Russia’s Demographic Problems Set Stage for Future Political Challenges

Executive Summary:

• Russia’s demographic decline is accelerating, with the population giving birth to fewer babies during the first quarter of 2025 than at any time in the last two centuries.
• Moscow is alarmed by demographic decline because of the impact of population decline on the economy, military, and national prestige, but demographers say it should focus on falling birth rates.
• The Kremlin is not adequately addressing falling birth rates because effective solutions are costly and because experts predict an uptick in births in the 2030s, as the larger number of women born 10 to 15 years ago enter reproductive age.

Russia’s population has declined for the last seven years as the fertility rate, the number of women of reproductive age, and the immigration rate continue to decrease. According to Russian demographer Aleksey Raksha, Russian women gave birth to fewer than 294,000 babies during the first three months of 2025, the lowest quarterly figure for Russia in 225 years (The Moscow Times, April 11; Tochka, April 25). The current decrease in the fertility rate means that the average age of Russians will decline, resulting in higher mortality rates and an aging, generally smaller population in the coming decades (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, December 22, 2023; see EDM, August 18, 2022, February 6, 2024; URA.ru, April 24).

The seriousness of this combination is only now becoming clear. National fertility rates have fallen to 1.4 children per woman and, in some major cities, 1.0 children per woman. This is far below the estimated fertility rate needed (2.2) to counterbalance the population (see EDM, October 22, 2024; Window on Eurasia, February 2). Low birth rates now mean fewer women will be of childbearing age in the 2040s, and even fewer babies will be born in that decade. Demographers predict that there may be a slight uptick in babies born in the 2030s since there was a birth rate increase between 2007 and 2015 (URA.ru, April 24). Still, a potential increase in the 2030s is unlikely to make a substantive dent in the overall demographic crisis. The Kremlin may consider a limited birth rate increase in the 2030s as enough progress not to warrant substantial policy changes, which would worsen the demographic trend (URA.ru, April 24).  

Russian demographic decline can be traced to World War II, which wiped out a generation and led to falling birth rates approximately every 25 years as each successive and smaller generation gave birth to fewer children. Small intermittent periods of growth since World War II have created a false sense of improvement and resulted in inadequate government response (see EDM, September 13, 2016; Window on Eurasia, April 21, 2024).

The decline in fertility and birth rates in the last few years has led Moscow to begin discussions to address these concerns and implement policy solutions. Kremlin policies to date have been unsuccessful, and demographers and other observers have been increasingly critical of the government’s response (President of Russia, May 7, 2024). Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policy of giving money to mothers has not boosted birth rates to the degree or among the groups he intended (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, updated August 2, 2023). Government attempts to restrict abortion have been ineffective since access varies throughout Russia, and women simply travel to regions where they are available (see EDM, March 13). The most recent policy solution, a program promoting underage pregnancies to boost the birthrate, is deeply unpopular not only with educated groups but also among Putin’s traditional allies (see EDM, April 17).

Raksha believes that Moscow can increase the fertility rate if it devotes more money to women who might not otherwise have multiple children, even as much as 1.5 million rubles ($16,000) per second and third child (Tochka, April 25). Raksha also recommends a state nanny service so women can more easily combine motherhood and careers. Other demographers and social scientists are less optimistic and conclude that more drastic measures are needed to avoid a precipitous decline in the Russian population in the 2040s. They argue that only a wholesale change in the Russian economy that boosts incomes has any chance of causing couples to have more children (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, updated August 2, 2023). There seems to be little chance that Putin will make that his focus, however much concern he may express about Russia’s demographic decline.

Demographers claim that unless the Kremlin commits to rapid economic growth and provides far more benefits to women who have children, predictions of demographic disaster in the 2040s will come to pass (URA.ru, April 24). Some argue that the Kremlin should stop obsessing about birth rates and instead seek to reduce mortality and increase life expectancy. Few expect the Kremlin to take this route, given that increasing life expectancy is more difficult and costly than boosting birth rates (Window on Eurasia, October 25). Other demographers suspect that Moscow does not have a substantive and consistent demographic policy at all. They see the Kremlin’s policy solutions as throwing money at the problem with minimal returns just to have the appearance of addressing the issue to please its political base (Nakanune.ru, December 1, 2023; Window on Eurasia, April 1). Still, a third group of demographers says that the enormous sums Putin talks about investing to overcome demographic problems are designed to fight poverty rather than promote growth (Sovershenno Sekretno, January 20, 2023). All demographers, including Raksha, agree that Russia is entering a crisis that will only worsen if the regime fails to act.

Many Russians share concerns about demographic decline, even if they do not articulate them in the same way. The idea that Putin will solve the demographic crisis through immigration from Central Asia has led to the spread of conspiracy theories about the “replacement” of ethnic Russians by other groups (see EDM, April 30, May 15, October 22, 2024, April 10). These conspiracy theories posit that a reduction in the share of ethnic Russians in the Federation will threaten ethnic Russians’ political control (Window on Eurasia, February 15). If Putin annexes more of Ukraine and the Kremlin adds more non-Russians to the Russian Federation, the current percentage of ethnic Russians in Russia (70 percent) could drop to 60 percent or less (see EDM, January 10, 2023; Window on Eurasia, April 24; Rosstat, accessed April 29). One of the reasons the Soviet Union collapsed and a major reason why many are concerned about such demographic changes now is that in the decades before 1991, the share of ethnic Russians in the Soviet population fell to just over 50 percent in the last Soviet census in 1989 (Russian Presidential Library, 1990; Window on Eurasia, February 23, 2022). Russia’s demographic problems have caused some citizens to consider possible parallels between today and 1991 (Window on Eurasia, February 28, 2024, April 24). More Russians will certainly draw on these parallels if current trends of fewer ethnic Russian births continue and if the Kremlin proves unwilling or unable to implement policies that limit this demographic trajectory. Moscow’s incorporation of annexed Ukrainian territories into Russia will further contribute to the decline of the proportion of ethnic Russians, far below the 80 percent that the Putin regime likes to claim, posing new challenges for the regime’s stability.