2020 and the Future Perspective” (Static.government.ru, accessed June 7). In 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a document defining the land-based boundaries of the AZRF (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, May 2, 2014). In 2017, 2019, and 2020, territorial boundaries of the AZRF were expanded several times, adding remaining parts of Karelia, Arkhangelsk oblast, the Komi Republic, and Krasnoyarsk krai to the AZRF (Ivo.garant.ru, June 27, 2017;Consultant.ru, May 13, 2019; Publication.pravo.gov.ru, July 13, 2020).

At the institutional level, Moscow has implemented changes that indicate Russia’s determination to maintain its dominance in the Arctic. On August 13, 2024, Putin signed a decree inaugurating the Maritime Collegium of the Russian Federation. Under the collegium’s umbrella, three additional bodies—the Council for Strategic Development of the Navy, Council for Defense of the National Interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, and Council for Development and Securing of Maritime Activities— were established (President of Russia, August 13, 2024; see EDM, September 4, 2024). According to the official decree, the collegium’s main task is to “elaborate on measures aimed at preserving the status of a great naval power” (President of Russia, August 13, 2024).

This broad task includes several specific measures that will be monitored and coordinated by the new body. Russia plans to develop its naval potential, including fixing problems in the shipbuilding industry and the drastic renewal of domestic naval research and development by attracting scientists and research institutions to best implement national maritime policy and the protection of Russian national interests. Russian national interests in terms of the exploration, exploitation, and protection of natural resources in the World Ocean, as well as the Arctic and Antarctic regions plan to be developed. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) will be developed as a “national transportation communication” artery to secure Russia’s guaranteed access to global transit via the World’s oceans. Russia will also focus on the mutually beneficial partnerships and relations in naval activity, given the conditions for “forming a polycentric world,” entailing a multipolar approach to Russian international relations in the maritime sphere (President of Russia, August 13, 2024).  

The new Maritime Collegium will be directly subordinated to the Russian president and headed by Nikolai Patrushev, a former Secretary of the Security Council and long-time Putin ally, who is currently in charge of national maritime policy (Vzglyad, August 13). Putting Patrushev essentially in charge of Russia’s Arctic policies is a clear sign of the prevalence of Cold War thinking in Russia’s Arctic strategy. The inauguration of the Maritime Collegium clearly aims to strengthen Russian statehood (державность, derzhavnost) as a continuation of both its imperial and Soviet legacies and traditions. The new Maritime Collegium can be seen as a continuation of the policies of Russian Emperor Peter the Great, who prioritized Russia’s transformation into a maritime power. Maritime development, in turn, afforded advantages to Imperial Russia’s status as a great power. This was particularly evident in 1717 when Tsar Peter I inaugurated the Board of Admiralties (Адмиралтейств-коллегия, Admiralteystv-kollegiya)—a supreme body for the administration of the Imperial Russian Navy and admiralty shipyards in the Russian Empire (Mil.Press FLOT, accessed June 17).  The original Imperial Board of Admiralties is similar to the newly created Maritime Collegium in terms of its functions, responsibilities, and authority delegated to it.  These features may indicate the significance of symbolism in Russia’s naval and Arctic strategies.

Institutional transformations bring Patrushev and his circles to the forefront of Russia’s Arctic policy. This group is now likely assuming the leading role in shaping and determining Russia’s Arctic strategy.

As a state corporation (государственная корпорация, goskorporatsiya), Russia’s Rosatom essentially took control of major economic and cultural Arctic-related projects and initiatives (Neftegaz.ru, June 28, 2022). These have included transportation projects along the NSR, the construction of icebreakers, and international cultural and educational youth programs (see EDM, June 12, 2023, September 4, November 25, [1], [2], 2024, April 18). In terms of oversight over political developments and management in Arctic-related matters, however, certain Rosatom officials and Russian officials perform duplicate functions. For example, the control and supervision of political processes in and around the Arctic were shaped by a duumvirate, with Yuri Trutnev, the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District, and Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, playing key roles. Both individuals differ from Patrushev in terms of experience, energy, determination, and their focus on intelligence- and security-related issues (Republic, October 16, 2024).

After becoming head of the new Maritime Collegium, Patrushev outlined in a six-point plan of his vision for the Arctic, consisting of the following priorities (TASS, December 18, 2024). The first includes defense and security priorities. These consist of the impenetrability of the national borders in the Arctic; ensuring Russia’s military superiority; the development of dual-purpose infrastructural objects and search-and-rescue infrastructure; and the formation of the satellite units and means of communication. In an earlier statement, Patrushev drew attention to climate change and the need to strengthen Russia’s national focus in the Arctic on defense and security. He claimed that climate change contributes to the growing geostrategic potential of the Arctic—in terms of both exploitation of its natural resources and expanding transportation capabilities—which in turn contributes to “political tensions and military competition in the Arctic … and growing activities on the part of NATO members … contributing to the growth of conflict potential in the region” (RIA Novosti, December 18, 2024).

In early 2025, Patrushev referred to the Arctic as a territory “playing the key role in the realization of [Russia’s] national interests and upholding national security” (National Defense, February 15). He also noted, among other things, that Russia’s longest border—consisting 20,000 kilometers (approximately 12,400 miles) in the Arctic—“needs protection against our Arctic neighbors and their increasingly provocative behavior” (National Defense, February 15).

The second priority includes increasing the number of Arctic residents by allocating additional funds and creating special conditions to attract and retain settlers in the Arctic (see EDM, November 15, 2022, March 4). This aspect has a pronounced defense- and military-related subtone.

The third priority includes the development of clusters specializing in the extraction of minerals and raw materials, as well as commodities. Patrushev specifically highlighted the importance of continuing and expanding geological research on the Arctic shelf—likely to boost Russia’s territorial claims in the Arctic—and investment in Arctic transportation (TASS, December 18, 2024).

The forth priority includes upgrading the transportational potential of the NSR by  enabling cargo delivery to the remote areas of Russia’s Arctic region, and employing the NSR as the key artery of international trade, bringing Russia’s products, mainly raw materials and hydrocarbons, for export (TASS, December 18, 2024).  

The fifth priority includes expediting the development of Arctic-related scientific projects with special emphasis on such areas as Arctic shipbuilding, likely, icebreakers and liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers; materials science; the nuclear industry and technology; nature-like technologies (природоподобные технологии, prirodnopodobnyje tekhnologii), which draw on solutions resembling natural systems and structures (TASS, December 18, 2024).

The sixth priority includes resolving ecology-related issues and concerns. Patrushev specifically highlighted that the importance of these issues primarily stems from “ecological agendas being used [by Western countries] against [Russia] as an instrument of pressure” (TASS, December 18, 2024). Given Patrushev’s concern over the use of ecological issues on the informational battlefield and the fact that after February 2022, Russia chose to either evict of shut down Russia-based ecology-related organizations, Moscow’s approach will be less focused on finding genuine solutions to environmental issues, but rather on concealing Russia’s continuous exploitation of the Arctic environment and ecosystem (see EDM, June 17).

In March, Patrushev summarized his vision on the development of the Arctic region in an interview and outlined his perception of international “cooperation” in the region (National Defense, March 13). He stated that NATO member states blame Russia for recent subversive activities in the Baltic, which those member states themselves carried out. He claimed that, according to his information, NATO is planning to strengthen its “terrorist activities against Russian pipelines and critical infrastructure, tankers, and bulk carriers.” He also claimed that these methods “entered the Western arsenal during the Cold War and they [the West] are not planning to depart from these practices.” He also accused the West of “militarization of the Arctic,” which has become “a part of Western geopolitical agenda.” According to Patrushev, this stems from the ongoing intensification of competition for natural resources and new transportation routes. He claimed that the Arctic’s natural resource wealth makes “many other traditional deposits pale in comparison.” Finally, Patrushev implied that Russia’s special status in the Arctic is dictated by its historical rights. He discussed the idea of maritime transportation along the Arctic (essentially a proto-NSR), dating back to 1525, with the emergence of the first Russian settlements along the Ob and Yenisei rivers.

With ultraconservative conspiracist Patrushev expanding his influence over political agendas in the Arctic, Russia’s perception of and behavior in the region will continue to evolve along the lines of Cold War thinking progressively and the “Russia as a besieged fortress” narrative. Additionally, despite discussions about the need for innovation, modernization, and adherence to the principles of ecological and social sustainability, Russia’s activities in the Arctic will likely focus on the simple extraction of natural resources and finding the most effective ways to export them. In terms of technological goals, the needs of the Ministry of Defense and the so-called “power block” will be given a clear priority. This will include the upgrading of capabilities in the domain of icebreakers, since this tool is of dual use and (even civilian icebreakers), thus must be viewed as a part of Russia’s regional power projection strategy.