The Kremlin Threatens European Countries Could be Oreshnik’s Next Target

Executive Summary:

• Russia has developed a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), Oreshnik, based on its RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). In November 2024, Russian armed forces conducted a combined missile strike on a Ukrainian military-industrial complex facility as a test for the missile.
• The Kremlin coordinated a media operation to amplify Oreshnik’s perceived power aimed at intimidating European nations. Russian leadership hinted at strikes on decision-making centers in Ukraine and Europe, emphasizing its invulnerability to existing air and missile defense systems deployed on NATO’s Eastern Flank and Ukrainian territory.
• With the Kremlin’s plans to deploy Oreshnik in Belarus, the potential of deploying the latest missile defense systems in Ukraine is becoming more relevant to protect Europe.

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the attack on Dnipro city with a new hypersonic missile, Oreshnik (Орешник), on November 21, 2024, was a response to Ukraine’s use of Western long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and Storm Shadow missiles on Russian territory (see EDM, November 21, 2024). Putin framed its development as a reaction to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) hostile stance and the United States undermining the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, including plans to deploy such weapons in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Moscow accused Washington of dismantling global security and pushing for global conflict while simultaneously expressing openness to dialogue (Kremlin.ru, November 21, 2024). According to Putin, targets for further tests of the missile system will be determined based on threats to Russia’s security. If aggressive actions escalate, including plans to use Western military contingents against Russia in Ukraine, Moscow will respond decisively. Following the test, he ordered the mass production of Oreshnik for the Strategic Missile Forces and announced continued development and testing of new intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missiles (IRBM) (Kremlin.ru, November 22, 2024).

The Oreshnik missile demonstration was part of a Kremlin-coordinated propaganda effort to showcase Russia’s military-industrial capabilities in response to Western permission for Ukraine to use long-range weapons. The campaign included social media distribution of strike footage to exaggerate Russian military strength and intimidate Europe (Telegram/moscowtimes_ru, December 3, 2024). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described the missile use as a warning that Russia will not allow the West to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia (RBC, December 6, 2024).

Chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff Valery Gerasimov later admitted in a call with U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Charles Brown that the attack had been planned long before the Biden administration allowed Ukraine to use U.S. missiles against Russian targets (Deutsche Welle, December 5, 2024).

The initial idea to attack Ukraine with an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) originated from former Roscosmos Chief Dmitry Rogozin. In January 2023, he proposed attacking a Ukrainian city using a Soyuz (Союз) space rocket loaded with heavy aerial bombs (FABs). Rogozin discussed the strike with Progress Rocket and Space Center Head Dmitry Baranov, suggesting a launch from Plesetsk (Космодром «Плесецк») instead of Vostochny Cosmodrome (Космодром «Восточный») to allow greater payload capacity. Baranov noted, however, that the supersonic atmospheric reentry of such warheads would cause them to overheat and destroy their explosive material filling (The Moscow Times, October 24, 2023).

Reports after the fact indicate that the United States and Ukraine knew about the launch at least 24 hours in advance due to Russia’s notification in accordance with the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding on Notifications of Missile Launches (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, December 16, 2000; Telegraf.com.ua, November 20, 2024; Interfax, November 25, 2024). The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv issued a warning of a possible significant air attack (U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, November 20, 2024). The notifications intend to decrease the risks of nuclear war since the early warning radar systems cannot identify the type of warhead, and the potential enemy may not know that the launched intercontinental missile does not carry nuclear warheads and react to a nuclear attack. Russia is still committed to this memorandum despite the Kremlin suspending participation in New START in February 2023 (Interfax, February 21, 2023). Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Moscow notified Washington through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center allegedly 30 minutes before launch, contradicting earlier claims that Russia was not obligated to do so (Kommersant; Pravda.com.ua; TASS, November 21, 2024).

The missile used in the attack on Dnipro was initially identified as an ICBM by the Ukrainian Air Force (Telegram/kpszsu; see EDM, November 21, 2024). Later, Ukraine’s intelligence agency (GUR) specified that it was a Kedr (Кедр) ballistic missile system, an evolution of the RS-26 Rubezh (PC-26 Рубеж) ICBM, intended to replace RS-24 Yars (PC-24 Ярс) ground mobile ICBMs with greater mobility and lower vulnerability. The GUR estimates that Russia has produced up to ten units of the system and can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads (Ukrinform, November 21, 22, 2024).

For the attack on Dnipro, the missile was equipped with six multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), each containing six kinetic submunitions. These projectiles, traveling at over Mach 11, struck their targets using kinetic energy rather than explosives, as traditional warheads would overheat and detonate in the atmosphere. The kinetic impact alone caused significant destruction (Kommersant, November 23, 2024). The capability of Oreshnik at a target area, according to Putin, will be comparable to the use of nuclear weapons (RBC, November 28, 2024).

Putin called Oreshnik an intermediate-range ballistic missile, suggesting a range of 1,000–5,500 kilometers (621–3,417 miles). The missile struck the Yuzhmash Machine-Building Plant in Dnipro, reaching its target about 800 kilometers (497 miles) from the Kapustin Yar launch site where it originated (Reuters, November 28, 2024). In 2013, Russian Strategic Missile Forces had already previously tested ICBMs such as RT-2PM2 Topol-M (РТ-2ПМ2 Тополь-М) and RS-26 Rubezh along similar trajectories to hit targets at 2000 kilometers (1,243 miles) distance, i.e. less-than-ICBM minimum range (3,400 miles), indicating they could perform tasks of missiles banned by the INF Treaty (Militaryrussia.ru, December 12, 2022).

Following the attack, Putin announced the possibility of striking decision-making centers in Kyiv with Oreshnik-type missiles. He asserted that Ukraine lacks the missile defense systems necessary to intercept such weapons and dismissed NATO’s missile defense facilities in Redzikowo, Poland and Deveselu, Romania, as too distant from the launch sites deep in Russian territory. Provocatively, Putin proposed a “high-tech duel of the 21st century,” challenging the West to protect a designated Kyiv facility from an Oreshnik strike (Interfax, December 19, 2024).

Strategic Missile Forces Commander Sergei Karakaev expanded on potential targets, stating that Oreshnik could reach all of Europe (Interfax, November 22, 2024). Other identified targets include energy systems, transport infrastructure, communication hubs, military-industrial facilities, and symbolic or political decision-making centers. Dmitry Trenin, Academic Supervisor of the Institute of HSE World Military Economics Institute, reinforced this view, noting that Oreshnik could play a decisive role in Russia’s deterrence strategy (Profile.ru, December 3, 2024).

Russia’s demonstration of Oreshnik represents a significant escalation in its missile capabilities and strategic messaging, especially on the background of the Kremlin’s plans to deploy Oreshnik in Belarus, reportedly at Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s request (Belta.by, January 26). These developments further increase the relevance of deploying missile defense systems such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Arrow, and Aegis in Ukraine. In this case, these systems could intercept Oreshnik at early trajectory stages before warhead separation, preventing strikes on European targets (Defence-ua.com, January 20).