Kremlin Announces Doubling of Funding for Cossack Societies

Executive Summary:

• The Kremlin announced that it will more than double the budget for the All-Russian Cossack Society in 2025 at the beginning of November, indicating plans to expand their roles in Russian society, including activities in occupied Ukrainian territories.
• Cossacks are being integrated into the Russian Armed Forces’ reserve and tasked with defense and administrative roles in occupied territories of Ukraine, emphasizing their importance in Russia’s military and territorial strategies.
• Beyond militarization, the Kremlin is leveraging Cossack traditions and diaspora connections abroad to promote Russian influence, blending historical symbolism with contemporary soft-power strategies.

At the beginning of November, the Russian Presidential Council for Cossack Affairs meeting led by Presidential Aide Dmitry Mironov announced that the federal budget for the All-Russian Cossack Society (VsKO) will “more than double” in 2025. The Russian Federation’s Deputy Chief of Staff Dennis Molchanov revealed, “In 2025 [the budget will increase] to 28.3 million rubles [approximately $280,000] and in 2026–2027 to 37.8 million [approximately $374,000] rubles annually” (Kazachestvo.ru, November 1). Additionally, the establishment of new Cossack societies in the occupied Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, where two Cossack villages have already been entered into the register, was announced (Kazachetvo.ru, November 2). While some of the budget increases can presumably be accounted for by the new responsibilities society will hold in the occupied territories, such a sizeable increase suggests an expansion of planned future activities for the Cossack army at both the domestic and foreign levels.

Undoubtedly, the Kremlin is planning to expand the Cossacks’ role in the “newly liberated territories” of Ukraine. The so-called “liberation” has witnessed a rebirth of the strong, “loyal” Zaporizhzhian Cossacks (see EDM, October 9). The integration of society in the occupied territories with the Russian Cossack movement has been managed by the Presidential Council for Cossack Affairs and the Staff of the VsKO alongside the Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs. Moreover, to establish these Cossack societies in the occupied territories, they coordinate with regional governments to ensure a smooth transition (KP.ru, September 14). Such moves were followed by a Cossack circle gathering (the traditional meeting format of the Cossacks) at the village of Andriivka in Zaporizhzhia oblast to vote on a proposal for the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks to officially enter the Russian Armed Forces (Rossprimavera.ru, November 18). The proposal is characteristic of the Kremlin’s strategy to co-opt or create supposedly independent social organizations to legitimize and strengthen its position and authority in other countries. Similarly, in the past, in Georgia, Russia has used its “borderization” policy to separate regions and change previously established borders to suit the Kremlin’s own interests (see EDM, October 2, 2013, March 6, 2018).

Cossacks look set to play a leading role in Russia’s initiative in Ukraine. During the Presidential Council for Cossack Affairs meeting, Mironov detailed Cossacks’ willingness to serve in the Russian army, documenting that “Cossacks realize their potential within the framework of serving the Fatherland, strengthening its defense potential” (see EDM, September 16, February 8; Kazachestvo.ru, November 2). Mironov further stressed that the Cossacks are going to play a significant role in constituting the Russian Federation’s reserve army, stating, “the all-Russian Cossack society and the Ministry of Defense plan to conclude an agreement about the inclusion of the Cossacks in the mobilizational reserve of the Russian army” (see EDM, May 1; VsKO.ru, November 1). The Kremlin’s actual plans, however, seem even more ambitious. The Cossacks will carry out essential tasks in defense and create new state veterans’ institutions in the army. The Kremlin looks to develop the Cossack economy further and to integrate Cossacks into Russia’s economy while protecting the traditional Cossack lifestyle and values (VsKO.ru, November 1).

While the Kremlin’s use of the Cossacks draws heavily on romanticized historical imagery, this idealized narrative risks clashing with modern realities. The typical and kitsch image of the Cossack is of pastoral and romantic people, in the same way as some of the most ersatz nationalist movements of 19th-century Europe. In other words, it is out of touch with modern existence (see EDM, November 19). Simultaneously, the prominence of the Cossacks on the website of the Russian Ministry of Nationality Affairs and their involvement in promoting interethnic harmony in the country suggests a different and softer use for the Cossacks than just militarization (see EDM, June 26). A seminar in Moscow titled “Russian Cossackdom” was announced to be held at the end of November, within which “a plenary session will be held on the solution of urgent tasks by the executive bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation on interacting with the Russian Cossacks” (FADN, November 14). The dual focus on militarization and cultural preservation could strain the movement’s coherence, as the demands of geopolitical strategy may overshadow the traditional values that form the foundation of Cossack identity.

The upcoming celebrations on the 30th anniversary of the creation of the Central Cossack Army were the subject of an interview with Gennady Sidorin, the first deputy ataman of the Central Cossack Army, on the Kazachestvo portal. Aside from the expected platitudes to the “birth” of the Cossack host in December 1994, Sidorin hinted at another important and unexpected use for Cossack interaction with its diaspora. Cossack populations exist in various countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Greece, who at one time or another left Russia and never returned. Following the Bolshevik revolution, a mass emigration of Cossacks occurred. Sidorin confessed that they are forming connections with Cossack communities located in Russia and abroad (Kazachestvo.ru, November 14). The Kremlin appears to view the Cossacks as a soft-power asset, and efforts to connect with diaspora Cossack communities in Europe indicate an intent to leverage cultural ties to build influence abroad

The recent announcement of increased funding for the Cossacks suggests that the movement will be used further in the “newly liberated” territories, the reserve army, and foreign affairs. Additionally, the expanded role of the Cossacks reflects the Kremlin’s multifaceted use of this historical institution as a tool for military, administrative, and cultural objectives. However, the long-term viability of this strategy will depend on balancing the traditional Cossack identity with the state’s contemporary geopolitical ambitions.