The Prospects for Sino-Indian Relations During Modi’s Second Term

Introduction

On May 30, Narendra Modi was sworn in for a second term as India’s Prime Minister. Conspicuous by their absence at the inauguration ceremony were Imran Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan; Lobsang Sangay, President of the Central Tibetan Authority (CTA), more commonly known as the Tibetan government-in-exile; and Tien Chung-Kwang, Taiwan’s trade representative to India. While Khan was not invited on account of the serious deterioration in India-Pakistan relations since early this year, the absence of Sangay and Tien can be attributed to the Modi government adopting a more cautious approach to China in its second term. Modi’s administration seems keen to avoid needling the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially at a time when Sino-Indian relations are improving (Deccan Herald, May 29). This caution on the part of India notwithstanding, Sino-Indian relations during Modi’s second term (scheduled to run through May 2024) are unlikely to be tension-free.

The “Tibet Card” in Sino-Indian Relations

When Modi began his first term as prime minister in May 2014, both New Delhi and Beijing were optimistic about the prospects for improved bilateral relations. The PRC’s good relations with Modi when he served as chief minister of the western Indian state of Gujarat were expected to give it a head-start over other countries in establishing ties with Modi’s new national government (Business Standard, May 30, 2014). Chinese analysts predicted that Modi’s economic policies would not only bring a “myriad of opportunities for Chinese enterprises,” but that they would also “further propel the China-India relationship” (Global Times, May 19, 2014).

While Sino-Indian economic co-operation did indeed expand during Modi’s first term, relations in general were rather uneven. It got off to a bad start at Modi’s inaugural. Not only were Sangay and Tien special invitees to the event, but the CTA President was treated almost on par with the visiting South Asian heads of state. This drew a sharp reaction from Beijing. Moreover, the Modi government persisted in playing the “Tibet card” over the next three years in a bid to exert leverage over China (China Brief, May 31, 2018).

In December 2014, for instance, the Dalai Lama was a guest along with other Nobel Laureates at the Presidential Palace in New Delhi; and in March 2017, he visited Tawang, an important site of contention in the Sino-Indian border dispute and a place of religious, historical and political significance for Tibetan Buddhists. Although such visits by the Dalai Lama had happened in the past as well, India under Modi was using the “Tibet card” more frequently and systematically as part of a strategy in its relations with China  (China Brief, May 31, 2018).

Chinese Pressure Levied Against Indian Security Interests

As for China, its insensitivity—if not outright hostility—to India’s security concerns has riled New Delhi. Beijing refrained from supporting India in international forums, especially on issues involving Pakistan. It long blocked India’s efforts to get the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to list the Pakistan-backed, anti-India Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Masood Azhar as a global terrorist (China Brief, April 9). It also stood in the way of India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (Deccan Herald, August 13, 2016).

The PRC has also applied military pressure to gain leverage over India. Soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border between the two countries, frequently during Modi’s first term. Such intrusions across the LAC rose from 271 in 2016, to 416 in 2017 (Indian Express, January 19, 2018). In mid-2017, China intensified pressure on India by constructing a road into the Doklam Plateau in western Bhutan, which had serious implications for India’s security. This was the worst crisis in Sino-Indian relations since the 1962 war: it culminated in India and China amassing their troops in the area for 73 days, vitiating a relationship that was already strained and putting the two countries on the brink of war.

Improving Relations Since Early 2018

After the crisis of 2017, Sino-Indian relations began improving in early 2018.  With Modi and Xi needing to focus on, respectively, approaching elections and a trade war with the United States, another Sino-Indian military stand-off needed to be averted (The Wire, June 15). Several high-level visits were exchanged culminating in the April 27-28 “informal summit” between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Modi at Wuhan in China. The two leaders agreed at this meeting to provide “strategic guidance” to their respective militaries to improve communication, implement various confidence building measures, and strengthen existing institutional mechanisms to prevent tensions escalating in the border areas (MEA, April 28, 2018).

In the run-up to the Wuhan summit, the two sides also began acting on issues of sensitivity to the other. Thus, India stopped needling China on the Tibet issue: it clamped down on the Tibetan exile community’s plans to mark the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile in India through a series of high-profile public events, and even informed the Chinese government of the steps it had taken in this regard. Simultaneously, China lifted its objections to Pakistan’s inclusion in a “grey list” of the Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental money laundering and terror funding watchdog (China Brief, May 31, 2018).  On May 1, 2019 the PRC lifted its “technical hold” on the UNSC’s inclusion of Azhar in its sanctions list (Hindustan Times, May 2).

Opportunities Await for Closer Sino-Indian Relations

It is likely that the Modi government’s experience of the past five years of dealing with the PRC prompted it to not invite Tibetan or Taiwanese officials to the inaugural of its second term. Thus, its diplomacy towards China has begun on a positive note; whether this lasts, or is reciprocated by China on issues of concern to India, remains to be seen. There are opportunities for India and China to work together. U.S. President Donald Trump’s all-out trade war with China and tariff disputes with India could prompt Beijing and New Delhi to collaborate more closely on trade policy (Economic Times, January 10).

India and China are also currently in a situation that bodes well for settlement of their border dispute.  A growing number of analysts in both countries hold the view that it is time to settle the border dispute. Furthermore, with Sino-American relations under severe strain, China’s leaders are reportedly waking up to the importance of stable and cordial relations with India. They recognize that this will not be possible without resolving the border dispute (Sunday Guardian, May 18, 2019). Importantly, the “broad contours” of a Sino-Indian border agreement have reportedly “been worked out” in the course of 21 rounds of talks between special representatives of the two countries. An agreement is possible but requires the political leadership in the two countries to make the final call (The Hindu, April 30, 2018).

Both countries have powerful leaders at the helm. With the two two-term restriction on the Chinese presidency (and the parallel customary limit on terms for the general secretary post of the Chinese Communist Party) removed in 2017, Xi could be in office for life as the most powerful Chinese leader since Chairman Mao. As for Modi, he has returned to power with a larger mandate. Both leaders are in a position to make bold moves on the foreign policy front. They are at the height of their power and do not have to fear serious domestic repercussions. They have the political space to sign a final border settlement agreement, and the prospects for resolution of the decades-old border dispute have therefore never been more promising.

The Likelihood of the Status Quo Regarding the Border Dispute

However, a border agreement will require compromise, and both countries will need to give up some territory to which they lay claim. Giving up territory to China is unlikely to go down well with hardliners among Modi’s support base of fervent nationalists: Will Modi be willing to take on the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the ideological fount of his Bharatiya Janata Party, which takes uncompromising and hawkish positions on issues related to China and Pakistan? [1]

A Sino-Indian border agreement will reduce the chances of a war between the two countries. It would ease Chinese military pressure on India, which at present needs to plan and prepare for a two-front war in the event of a confrontation with either Pakistan or China, given that the latter two countries are allies. China has often stepped up military pressure on India along the disputed border when New Delhi plays the “Tibet card,” and an unsettled border keeps India vulnerable to such pressure. Is China ready to give up that capacity to pressure India, especially when Tibet remains a sensitive issue for Beijing?

India did not ruffle Beijing’s feathers by inviting the CTA President to Modi’s second inauguration, but it could still use the “Tibet card” in the future—especially in the event of the 84-year old Dalai Lama’s passing. Post-Dalai Lama, the exile community in India could turn militant, and unrest in ethnic Tibetan regions is likely. At a time when China is apprehensive over the Dalai Lama’s succession, and concerned about how the 100,000-strong Tibetan exile community in India would respond to its appointee, China is unlikely to give up its capacity to pressure India along the disputed border. It is therefore likely that the status quo will be maintained in regards to the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Persistent Differences

Given Beijing’s unease with India’s growing stature in the global arena, it can be expected to continue opposing India’s entry into the NSG, and its ambitions of becoming a veto-wielding member of the Security Council. Indeed, just weeks after India—in deference to Chinese sensitivities on Tibet—avoided inviting the CTA President to Modi’s swearing-in, Beijing blocked India’s entry into the NSG once again (The Wire, June 22). The PRC can also be expected to step up its role in India’s neighborhood. Bhutan, in particular, will come under Chinese pressure to establish official diplomatic and economic relations (China Brief, April 20, 2017).  China’s challenge to India’s regional dominance will grow as the Belt and Road Initiative makes deeper inroads to the region, and India will continue to resist this growing Chinese influence.

Sino-Indian relations can be expected to fray further over China’s mounting strategic cooperation with Pakistan, and India’s growing proximity to the United States. India’s response to U.S. pressure to ban Chinese company Huawei’s 5G network is being closely watched by Beijing. To address India’s security concerns, Huawei has offered India a “no back door” pact (The Mint, June 25). Rejection of Huawei’s 5G network would almost certainly negatively impact India’s relations with Beijing.

Conclusions

Sino-Indian relations during Modi’s second term as prime minister have begun well, with the Modi government deciding to avoid riling Beijing on the Tibet issue. With strong leaders at the helm in India and China, prospects for an agreement on the decades-old Sino-Indian border dispute have opened up.  However, old contentious issues and challenges continue to litter the road ahead. China’s insecurities over Tibet and the succession of the Dalai Lama are mounting—and will peak in the event of the current Dalai Lama’s demise, which will likely spark unrest in Tibet and among the exile community in India. These factors, and reservations over India’s ultimate intentions in its growing closeness to the United States, could deepen China’s suspicions of India. Relations between the two states appear to be improving, but many points of contention could still roil Sino-Indian relations as Modi’s second term in office unfolds.

Dr. Sudha Ramachandran is an independent researcher and journalist based in Bengaluru, India. She has written extensively on South Asian peace and conflict, political and security issues for The Diplomat, Asia Times and the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor.

Notes

[1] Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is a mass-membership, Hindu identity and Indian nationalist civic organization. PM Modi’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party grew out of the RSS movement.