Russia Details Preconditions to Ukraine For Ceasefire and Political Settlement: Political Terms

(Part One)

Executive Summary:

• Russia has released an embryonic Treaty of final settlement with Ukraine following their June 2 bilateral meeting in Istanbul. The territorial clauses require Ukraine to recognize Russia’s de jure annexations of Crimea and four Ukrainian mainland provinces to the full extent of their pre-2014 administrative boundaries.
• Security clauses demand Ukraine give up all its previously existing forms of cooperation with Western powers in any framework. Under its expansive interpretation of neutrality, Russia could also claim the right to vet or even veto cooperation agreements between Ukraine and the European Union. Ukraine’s renunciation of war reparations could shift the post-war reconstruction costs on the EU.
• Cultural and political clauses would introduce official Russian-Ukrainian language parallelism and language contest in Ukraine; could ban legitimate expressions of Ukrainian nationalism through conflation with “Nazism;” and initiate a process of re-russification in Ukraine.

On June 2, in Istanbul, Russian negotiators presented their Ukrainian counterparts with military and political preconditions for a ceasefire agreement and an eventual settlement of what Russia describes as “the Ukraine crisis.” Moscow eschews the terms “war” and “peace” (see EDM, June 3). The set of Russian documents includes two ceasefire options (both in Chapter II), a framework for a final settlement, and a roadmap toward that settlement (Chapters I and III, respectively) (TASS, June 2, released in Russian only).

The political framework document, “Basic Parameters of a Final Settlement,” constitutes the foundation of a Russian-Ukrainian treaty. The “final settlement” becomes a purely bilateral matter despite its vast European and Euro-Atlantic ramifications. Such bilateralism is designed to insulate the negotiation process against inputs from Ukraine’s Western partners. Kyiv sought to bring its main European partners and the United States to the table at both meetings in Istanbul on May 16 and June 2. Moscow, however, ruled this out while Washington has endorsed Russian-Ukrainian “direct talks” (U.S. State Department, June 1).

Among the political terms of settlement, the following stand out (Chapter I, “Basic Parameters”, TASS, June 2):

Territories

“De jure recognition of the accession of Crimea, the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘people’s republics’ and the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts [administrative regions] to the Russian Federation. Complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from these territories.”

“Complete” refers to the entirety of those four mainland regions, as per their pre-2014 administrative boundaries (see EDM, June 3).

 International security arrangements

“Neutrality of Ukraine, entailing its refusal to join military alliances or coalitions, as well as banning any military activities of third states on the territory of Ukraine and deployments of foreign military formations, military bases or military infrastructure there.”

Ukraine used to host multiple military exercises on land and at sea with U.S. and European forces (outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) framework) on Ukraine’s territory as a non-aligned state (mid-1990s–2007, 2010–2018) and as a NATO-aspirant state (2008–2009, 2019–2021). Ukraine also hosted U.S.–U.K.–Canadian military contingents that trained Ukrainian troops at the Yavoriv range (2015–2021). Banning such activities at Russian dictation would undermine the security of Ukraine, its Central European neighbors, and the Black Sea region.

Ukraine to “invalidate its international treaties and agreements that are incompatible with neutrality and to refuse entering into such [documents] in the future.”

Russia could, on this basis, claim to vet and even veto future agreements between Ukraine and the European Union in the security sphere or Ukraine’s EU candidacy as such. Moscow increasingly views the European Union as a military and security bloc, hence deems Ukraine’s (and neighboring Moldova’s) EU candidacies as incompatible with their neutrality.

“Confirmation of Ukraine’s status as a non-nuclear weapon state and not possessing other weapons of mass destruction.”

Ukrainian military forces

 “Upper limits to be set on the Ukrainian armed forces’ personnel numbers, weapons holdings, and military technology and their admissible characteristics. The Ukrainian armed forces and National Guard are to dissolve [their] Ukrainian nationalist formations.”

Identity politics

“Provision [obespechenie, обеспечение] of the fullness of rights, freedoms, and interests to the Russian and Russian-speaking population. Conferral of the status of official language on the Russian language.”

The “Russian-speaking population” is Moscow’s artificial political construct to contest, in this case, the Ukrainian national identity. While most residents of Ukraine can speak Russian, fewer than 20 percent self-identified as Russian in pre-2014 censuses, and even fewer in the post-2014/post-2022 Ukraine. Conferring official status on the Russian language, parallel to the Ukrainian, is calculated to spark linguistic and political polarization, impede Ukrainian from functioning as the lingua franca of the state, and initiate a re-russification process. 

“Lifting restrictions affecting the UOC [Ukrainian Orthodox Church subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchy].”

Russia also undoubtedly plans to use the Moscow-affiliated UOC as an influence conduit in post-war Ukraine.

Political activity

“Legal ban on the heroization and propaganda of Nazism and neo-Nazism, dissolution of nationalist organizations and parties.”

Russia conflates (as did the Soviet Union) “Nazism” with nationalism in societies that resist subjugation to it, as in the Baltic states and Ukraine post-1945 and post-1991. On the same basis, it wants the Ukrainian army to dissolve its “nationalist formations” (see above). Such conflation opens the way for banning legitimate expressions of Ukrainian national identity.

War Reparations

“Mutual renunciation of claims regarding damage caused in the course of military reparations.”

Russia would thereby pass on the costs of Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction to the European Union. 

The roadmap toward a treaty on final settlement (Chapter III, “Sequence of Steps and Timeframes for their Implementation,“ TASS, June 2) includes these landmark steps:

• “Signing the Memorandum on the cessation of hostilities, with implementation deadlines for all of its provisions and setting the date for signing the future Treaty on final settlement” (see EDM, June 3).
• “A 30-day ceasefire to be introduced from the moment the Ukrainian armed forces begin their withdrawal [from Moscow-claimed territories of Ukraine—see above and Part One]. Their withdrawal from the Russian Federation’s territories must be completed within those 30 days.”

• “Elections to be conducted and political authorities to be formed on the territory of Ukraine.”
• “Signing of the Treaty.”
• “Approval of the signed Treaty through a legally binding resolution of the UN Security Council.”
• “Ratification [by Russia and Ukraine] of the Treaty, its entry into force and its implementation.”

The landmarks in this sequence imply three points. First, Russia could revoke the short-term ceasefire, reserving the option to use force unless Ukraine evacuates all Moscow-claimed territories by that deadline. Second, Russia will have “negotiated” the final Treaty with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s representatives—not ruling out a summit-level meeting with him—but would sign the final Treaty with a newly elected Ukrainian leadership. Third, Western powers on the U.N. Security Council would be asked to legitimize a Treaty they did not shape and that would contravene Western values and interests, if signed in a form resembling this.