Russian Mobilization Falls Short Ahead of Putin’s Summer Offensive

Executive Summary:

• Following Ukraine’s successful “Operation Spiderweb” strike on Russian airfields on June 1, the Kremlin dropped its pretense of seriously pursuing peace talks, ramping up retaliatory strikes in Kyiv, Odesa, and other cities.
• The Kremlin is counting on its summer offensive to achieve Ukrainian capitulation or, at a minimum, favorable conditions for a ceasefire.
• Independent investigations into Russian mobilization contradict Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims that more Russians are willing to fight in Ukraine, as recruitment slowed in the first half of 2025.

Russia continues its barrage of drone strikes on Ukraine. On June 24, Russian forces launched an attack on the city of Dnipro, killing 16 and injuring at least 279 civilians. The strike damaged infrastructure across the city, including educational and medical facilities, administrative buildings, and residences (Ukrainska Pravda, June 24). On the night of June 10, Russia carried out massive strikes on Kyiv and Odesa. In Odesa, the drone struck a maternity hospital, killing at least three people (Ukrinform, June 10). In Kyiv, a drone hit a multi-story building, injuring civilians (Nastoyashee Vremya, June 10). Pro-war Russian Telegram channel “Rybar” claimed the Kyiv strike was “the most large-scale” yet, declaring that it damaged the Ukrainian “military-industrial complex” (Telegram/@rybar, June 10). Rybar claimed that the targets “were large industrial enterprises: the Kyiv tank armor plant and workshops of the Artem plant … the Kyiv ship repair plant and other industrial zones in many areas of the city,” as well as infrastructure in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Borispol (Telegram/@rybar, June 10).

Preceding these attacks, on June 1, Ukraine conducted a large-scale strike called “Operation Spiderweb” on Russian air bases. U.S. experts estimated that this drone attack hit up to 20 Russian military aircraft, destroying 10 (Reuters, June 5; Ukrainska Pravda, June 7). Reports indicate that Moscow will likely require years to replace the damaged aircraft, and German military specialists estimate that “Operation Spiderweb” has damaged around 10 percent of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet (Reuters, June 7). In response, the Kremlin threatened retaliatory strikes while continuing its nightly shelling of Ukrainian cities and ramping up its summer offensive in eastern Ukraine (see EDM, June 9).

The success of Russia’s June 10 strikes was celebrated by analysts at the Russian business newspaper “Vzglyad,” who noted that “Russian forces have entered the Dnipropetrovsk region.” They admit that the Russian military has “occupied only one small forest belt adjacent to a series of ponds west of Orekhova,” which has no strategic or tactical importance. Analysts at Vzglyad hope that Russia’s occupation of the small portion of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast will serve as a foothold for further advancement of the Russian front (Vzglyad, June 9).

Pyotr Akopov from Kremlin-owned “RIA Novosti” believes that at this rate, Russia’s summer offensive will force Ukraine to accept the terms of the “Medinskiy Memorandum,” which would end the war on Putin’s terms and calcify Kremlin control over Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory (Regnum.ru, June 3).

Russia has markedly increased the tempo of its summer offensive to achieve Ukrainian capitulation in its war of attrition. The Russian offensive is taking place amid geopolitical challenges for Ukraine, which include the imminent exhaustion of U.S. arms assistance, U.S. President Donald Trump’s apparent reluctance to exert additional economic pressure on the Kremlin, and the expansion of Russian–People’s Republic of China (PRC) military cooperation and drone development (see EDM, December 13, 2024, April 1, May 12, 19, June 4; see China Brief, May 14).

The success of the Russian offensive will depend on whether the Russian side can continue to replace growing casualties and gain the upper hand in the drone war (Re: Russia, June 9). Since Moscow has no shortage of drones from their cooperation with Iran and the PRC, replenishing lost troops will be the greater obstacle to Russian victory in its protracted war against Ukraine (see EDM, June 4).

In May, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a nearly two-fold increase in the number of people willing to go to war in Ukraine (Agenstvo, May 13). Journalists from the independent outlet “Important Stories” checked Putin’s claim based on information about one-time bonus payments to new contract soldiers from regional budgets (Vazhnie Istorii, May 30). According to their assessment, Russia’s military recruitment rate slowed in spring 2025. In the Kemerovo oblast, recruitment in May 2025 was almost half of recruitment in November–December 2024, and fell by about 33 percent in the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic during the same period, with similar reductions throughout Central Russia. Putin’s assertion of 1,800 new contract soldiers per day in the summer of 2025 may be nearly double the actual number (Vazhnie Istorii, May 30).

Increased losses from Russia’s summer offensive and repelling Ukrainian attacks may deplete Russia’s reservoir of manpower. Pro-Kremlin analysts acknowledge that the extended Russian front is vulnerable. Some writers for the outlet Military Review, which has close ties to the Russian Ministry of Defense, fear that the Ukrainian military is preparing an offensive on Crimea (Top War, June 5). Other writers at the radical nationalist “Tsargrad” news outlet claim that Ukraine is preparing for another incursion in the Kursk and Belgorsk oblasts (Tsargrad, June 10).

Russian military leadership seems to share concerns about a Ukrainian offensive in Crimea, hastily constructing concrete hangars for aircraft in the occupied region (Krym Realii, June 10). Similar work is underway in Yeysk, Krimsky, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Adygeya, Kursk, Lipetsk, and other cities. Experts on the Ukrainian military believe that such measures are futile, considering that Ukraine likely has sufficient weaponry to destroy both light hangars and concrete structures designed to protect Russian aircraft in Crimea (Krym Realii, June 10).

Russian pro-war commentators are not pleased with the international situation. Political scientist Dmitriy Suslov, for example, worries that the conflict between Trump and Elon Musk might politically weaken the U.S. president, making it more difficult for Trump to resist Republican party members who demand stronger sanctions against Russia (Top War, June 9).

If Ukraine succeeds in manufacturing enough drones and Russia cannot seriously increase its military recruitment, Moscow’s summer offensive may backfire. Should the summer offensive prove unsuccessful, the Kremlin may be prepared to enter an interim agreement while it regroups. Following peace, Moscow will likely remain an opportunist, ready to renew hostilities should diplomatic and domestic circumstances allow.

Pro-Kremlin political scientist Andrey Pinchuk formulated an ideal pretext for renewing hostilities after a period of peace—Ukraine “breaking” a peace agreement (Tsargrad, May 15). Before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin was actively seeking a more suitable justification for its aggression in line with Putin’s modus operandi. Oleksandr Danylyuk, a former adviser to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense and head of the Center for Defense Reforms, wrote in late January 2022 that Ukraine’s recognition of the pro-Russian puppet regimes in the Donbas would have destabilized the country. Ukrainian recognition of these puppet governments could have given the Kremlin a rhetorical foothold for a broader invasion under the pretext of protecting Russian-speaking peoples in eastern and southern Ukraine (Military Times, January 22, 2022).

The scenario described by Danylyuk did not materialize in the form the Kremlin conceived. It is possible, however, that Moscow will try to implement this plan in the future, pausing the war while searching for an acceptable justification for a new invasion. This possibility is important to consider while weighing how Putin’s present-day conditions for peace may situate Russia to renew hostilities in the future.