Ukraine’s Kursk Operation Demonstrates Russia’s Dysfunctional Authoritarianism

Executive Summary:

• The Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast has highlighted the Kremlin’s lack of preparation for Ukrainian military advancements into Russian territory through its repositioning of troops and reliance on new conscripts.
• Moscow’s dysfunctional authoritarianism, demonstrated by Russian officials’ lack of action in fear of retaliation, creates a lack of bottom-level initiative and complicated bureaucracy focused on gaining approval from the Kremlin.
• The Russian people’s indifference to developments on the front is a product of the Kremlin’s propaganda efforts to control the narrative, leading to growing societal reluctance to support and join the war effort.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces’ operation in Russia’s Kursk oblast began only nine days ago but has already revealed the disorganized state of Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian regime and its armed forces (The Moscow Times, August 14). Russia appears to be relying on conscripts and troops from less critical areas to combat Ukraine’s incursion, demonstrating how unprepared Moscow was for this advancement. Despite official statements made over the past several months, the Russian Armed Forces face a severe lack of manpower, which will force the Kremlin to use drafted soldiers in the war or conduct another wave of mobilization that could begin targeting Russian city centers (see EDM, September 28, 2023). Additionally, independent journalists report that the Kremlin and Russian General Staff ignored reports about the possibility of Ukraine crossing the border (Istories.media, August 8; see EDM, August 14). Russia’s political institutions remain dysfunctional, as they have been since the Wagner Group mutiny in June 2023 (see EDM, July 7, 2023). Seemingly no one within the Russian state is willing to execute their duties without direct orders from above, and no one seems willing to take responsibility for making decisions for fear of retaliation, should those decisions go against the Kremlin’s wishes (Ukrainska Pravda, August 13).

Russian society has been largely indifferent to the developments in Kursk. The Kremlin is trying to control the narrative about what is happening to curb any domestic discontent at its mismanagement of the defense of this border region, keeping the Russian population ignorant about the seriousness of the situation (T.me/svobodnieslova, August 8).

Dysfunctional Authoritarianism

Russia’s system of governance has demonstrated once again that its civilian officials and military and security officers do not execute their duties and do not take any initiative without orders from above. The same inaction took place during the Wagner mutiny in June 2023 and during the terrorist attack near Moscow in March 2024 (see EDM, March 26, 28). In response to these issues, the cumbersome Russian government institutions created commissions and emergency headquarters, delegated decision-making responsibility from the bottom up, and suffered from insufficient interagency communication and lack of information (see EDM, January 18).

During the first days of Ukraine’s offensive into Kursk oblast, the Kremlin lacked information on the severity of the situation and underestimated the significance of the combat threat. This was evident in how Putin did not cancel his ceremonial participation in launching a new infectious disease hospital in Perm, a new school in Nizhniy Novgorod, and a new nursery school in Simferopol in occupied Crimea. The Kursk regional government could not do anything by itself without support from the Kremlin. The federal deputy ministers and Putin’s aide Alexei Dyumin tried to coordinate the movement of civilian authorities on the ground. Several days later, the federal ministers and vice premiers replaced their deputies as coordinators. In addition, Sergei Kirienko, first deputy head of the Presidential Executive Office, became involved in the operations at the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant to evaluate its construction and the current situation in the region (Kremlin.ru, August 7, 8, 12; Interfax, August 15).

The final crisis-management system created took the form of a “double triumvirate.” The first “triumvirate” consists of the Ministry of Defense (MoD); the Federal Security Service (FSB), together with its border troops; and Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) units. With the support of FSB border troops, the MoD is responsible for the combat activity against Ukrainian forces. The FSB is responsible for the counter-insurgency activity behind the frontlines, and Rosgvardia is responsible for protecting critical infrastructure and regional civil authorities. The second “triumvirate” consists of Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff; Alexander Bortnikov, head of FSB and the national anti-terrorist committee; and Dyumin, who likely manages inter-agency contradictions. This system appears to leave no significant room for the commander of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev, or for the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Colonel General Alexander Lapin, who also commands Russian troops in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region (Kremlin.ru, August 7, 9, 12; TASS; RTVI, August 13).

The entire structure resembles a sophisticated authoritarian “checks-and-balances” system. The absence of political trust, however, creates a lack of bottom-level initiative, permanent needs for commissions, endless meetings, and delegating the decision-making process and coordination directly to the Kremlin. Only such emergency activity allows Russian leadership to consolidate political power in Russia, providing them with motivation and the necessity to conduct their affairs efficiently.

Lack of Manpower

The significant number of drafted soldiers who found themselves on the frontlines and in the role of prisoners of war clearly demonstrates that the Russian Armed Forces have a serious manpower deficit. Those 700,000 Russian troops Putin mentioned two months ago simply do not exist, and the actual number of combat-capable forces would be much lower at this point than those reported (see EDM, June 13; Kremlin.ru, June 14; Istories.media, August 14; Svoboda.org, August 14). Additionally, forces from less critical fronts have been transferred to Kursk oblast (The Kyiv Independent, August 14).

As a result, the Kremlin will have to make tough decisions on how to at least partially restore its manpower in the coming months. Moscow will likely either use the available mass of drafted soldiers in the combat and/or combat support operations or conduct another wave of mass mobilization. Even today, there is evidence that drafted soldiers are being forced to sign contracts and consequently join the Russian troops in Kursk oblast as contracted soldiers (see EDM, August 7; RTVI, August 9; Verstka.media; Chita.ru, August 13; Agents.media, August 14).

Indifference of Russian Population

Despite the severity of the situation, Russian society prefers not to acknowledge the updated reality of the war (see EDM, April 1). There is no evidence of a “rallying around the flag,” significant empathy for the people in Kursk oblast, or a growing number of those who would like to join the Russian army. Most Russians just do not care as they have other issues to worry about in their everyday lives, such as the deteriorating economy (see EDM, July 10). If Russians do not care about Kursk or other Russian regions on the border with Ukraine, they will hardly care about Donetsk, Luhansk, Crimea, and other occupied territories. The presumptions that Russian society will never accept a withdrawal from Crimea and that the Kremlin will need significant territorial concessions from Ukraine and the West for the war to end could be considered inaccurate.

On the one hand, the absence of societal pressure allows the Kremlin to do what it wants. On the other hand, the Russian leadership needs the people’s active support for its combat and political efforts, as it is consistently losing manpower in Ukraine and is in dire need of more soldiers. The absence of such support makes Russia’s political situation less predictable for the Kremlin and limits Moscow’s capabilities, as it does not have enough information to gauge how the Russian population will react.

Ukraine’s Kursk operation has exposed critical vulnerabilities within Russia’s authoritarian regime and military apparatus. The lack of preparedness and the reliance on conscripts from less critical areas highlight the systemic inefficiencies and the growing manpower crisis facing the Russian Armed Forces. Disorganization and lack of initiative within the Russian government raise questions about the long-term sustainability of its political and military strategies. As the situation in Kursk unfolds, Ukraine’s offensive serves as a stark reminder of the fragility of the Kremlin’s authoritarian model, in which both the leadership and Russian society appear increasingly detached from the war’s realities.