Russia Focusing on Arctic to Divide West and Expand Its Influence and Position in Antarctica

Executive Summary:

• Moscow views Arctic cooperation with the United States as a means of deepening the divide between Washington and Europe. The United States, conversely, views cooperation with the Russian Federation in the Arctic as a means of dividing Moscow and Beijing.
• The Kremlin seeks to ultimately capitalize on rising Arctic temperatures in order to expand economic activities and propagate its military presence in the Arctic.
• Moscow has an interest in using changing international cooperation and competition in the Arctic as a precedent to also transform the international treaty governing the use of Antarctica and expand Russia’s role on and around the continent.

At the Riyadh talks between Russia and the United States on February 18, U.S. representatives reportedly raised the possibility of expanding U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Arctic (see EDM, March 3; Vedomosti, Meduza, February 27). According to Kirill Dmitriev, head of Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) who was involved in the talks, the two had a “general discussion–maybe joint projects in the Arctic. We specifically discussed the Arctic” (Interfax, TASS, February 19). This is intended by the United States as a “way to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing,” particularly given their deepening partnership since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began (Bloomberg, February 26; Meduza, February 27).

Moscow welcomes cooperation with the United States for two main reasons. First, Russia has been facing problems in attempting to develop the Northern Sea Route (NSR) on the cheap due to sanctions restrictions, which U.S. cooperation may help to resolve (see EDM, May 6, 2021, February 18). Second, activities conducted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Arctic exploit Russia’s financial weaknesses and have created concerns in Moscow that Beijing may attempt to become the dominant power in the region (see EDM, February 18). Moscow may view U.S. cooperation as a mechanism to counter Beijing’s activities in this respect. The Kremlin also views such cooperation as part of its larger effort to deepen the divide between the Trump Administration and European leaders committed to the long-standing idea of keeping the Arctic out of international geoeconomic, geopolitical, and especially military competition (NG.ru, February 27). Additionally, any change in the United States’ approach to the Arctic would likely serve as a precedent for Moscow to seek a transformation to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 (The Antarctic Treaty, 1959 (also available with the British Antarctic Survey, accessed March 6).

Due to rising global temperatures, the Arctic affords both the potential extraction of mineral resources from its seabed as well as fish from its waters. The melting ice causes waterways to expand as an international transportation route, presenting new challenges and opportunities for Arctic littoral states (United States, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark). In 1996, the Arctic Council was established by Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States to guide responses to this development by promoting cooperation and avoiding militarization and conflict (Arctic Council, 1996). Over time, the Council has granted observer status to other countries including the PRC who, in 2018 declared itself a “Near-Arctic State” (State Council of the PRC, January 2018; Arctic Council, accessed March 6). Original group members were conflicted over admitting the PRC into the Arctic Council as seven of eight members are part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the eighth, the Russian Federation, is not. China gained observer status in 2013 and Russia has pushed for a more enhanced position, but the other members have not gone along with what would have been a change in the organization’s founding document (The Arctic Institute, June 6, 2023). In 2022, the seven NATO members limited the work of the Arctic Council to “projects that do not involve the participation of the Russian Federation” in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Arctic Today, March 3, June 8, 2022). This prompted Moscow to condemn the Arctic Council and suspend its contact with other similar international groups and led Russian officials to develop plans to establish an alternative Arctic body that would include its allies (Window on Eurasia, June 26, 2022; The Barents Observer, September 18, 2023).

The divide between Russia and the West has only intensified following the divergence between Washington and Europe over the proper response to Russian actions (NG.ru, February 27). Moscow has recently announced an International Arctic Forum in Murmansk for the end of March that will likely be attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials and likely is aimed at attracting non-NATO government representatives (Forumarctica.ru, accessed March 5). Whether there will be U.S. government representation is unconfirmed, but this is certain to be welcomed by Putin as it would signal further division between Washington and NATO (Interaffairs.ru, accessed March 5). Moscow certainly will portray the emergence of its own Arctic Forum as the legitimate successor to the Arctic Council from which it has been suspended with Russian commentators already celebrating that possibility. 

Moscow remains likely to, at the very least, rely on the use of U.S.-manufactured components to expand its oil and natural gas drilling in the Arctic, to seek benefits from PRC Arctic activities, especially in terms of countering Europe and the West, to continue its claims on the Arctic seabed, and to expand the NSR and Russia’s military presence in the region (Window on Eurasia, February 25, 2023;  IZ.ru, August 16, 2024; NG.ru, February 27). Regardless of how much assistance Moscow may receive from the U.S., these developments will redefine the nature and impact of Russia’s Arctic presence. 

One such area is Antarctica. Although distant geographically from Moscow, Antarctica has been a point of interest and regular activity by Russia for years (Interaffairs.ru, accessed March 5). Shifts in the Arctic are certain to hold implications for international activity and engagements in the southernmost continent as well, where military activity, disposal of nuclear waste, and economic endeavors such as mining are among the activities banned according to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 (The Antarctic Treaty, 1959). The Treaty functions as a guide and restraint for international activity in Antarctica, particularly in assuring that “Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only” (Article I, The Antarctic Treaty, 1959). Russia has long linked its activities in the Arctic with its goals toward the Antarctic (see EDM, June 9, 2020,  June 24, 2020, November 19, 2020, August 13, 2024; Window on Eurasia, July 15, 2022). This linkage has received particular emphasis recently as Moscow celebrates the 105th anniversary of Russia’s Arctic and Antarctic Institute (AARI) (NTV.ru; Lentv24.ru, March 4; AARI, accessed March 6). In recent months, Moscow sent clear signals that its attention to Antarctica and its focus on the Arctic are simultaneously rising. In 2024, Putin announced Russia’s exploration of oil reserves in Antarctica after Russian drillers discovered a field equivalent to 511 billion barrels of oil (see EDM, August 13, 2024; Glavny.tv, July 21, 2024). On March 3, the director of AARI, Alexander Makarov, announced the expansion of Russia’s Russkaya station (Русская) in West Antarctica to a year-long operation and ongoing discussions about the location for a new station (Progorodspb.ru, March 3). Earlier this year when U.S. President Donald Trump proposed the U.S. acquisition of Greenland or even Canada, rumors swirled in Moscow that Putin would respond by visiting Antarctica (Window on Eurasia, January 10).

Moscow would certainly benefit from a U.S. tilt toward Russia vis-a-vis sanctions lifting and resisting PRC influence in the Arctic. At the same time, however, the Kremlin will likely seek to balance continued Chinese support for Arctic development while exploring new opportunities to expand its presence in Antarctica and adjoining waters. The Kremlin’s moves in Antarctica could have more serious consequences for the United States than for the PRC–especially if Moscow is able to ramp up the development of its navy and merchant marine capabilities (Window on Eurasia, August 17, 2024). Effective Western policies on the Arctic must reflect both these changing geopolitics of the region as well as Moscow’s potential and stated intentions toward the opposite pole.