Russia Faces Upsurge in Crime as Veterans Return from Ukraine

Executive Summary:

• Russian officials warn that the increasing crime rates in Russia are likely to continue rising as more soldiers return home from its war against Ukraine, creating a problem worse than when the Soviet veterans returned from Afghanistan in the 1990s.  
• The number of veterans from Russia’s war against Ukraine is far greater than the number of veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war, and many have a criminal past, are better armed, and have expectations that are likely to be dashed.
• In response, the Kremlin will likely increase repression, but it may also decide to keep its military busy with new aggression abroad to avoid the problems the return of veterans would pose at home.

Since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, serious crime has risen in Russia. Last year, for example, violent crime jumped to seven percent, the highest level it had been in more than a decade, with far higher percentages being recorded in regions near Ukraine and in non-Russian republics (The Moscow Times, January 13; Profile.ru, January 16). The Kremlin repeatedly insists that this had nothing to do with the war but reflects other problems—although many have conceded that this might change when the flow of veterans increases at some point in the future (Profile.ru June 1, 2024; Window on Eurasia, September 16, 2024). Russian officials, experts, and foreign observers have challenged the Kremlin’s view from the very beginning (Current Time, April 29, 2023; The Moscow Times, November 19, 2023; see EDM, January 29, 2024). As the possibility of a settlement looms, more have been speaking out. Many warn that the return of Russian veterans will spark a crime wave of unprecedented proportions, far larger than the upsurge that followed the Afgantsy (Афганцы), as Russian veterans of the fighting in Afghanistan were known a generation ago, and possibly even more than following the end of World War II (see EDM, January 19, 2024). Following the Second World War, crime surged and was often combined with ethnic and regional protests, which prompted Stalin to increase his repressive system even more (MK.ru, February 20; The Moscow Times, February 21). 

Such fears and comparisons may seem hyperbolic, but there is growing evidence that crime in Russia has increased since the start of the full-scale invasion and that much of it is being committed by veterans, who are treated lightly by the courts given Putin’s presentation of veterans as the new elite (Verstka, November 18, 2022; see EDM, March 13, 2024; Kavkaz Realii, August 19, 2024; NG.ru, February 20). Following current trends, crime will likely increase further as more veterans return and become a social group vastly larger and better armed than the Afghantsy ever were, especially if what some are already calling the Ukraintsy (Украинцы), Russian veterans of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, come home all at once (Kasparov.ru, January 10, 2023; Window on Eurasia, January 14, 2023, January 14, 2024). The Ukraintsy will find difficulties in obtaining work or fitting into Russian society again after being paid extraordinary sums to fight in Ukraine and use the arms acquired from combat to get what they want (see EDM, November 29, 2022).  

If those expressing fears of a crime wave are right and if that crime wave joins the rise of radical nationalist groups such as the Russian Community; leads to the formation of militias of their own to fight migrants and minorities, as they are already doing; or gets involved with the distribution of illegal drugs or guns, the Kremlin will almost certainly be compelled to take action (Centrasia.org, September 1, 2023; Dovod.online, June 4, 2024; T.me/mozhemobyasnit, July 15, 2024; see EDM, October 15, 2024; Government of Vladimir oblast, accessed February 24). This will probably lead to increased repression not only against those veterans coming back from Ukraine but against Russians in general as well (The Moscow Times, July 24, 2024). In the short term, however, Russia will have problems punishing these groups as the Russian police force has been stripped of men to send them to fight in Ukraine. Many militia offices across Russia have only 80 percent of their slots filled, limiting their ability to fight any surge in crime (Rosbalt.ru, November 29, 2024). Perversely, Moscow has even talked about making it easier for veterans, compared to other Russians, to own guns (Window on Eurasia, November 21, 2023).

Another possible response could include Putin deciding that the best way to limit the threat of such a crime wave is to limit the number of veterans who will return. The easiest way would be to give them new tasks abroad by launching new acts of aggression against other countries. While that may never become the Kremlin leader’s primary reason for taking such a step, the potential that not doing so could present him with problems at home is likely to be something he is very much aware of and will make up part of his calculus.

Especially worrisome already is that, according to Russian clinical psychologists and other specialists who have worked with veterans of the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin has exacerbated the problem. Above all, by paying men so much to fight in that war, Moscow has generated expectations among those men about the future that cannot possibly be met— except by criminal action (Publizist.ru, accessed February 24). Moreover, the regime has promoted ideas of toxic masculinity, which makes it virtually impossible for psychologists to treat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) successfully (Moscow Times, November 5, 2024). According to Russian experts, the Putin regime has even downplayed the existence of PTSD both among men fighting in Ukraine and also among their families at home—what psychologists call “secondary PTSD”—and the latter are increasingly engaged in criminal activity as well (Radio Svoboda, July 11, 2024; Window on Eurasia, September 2, 2024).

Behind all these factors is another that the Kremlin has brought on itself, as far as the future of crime in the Russian Federation is concerned. By recruiting so many convicts to serve in its army and then holding up these veterans as heroes and role models for young people, having them serve as teachers in schools, the Putin regime has deepened the divide between the veterans and the Russian people (see EDM, October 31, November 8, 2023, July 29, 2024). The latter is ever less likely to view the veterans as heroes and are even taking steps to isolate themselves and especially their children from them (Window on Eurasia, September 3, 2024; Gorizontal’naya Rossiya, November 18, 2024). Such attitudes will have the effect of making it even harder for veterans of Putin’s war to reintegrate into Russian society and thus make it more likely that they will seek solace and support from each other. In at least some cases, this means that they will engage in anti-social and criminal activities, thus making the rise of not only individual crimes but organized criminal groups far more likely. Judging from recent studies, this is already happening (Window on Eurasia, July 18, 2024).

Reports will accelerate the process of popular alienation from the veterans. According to the Horizontal Russia portal, which covers developments outside of Moscow, “hundreds” of Russians have become victims of crimes committed by Russian veterans from Ukraine, with many of them severely harmed or even killed, according to court documents (Gorizontal’naya Rossiya, February 24). While relatively few Russians may see this report, far more will hear about these cases given that they are likely being reported in local and regional media. 

Thirty-six years ago, when Mikhail Gorbachev withdrew Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the Afgantsy, who faced some, but hardly all, of these problems, became yet another one of the reasons that the population turned on the Soviet government and the Soviet Union disintegrated. It is uncertain whether the Ukraintsy could play a similar role. One thing, however, is clear. If they do spark the crime wave that many now expect, their actions will cause ever more Russians to ask questions about what the Kremlin has done and not done and their answers are unlikely to be anything but helpful for the stability, or even survival, of the Putin regime.