Weakened Islamic State Eyes Resurgence in Libya

• Islamic State’s Libyan network remains degraded but resilient, sustained by integration with transnational smuggling and financial networks in the country’s south and links to instability in Sudan and the Sahel.
• Political and militia fragmentation in Tripoli and Haftar’s dynastic consolidation in the east are deepening Libya’s governance vacuum—conditions that could enable jihadist regrouping.
• Recent IS arrests and renewed propaganda underscore Libya’s enduring role as a logistical and ideological hub, making coordinated border control and intelligence sharing with Sahelian and Mediterranean partners an urgent counterterrorism priority.

Militia infighting has plagued Libya’s sense of security. Since early 2025, the nominally temporary Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity (GNU), Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, has been attempting to consolidate his power. After the killing of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli (Arabic: عبد الغني الككلي, better known as Ghneiwah, غنيوة), who led the Security Stabilization Apparatus (Arabic: جهاز دعم الاستقرار, SSA), security units and militias loyal to Dbeibah have tried to eliminate Tripoli’s other major militia, the Special Deterrence Force (Arabic: جهاز الردع لمكافحة الارهاب والجريمة المنظمة, RADA). The RADA (also sometimes called the SDF) is a Madkhali militia controlling Mitiga (Arabic: معيتيقة) airport and led by Abdel Raouf Kara (Arabic: عبد الرؤوف الكارة) (Al Jazeera, May 12, 2025) [1].

Against this backdrop, diplomacy is attempting to regain momentum, with several actors involved. On August 21, UN Special Representative Hanna Tetteh presented a roadmap to the UN Security Council aimed at breaking Libya’s political deadlock. Spanning 12–18 months, it seeks to establish an electoral framework, form a unified government, and launch an inclusive dialogue with political elites, youth, women, and civil society (UN News, August 21).

In parallel, General Khalifa Haftar (Arabic: خليفة حفتر) has consolidated his family’s power in eastern Libya. His son, Saddam, was promoted to Deputy General Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), while his brothers, Khaled and Belgacem (Arabic: بلقاسم), assumed senior roles. Observers view Saddam as the likely heir to his father. Days after these announcements, Haftar hosted Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın in Benghazi. The visit highlighted Ankara’s pragmatic engagement with Haftar despite past enmity, signaling Turkey’s intent to maintain influence across Libya’s fractured landscape. Allegedly, Haftar is also planning to visit Turkey (Focus Plus, August 28, Middle East Eye, September 2). Meanwhile, in Rome, Saddam met with Ibrahim Dbeibah, nephew of the GNU Prime Minister, in talks that sought to mediate between rivals, facilitated by the United States and Italy (Agenzia Nova, September 3, X/US_SeniorAdvisorAF, September 9).

The internal infighting in Tripoli to consolidate power, along with Haftar’s concerted attempt to create conditions that would allow his family and inner circle to dominate Libya’s political and security environment, represent the most significant security concerns at present in the country.

Signs of IS Reawakening?

Over the past few years, the immediate terrorist threat in Libya has declined. A decade ago, the Islamic State (IS) was gaining ground across the country, having established itself in Sirte by the end of 2014 and launched attacks in the following months. These attacks targeted critical locations within Libya—such as energy installations—as well as cross-border sites, with IS using Libya as a logistical platform for the attacks carried out in Tunisia (Jeune Afrique, July 1, 2015).

These days, IS in Libya is degraded, but still maintains a presence. In early August, the Libyan Intelligence Service announced the dismantling of three IS-linked cells operating in the country’s south. According to the Service, these IS networks had international connections in Africa and Europe and were involved in recruitment, financing, and logistics.

Three significant cells have been active in Libyan territory. Local media reported that the first cell recruited fighters and transferred them from North Africa to Somalia and the Sahel using forged passports and safehouses. The second cell managed money laundering operations through front companies presented as humanitarian organizations, which were used to support IS members fleeing Syria’s al-Hol (Arabic: الهول) camp and to provide accommodation in Libya. The third cell was described as the most dangerous, handling cross-border financial transfers through cryptocurrency and investments (Al Arabiya, August 2; Libya Review, August 2). The announcement of these arrests followed the discovery of a weapons cache in Sabha (Arabic: سبها), where authorities found mortars, anti-aircraft guns, explosives, and large quantities of ammunition (Libya Review, August 2).

On top of these developments, IS also returned to target Libya rhetorically. In a September 11 editorial in its publication al-Naba (Arabic: النبأ, “The News,” also a surah of the Quran), IS described Libya as a “launching platform” for its comeback, issuing its first explicit call in three years for a renewed jihad there. The group cited Libya’s porous borders and strategic position as gateways to other jihadists across the region, while stressing its international relevance: proximity to southern Europe could threaten “crusader plans,” or at least force Europe to deplete its resources by playing on migration fears (islamway.net, September 13). The recent arrests reveal the presence of individuals tied to IS’s logistics and financial networks who are linked to the Sahel region, while the al-Naba editorial is a sign of IS’s renewed ambition to strengthen its operational profile in Libya.

Libya’s South: A Strategic Crossroads

Developments in Libya point to the continued risks in the country’s south, where a weak state presence and porous borders have allowed armed groups and illicit networks to continue to operate. IS thus maintains a foothold in the south, primarily through the organization’s integration within transnational organized crime networks involved in arms and goods smuggling, as well as the movement of fighters from North Africa to the Sahel.

IS is present throughout Libya, although more of a danger in the south, with links to the Sahel, than in the north. According to the UN, while IS remains active in northeastern Libya, reportedly conducting kidnappings for ransom (including the abduction of traffickers), it is in the southern Fezzan (Arabic: فزان) region, which includes Sabha, where its presence is more consistent (Sahifat al-Shahid al-Libiya, August 20). An estimated 200 to 400 fighters are also reportedly active along the Chad–Niger axis. Meanwhile, IS logistical networks in Fezzan are being used to transport individuals, vehicles, and weapons from Sudan, through Chad, to the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Sada Al-Sahel, March 23, UN Report on Daesh, August 2025).

IS in Libya maintains around 400 fighters in Sudan, where the ongoing war and its consequences are creating opportunities for the organization. In January, IS returned to the topic of Sudan with a message in a publication titled “The Forgotten Sudan!”  (Arabic: !السودان المنسي). In the message, IS called on its members in neighboring countries to re-establish themselves, rebuild their presence, and revitalize the group’s activities within Sudan (Al-Ain Al-Ikhbariya, August 8).

Conclusion

Despite the obvious degradation of its operational capabilities, IS continues to pose a threat in Libya, particularly through its integration with transnational criminal networks to its south. The group’s logistical and financial ties to the Sahel and the exploitation of regional instability—especially in Sudan—have allowed it to sustain a presence and facilitate the movement of fighters, weapons, and money across borders. Recent arrests and intelligence reports confirm the existence of active cells engaged in recruitment, financing, and arms trafficking. Moreover, the al-Naba editorial points at a renewed ambition to strengthen IS’s operational profile in Libya again. As such, Libya remains a critical node in IS’s broader regional strategy, underscoring the need for sustained counterterrorism and border control efforts.

[1] The Madkhali movement (Arabic: المدخلية, from the name of its founding philosopher, Saudi scholar Rabi’ al-Madkhali, ربيع المدخلي) believes in politically quietest Salafism, a form of Islamic puritanism seeking to emulate early Islam, in contrast to other prominent Salafi jihadist movements.