Russian Army’s Degradation in Ukraine Makes Returning Veterans Even Greater Threat

Executive Summary:

• The degradation of the Russian army in Ukraine has made it a crucible for the growth of criminal attitudes and extremist beliefs that will threaten Russian society and government as veterans return home.
• When as many as 700,000 veterans do eventually return home—100,000 more than the number of those who came back from Moscow’s war in Afghanistan—they are likely to generate an upsurge in violence that will pose a serious challenge to the Putin regime.
• The longer Russia’s war against Ukraine continues and the more the Russian army degrades, the greater challenge soldiers and veterans will pose, both on the battlefield in Ukraine and politically inside Russia.

The degradation of the Russian army in Ukraine, along with growing losses, means that Moscow is having to scrape the bottom of the barrel to fill its ranks. This has not prevented the Russian Army from continuing to advance, albeit with increasing losses, but the ever-decreasing quality of the average soldier causes myriad problems. The army itself has become a crucible for the growth of criminal attitudes and behaviors that will affect Russia long after the war’s end (Verstka, February 24; Okno, May 21; The Insider, May 22). Many Russian officials and observers now concede, however, that when as many as 700,000 veterans eventually return home—100,000 more than the number of veterans who returned from the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan in the 1980s—there is certain to be a dramatic upsurge in violence and crime. This may mean that the post-war consequences will be even greater than what has already been seen (see EDM, February 25). The longer Russia’s war against Ukraine continues and the more the Russian army degrades, the larger the challenge that veterans’ return to Russia will pose. Problems caused by returning veterans are yet another reason why some in Moscow would like to see the war end soon.

Russian commentator Viktoriya Ponomaryeva observes:

Discipline in the Russian army has never been its strong suit, but since the mass conscription of convicts began in the fall of 2022, the military [in the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine] has been unraveling at an alarming speed. The longer the war goes on, the harder it has become to re-impose order (The Insider, May 22) .

In this lengthy article, Ponomaryeva provides example after example to show that the deterioration of the Russian army reflects the influx of soldiers fighting in Ukraine for financial gain or because the government deceived them (The Insider, May 22 [Russian version], [English version]). Rising rates of alcoholism, corruption, and brutality are widespread (Versatka, January 30, February 23, 2024; Kholod, November 12, 2024; Vazhnie Istorii, May 26). Both in the ranks and among commanders, abuse of power and senseless violence against Ukrainians and fellow Russians alike are common. Desertion and suicide among Russian troops continue to rise (Okno, May 21). These factors have created an environment in which criminal attitudes and hostility to authority are growing, leading an increasing number of Russian analysts to predict disaster when those serving in Ukraine return home (Bumaga, March 5).

Observers of the effects of returning veterans from the war against Ukraine are drawing parallels to the role that the return of veterans of the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan—known as Afgantsy (Aфганцы). These soldiers played a large role played in increasing crime in Russia at the end of Soviet times and the beginning of the post-Soviet period. The behavior of Russian troops in Russia’s Kursk oblast, the lack of government effort to treat veterans’ post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and the Putin regime’s hesitancy to punish veterans for domestic crimes are all contributing to the threat that veterans pose to Russian society (see EDM. October 25, 2023, July 29, December 13, 2024, February 25, April 28). The Kremlin both coddles veterans, giving them the sense that they will not be punished for crimes, and represses them, angering growing groups of veterans and creating the potential for anti-regime actions in response (Kommersant, April 16, 2024; Window on Eurasia, September 3, 2024; Mediazona, November 15, 2024).

Not all Russian troops will be affected by their experiences in ways that lead to anti-social or criminal actions. Experts say that only 10 to 15 percent of veterans are likely to commit crimes (Bumaga, March 5). This proportion of the roughly 700,000 returning veterans (approximately 70,000 to 105,000), however, is still a very large number, and many more will probably engage in violence in the home against wives and children. Officials are unlikely to link crime with veterans’ experiences in the war against Ukraine, but this association is undeniable, especially given how difficult reintegration has been for veterans in a context where domestic incomes are stagnating (Radio Svoboda, May 14). The Kremlin ostensibly believes it can suppress any veteran-driven crime. Behind that confidence, however, are fears that returning veterans may engage in more serious political challenges to the Vladimir Putin regime. Some veterans have even already joined regional militias (Window on Eurasia, September 15, 2023, September 27, 2024). Even if only a few veterans are attracted to extremist nationalist militias that could become a real threat, the Kremlin intends to channel most extremist veterans into the “Russian Community,” a far-right organization under Moscow’s control. Still, in nurturing the far-right, there is a chance that the Kremlin is creating a political force that it cannot fully control (see EDM, May 27, 28).

If these veterans join forces with nationalist politicians who want the Kremlin to pursue more expansionist policies, there is a danger that the returning Ukraintsy (Украинцы), as the veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine are beginning to be called, could play an even more noxious role than the Afgantsy did a generation ago (see EDM, January 19, 2024, February 25). Ukraintsy could become a force similar to the Freikorps in post-World War I Germany, which challenged the civilian government by forming alliances with influential elite groups. There was, notably, more concern from Russian officials about returning veterans after 2014 when Putin occupied Ukraine’s Donbass, even though the number of veterans then was much smaller than now (Window on Eurasia, March 12, 2015). Both the threat to the regime posed by veterans and the scale of the Kremlin’s response to a potential threat could shake the foundations of the Russian Federation (Window on Eurasia, April 24).

The longer Putin’s war against Ukraine goes on, the worse shape the Russian military will be in, and the more veterans there will be to pose a threat to Russian society and its rulers. Some Russians think that ending the war quickly is in their best interests lest the Putin regime become even more repressive to cope with the return of veterans (see EDM, January 13). Others favor ending the war to ensure that extremist veterans who may want an even harsher regime than Putin do not take power. One thing is clear: veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine, precisely because of what Putin has done to the Russian military, are going to play a major role in the future of Russia, demanding close attention going forward.