The Three Pillars Underpinning the 2027 Centennial Military Building Goal

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Screenshot from a 2022 CCTV report on the Centennial Military Building Goal. (Source: CCTV)

Executive Summary:

  • Chinese analysts see achievement of the 2027 Centennial Military Building Goal as being based on advances in three key dimensions: military modernization, military readiness, and anti-corruption work.
  • Western analysts frequently link the 2027 Goal to readiness—if not a deadline—for a Taiwan scenario.
  • Chinese sources rarely link the 2027 Goal explicitly to reunification with Taiwan, but a 2023 article by the vice president of the Academy of Military Sciences that does so suggests a shift in public discourse.
  • Internal governance, which includes anti-corruption work, has been linked to military readiness more frequently since 2022, with sources portraying it as integral to achieving the 2027 Goal.

Near the end of an article published in August in the PLA Daily that reflected on the legacies of the Second World War, the author looks ahead to the future. Highlighting the importance of Five-Year Plans in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the author ties the upcoming 15th plan to the “2027 Centennial Military Building Goal” (the “2027 Goal”; 建军一百年奋斗目标). This goal, according to a soldier interviewed for the piece, “is right in front of our eyes” (近在眼前) (PLA Daily, August 11).

The “2027 Goal” was first framed in the 14th Five-Year Plan as an effort to accelerate military development, improve force readiness, and enhance deterrence capabilities in time for the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Xinhua, November 3, 2020). Subsequent Chinese sources suggest that there are three key dimensions to the 2027 Goal. Of these, two—military readiness and anti-corruption work—are seen as essential to progress in the ultimate dimension: military modernization.

Broad consensus exists between Chinese and Western analysts that the PLA seeks to modernize its military through advancing structural reforms, technological innovation, and joint operational capabilities. Divergence persists, however, over PLA readiness. There is less disagreement over the third dimension, anti-corruption work, but only because it has received so little attention in the West, despite official discourse in the PRC increasingly framing corruption as a structural obstacle to modernization and combat readiness, and thus to the 2027 Goal.

Divergent Chinese and Western perspectives on the three interrelated dimensions of the 2027 Goal reflect different views on threat perceptions, strategic priorities, and what constitutes military strength. Clarifying these differences can lead to more accurate assessments of what PRC officials mean when they discuss this goal.

Military Modernization

The CCP first introduced military modernization as part of the 2027 Goal in October 2020 during the 5th Plenum of the 19th Central Committee (Xinhua, November 3, 2020). This represented a departure from previous plans, which had pegged key modernization goals to 2035 (achieving full modernization) and 2049 (reaching world-class military status). In March 2021, during an annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping reaffirmed that the 2020, 2035, and 2049 three-step arrangement remained intact, but said that the 2027 Goal was considered a necessary additional step to ensure military development (Xinhua, March 11, 2021).

Western scholars broadly agree that military modernization is the core of the PLA’s 2027 Centennial Goal. For instance, Timothy R. Heath views the goal as an effort to accelerate reform of informatized and intelligentized warfare capabilities (Rand, January 27). The dissolution in 2024 of the Strategic Support Force and the established a new Information Support Force (ISF) is part of this process. This reorganization, which was intended to centralize key battlefield information capabilities and enhance the PLA’s ability to conduct integrated joint operations, are also internally regarded as steps to fulfill the PLA’s 2027 modernization goal (China Brief, April 26, 2024 [A], [B]). Other analysts similarly view 2027 as a transitional milestone in the PLA’s modernization trajectory. John Culver has emphasized readiness through improvements in command systems, weapons, and logistics; Gokireddy H. Bindu and Amrita Jash have underlined the role of military-civil fusion in driving modernization under the 2027 Goal; and Kyle Amonson and Dane Egli have interpreted modernization as a necessary precondition for a potential military campaign against Taiwan, with 2027 marking a capability threshold (Amonson, Kyle & Dane Egli, April 24, 2023; Gokireddy H. Bindu and Amrita Jash, 2024; Lowy Institute, February 12). [1] Despite variations in emphasis, these sources converge on the view that military modernization, whether for deterrence, reform, or potential conflict—is the unifying element of the 2027 goal.

Military Readiness

Military readiness is a key dimension of the 2027 Goal, but there is little consensus over what the precise object of that readiness is. CCP statements stress that achieving the 2027 Goal will strengthen the PRC’s ability to safeguard its sovereignty and national security, though they avoid directly linking modernization reforms to Taiwan policy (Qiushi, July 31, 2024). While the U.S. Department of Defense’s China Military Power Reports highlight 2027 as a critical benchmark for PLA modernization, the Chinese military sources cited in the report also do not explicitly establish a direct link between the 2027 Goal and a Taiwan contingency. Rather, they suggest that the capability developed through modernization reforms could compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table (CSIS, December 21, 2021; U.S. Department of Defense, December 18, 2024). Some additional writings by Chinese academics, think-tank scholars, and current and former military officials that discuss a timeline for actions over Taiwan often refer to scenarios far later than 2027 (China Brief, June 21).

Western analysts remain split on whether readiness refers to a potential Taiwan contingency. Admiral Philip Davidson, a former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, testified before Congress in 2021 that the threat from the PRC could manifest “in the next six years.” Although he did not explicitly mention 2027, his remarks have often been interpreted as aligning with concerns about a potential Taiwan contingency around the centennial military goal timeline (U.S. Naval Institute, March 9, 2021). Other Western analysts and U.S. military officials have frequently framed the 2027 Goal in this way, too. Another group of scholars have questioned these claims, arguing instead that 2027 is a military modernization milestone rather than a Taiwan unification deadline. In 2021, Brian Hart, Bonnie Glaser, and Matthew P. Funaiole argued that 2027 is primarily a symbolic centennial goal, aligning with the CCP’s broader military roadmap (China Brief, March 26, 2021). Heath, meanwhile, has suggested that the PLA’s modernization remains focused on CCP regime stability rather than preparing for war, pointing to institutional inefficiencies and untested combat readiness as major obstacles to a large-scale military operation (Rand, January 27).

Several factors may explain why Chinese leaders view accelerated preparations for Taiwan contingencies as necessary by 2027 (Ryan Hass, Stronger: Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence, 2021; Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China, 2022). Militarily, Chinese strategists may believe that the PLA has a window of opportunity in the second half of the current decade. This is based on assessments of its relative advantage over Taiwan’s military and on a likely U.S. response prior to the deployment of new technologies or alliance shifts that could shift the military balance in the region. Economically, the CCP faces slow economic growth, rising debt, and global supply chain risks in high-tech sectors where Taiwan’s semiconductor industry plays a critical role. Domestically, Xi may seek to strengthen his political legitimacy by promoting the goal of “national rejuvenation” (中华民族伟大复兴). This is particularly important as Xi enters his third term in office, as he has suggested that political disagreements between the two sides “cannot be passed on from generation to generation” (总不能一代一代传下去) (MFA, January 2, 2019; Matt Pottinger, The Boiling Moat: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan, 2024).

A 2023 Chinese article could represent an important intervention in this debate. Written by He Lei (何雷), a Lieutenant General (中将) and Vice President of the Academy of Military Sciences, and titled “Ensure the On-Schedule Realization of the Centennial Military Goal, Strive to Create a New Situation in National Defense and Military Modernization” (确保如期实现建军一百年奋斗目标，奋力开创国防和军队现代化新局面), the article is one of the first semi-official Chinese military publications to explicitly link the 2027 Goal to reunification with Taiwan. This marks a notable shift in the PRC’s public strategic discourse (Military Science, 2023).

He links the 2027 Goal to the fulfillment of “four strategic pillars” (四个战略支撑) entrusted to the military in the new era. These include: (1) safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity (捍卫国家主权、安全和领土完整); (2) achieving national unification (着实现祖国完全统一), particularly regarding Taiwan; (3) protecting the PRC’s expanding overseas interests (维护国家海外利益); and (4) maintaining regional and global peace and stability (维护地区和世界和平稳定). He argues that the PLA must achieve the 2027 goal as scheduled in order to possess the capabilities required to carry out these strategic missions under increasingly complex security conditions. In recent years, according to He, “‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces” (‘台独’分裂势力), emboldened and supported by “anti-PRC elements in the United States and the West” (美西方反华势力), have intensified activities that threaten peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and undermine the prospects for peaceful unification. Citing Xi Jinping’s report to the 20th Party Congress, He emphasizes that resolving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is the CCP’s unwavering historical mission, the shared aspiration of all Chinese people, and an essential requirement for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

By linking the 2027 Goal to Taiwan, He indirectly validates Western concerns that the PRC’s military buildup is at least partially driven by Taiwan-related capabilities. His acknowledgment signals that the PLA sees Taiwan as a major factor in its force development priorities, even if he does not explicitly call 2027 a deadline for military action. Although Taiwan has long been identified as the PLA’s “primary strategic direction” (主要战略方向), the association of the 2027 Goal with achieving national reunification is a new rhetorical development. Previous PRC statements tended to frame military modernization and Taiwan contingencies separately, whereas He Lei’s 2023 articulation marks a clearer integration of the two objectives within the PLA’s modernization agenda.

Anti-corruption

Prior to 2022, anti-corruption efforts within the PLA were largely framed as political initiatives aimed at restoring Party control over the military rather than as measures directly linked to combat effectiveness. For instance, the chapter of the 14th Five-Year Plan devoted to the 2027 goals made no mention of anti-corruption. In his report to the 20th Party Congress, however, Xi explicitly linked the two. Xi called for strict Party governance (全面从严治党) and urged the military to persist in rectifying conduct, enforcing discipline, and combating corruption (正风肃纪反腐). His speech was later published in Qiushi, the official theoretical and policy journal of the CCP, underscoring its enduring relevance (Xinhua, October 16, 2022; Qiushi, July 31, 2024).

By mid-to-late 2023, an intensifying emphasis on combat readiness (备战打仗) was causing a discursive shift. Suddenly, corruption began to be portrayed as a structural threat to the PLA’s modernization and operational effectiveness. By 2024, this linkage was further cemented in official discourse. To establish absolute Party control over the PLA, Xi Jinping has implemented anti-corruption measures such as institutionalizing political rectification campaigns, strengthening oversight of senior officers, reinforcing ideological discipline across units, and strengthening joint civil-military auditing systems (Ji You, China’s Military Transformation: Politics and War Preparation, 2016). [2] These measures aim to curb corruption and to enhance the PLA’s internal cohesion, reliability, and warfighting capability. More recently, media has defined anti-corruption as both an “offensive” and a “protracted” campaign (攻坚战持久战) that is essential to achieving the 2027 Goal (PLA Daily, January 1, 2024).

Conclusion

PRC writings on the 2027 Centennial Military Building Goal differ from Western perspectives on their analyses of the goal’s structural priorities. The latter tend to adopt an externalist lens, emphasizing deterrence, regional power projection, and the prospect of military action over Taiwan. This frequently leads to interpreting 2027 as a benchmark for PRC readiness to challenge U.S. dominance and, if necessary, forcibly resolve the Taiwan issue. PRC discourse, by contrast, embeds the 2027 goal within a framework of political control, institutional reform, and ideological loyalty. Modernization and preparedness remain central, but internal governance, particularly anti-corruption and Party discipline, is increasingly framed as indispensable to military effectiveness. Corruption is portrayed not just as a moral failing but as a systemic risk to cohesion and combat performance, making political purification and loyalty enforcement vital for ensuring the PLA’s reliability in high-pressure scenarios.

These discursive differences reflect fundamentally different assumptions about military strength. Unlike the West, which generally measures strength in terms of in capabilities and intentions, the PRC also emphasizes political reliability and ideological purity. Some PRC sources, especially starting around 2023, explicitly link the 2027 Goal to Taiwan, underscoring how unification has become more central to PLA planning. At the same time, the anti-corruption campaign—still underexplored in Western accounts—has been recast within the PRC as a core condition for modernization and warfighting readiness. A fuller understanding of the 2027 Goal therefore must include a balanced assessment, recognizing how both external capabilities and internal governance together shape the PLA’s transformation by 2027.

Notes

[1] Bindu, Gokireddy H. & Amrita Jash. “China’s Shift from CMI to MCF: Military Modernization and the Defense Industry at the Core.” Issues & Studies. Vol. 60, No. 3 (2024); Amonson, Kyle & Dane Egli. “The Ambitious Dragon: Beijing’s Calculus for Invading Taiwan by 2030.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs Vol. 6, No. 3 (2023): 37–53.

[2] You, Ji. China’s Military Transformation: Politics and War Preparation. Polity, 2016.