Outsized Climate Change Will Shape Russian Politics

Executive Summary:

• Russia is warming 2.7 times faster than the global average due to positive feedback loops resulting from Russia’s distinct geography, with alarming consequences for Arctic infrastructure and regional ecosystems.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin have shifted from skepticism about climate change to an official concern, but have failed to effectively implement environmental policy despite pledging carbon neutrality by 2060.
• Regional governments and civil society in areas such as Yakutia, Buryatia, and Tuva are increasingly strained by climate-induced disasters, while local environmental protests are emerging as a potential but suppressed outlet for discontent under Kremlin control.

Climate change increasingly affects Russia’s ecology. During the Tsargrad Institute’s Forum of the Future–2050, Andrey Melnichenko, the chairman of the Committee on Climate Policy and Carbon Regulation of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, said that even though rising temperatures may not appear serious on their own, they “trigger a chain of consequences: droughts, floods, and typhoons,” which are intensifying. He comments that this will affect Russia’s industry and economy (Tsargrad, June 10). The efficacy of the Kremlin’s response to climate change will play a significant role in both Russia’s environmental and political future. This was seen historically in the mobilization of the Soviet population’s response to environmental threats, which preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union (Javeline et al. “Russia in a Changing Climate,” WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2023): e872). According to Russian climatologist Andrei Kiselev, Russia is warming 2.7 times faster than the rest of the world due to positive feedback loops—a process where ecological changes caused by climate change accelerates warming—as Russia’s land area, which warms faster than the ocean, exceeds its ocean area (News.ru, January 22). Climatologist Roman Vilfand noted that December 2024 was the warmest the month had been in the history of meteorological observations, with the average temperature 10 degrees Celsius (18 degrees Fahrenheit) higher than normal (MSK1.ru, January 16).

Russian President Vladimir Putin began his political career, at least outwardly, skeptical about the dangers of climate change. In 2003, he said, “Maybe climate change is not so bad in a cold country such as ours? Two to three degrees would not hurt—we would spend less on fur coats and the grain harvest would go up” (Eurasianet, October 29, 2019). Putin’s public-facing opinion on climate change, however, has evolved. In 2015, he called it “a problem affecting the future of all mankind.” He signed the 2015 Paris Agreement, aiming to limit the temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial levels (Government of Russia, April 20, 2016). Kremlin policy implementation on climate issues, however, has been inconsistent with these actions. In 2023, Putin acknowledged that Russia is warming faster than the rest of the planet and unveiled the “Russian climate doctrine,” which committed the country to “five main tasks,” including a pledge to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. These tasks include “the creation of regulatory and economic mechanisms to prevent greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the development of mutually beneficial cooperation on a multilateral basis” (RBC, October 26, 2023). While the Kremlin has made the right statements, it remains ineffective in implementing its climate agreements.

The scientific evidence gives reason for alarm. At the 2021 G20 summit, Putin stated that Russia had warmed by half a degree Celsius (0.9 degrees Fahrenheit) over the past 10 years, with the Arctic warming even faster (RBC, October 31, 2021). While Siberia often experiences summer temperatures around 30 degrees Celsius (86 degrees Fahrenheit), the region saw temperatures in 2020 of around 38 degrees Celsius (100 degrees Fahrenheit). For a while, the Arctic coast was warmer than the Mediterranean (Naked Science, June 24, 2020). Such warm temperatures may cause glaciers in the Western Arctic to melt, reducing the permafrost to depths of four meters (13 feet).

Positive feedback loops as a result of climate change threaten to accelerate Russia’s warming. Of these feedback loops, two stand as particularly important. First, the tundra in Siberia holds centuries of methane stored in the soil, which is kept there by the ice. As the planet warms, the permafrost melts and releases an enormous amount of methane—a much more potent, although shorter-lived, greenhouse gas than carbon—into the atmosphere all at once (Zemlya Khroniki Zhizni, November 1, 2020). One estimate suggests there is as much as 170 billion tons of methane in the Siberian permafrost and Western Siberian swamps (Sibirskii Ekonomist, February 24, 2022). The changing composition of the Earth as it warms also creates sinkholes. This has already begun to manifest in Siberia, where the Buryeskoye reservoir in the Amur and Khabarovsk regions is set to release methane stored over the winter in a “bubble” as the ice melts (Russkaya Semerka, April 15).

More frequent forest fires also intensify climate change in Russia. While some forest fires are needed to regulate the local fauna and allow the land to replenish itself, the number of forest fires in Siberia releases huge amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. At the same time, carbon sequestration through Siberian forests is a substantial component of the Kremlin’s plans to reduce emissions. In 2024, the regions of Yakutia, Transbaikalia, Irkutsk, and Khabarovsk declared states of emergency because of the number of forest fires (Radio Svoboda, August 18, 2024). The 2025 Russian fire season began at the end of February, which is substantially earlier than usual. Fires have already engulfed parts of the Zabaykalsky krai, the Amur oblast, Buryatia, Yakutia, and the Khabarovsk krai—a total of 1.5 million hectares since the beginning of the year. While the spark for the fires is often related to human carelessness, Roshydromet, a federal agency responsible for administering state property and environmental monitoring, predicts that elevated air temperatures and the decreased ability of the soil to retain moisture, as permafrost melts, will result in widespread fires again this year (see EDM, July 6, 2021; Ridus, May 14).

Both the positive and negative consequences of Russian climate change are enormous. As the world moves away from reliance on hydrocarbons, Russia’s oil-centric economic model will fail to raise sufficient revenue to finance the autocratic state (see EDM, January 27, February 27). The prospective opening of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) around Russia’s Far North for moving goods from the Far East to European markets, however, could be a source of revenue (see EDM, June 12, 2023). Additionally, melting land poses a threat to infrastructure in Russia’s north, much of which was built under the assumption that the solid land would always remain so frozen (see EDM, March 4).

The world is moving, albeit slowly and imperfectly, away from the hydrocarbons that are the basis of Russia’s economy. In 2023, oil and gas exports accounted for one-third of the state budget, despite the impact of sanctions (Izvestiya, December 11, 2024). As more countries adopt renewable energy sources, the demand for hydrocarbon energy sources is likely to decline (Ars Technica, May 15). Russia would struggle to find revenue streams to replace those lost from oil and gas, with potentially dire consequences for its economic and political stability (Gustafson, Klimat: Russia in the Age of Climate Change, October 2021).

The potential opening of the NSR to year-round shipping could offset less lucrative oil exports (see EDM, June 12, 2023). Warming temperatures are melting Arctic Sea ice, which could create a new shortcut to Europe, cutting the shipping time from Singapore to Europe from 110 days to just 70. Russia is accordingly building new ports along the Arctic coast (Assotsiatsiia Morskikh Torgovikh Portov, September 14, 2023). The opening of the NSR is a central part of the government’s plans for developing the region. The Kremlin predicts that 135 ships will use the route by 2050 (Artika 2035 Strategia Razvitiia, accessed May 27). There is evidence, however, that warming effects are erratic and unevenly distributed, meaning that the Kremlin would need new icebreakers to reliably use the route year-round (see EDM, November 26, 2024). New shipping lanes create new security threats and competition, leading Putin to announce his intention to modernize Russia’s military in the Arctic (Vzglyad, March 27). Some observers accordingly see the Arctic as the next venue for great power competition (U.S. Department of Defense, April 5, 2023; see EDM, October 8, 2024, March 20).

Climate change threatens Russia’s infrastructure. Many Siberian cities were built under the assumption that permafrost levels would not change, as had been the case for centuries. The Russian permafrost region encompasses large cities such as Norilsk, Vorkuta, and Yakutsk, which were constructed in the traditional Soviet style, featuring large apartment buildings and heavy industry. Melting permafrost has reduced foundation support by up to 45 percent in some locations, rendering some buildings unstable or even dangerous (Javeline et al. “Russia in a Changing Climate” WIREs Climate Change Vol 15, No. 2 (2023): e872). Likewise, indigenous communities may soon be unable to rely on frozen rivers for winter transportation (see EDM, March 4).

There are other localized consequences of climate change. The burning of Siberian peatland is a public health concern specific to Siberia. Fires can lower soil productivity, leading to reduced harvests and even desertification. In some areas, fires can lead to an increased flood risk. Alexander Kurenkov, the Russian Minister for Emergency Situations, noted that floods affected 64 regions of Russia in 2024, with water levels at unprecedented levels in 60 regions (TASS, December 25, 2024). While some regions face flooding, others may face droughts, including in the Caspian Sea, where shipping routes would be impacted (see EDM, September 26, 2017, November 16, 2023, March 18, June 3).

Even though widespread protests about “climate change” in general are unlikely in many regions in Russia, it is likely to see more local protests on specific environmental issues. Despite being the root cause of many problems, climate change is too abstract from ordinary Russians’ lives to generate widespread activism. Measures to combat climate change as a whole would reduce government budgets and threaten the welfare state, making such policies unlikely. Increased local incidents due to climate change may lead to protests, albeit with limited solutions. There are already signs that the government lacks an effective response to environmental protests. By normalizing protests as a means of appealing to the government, environmental protests may play a role in energizing Russian civil society (see EDM, January 23, 2019, April 15, May 6). Even authoritarian regimes have an implicit social contract with the people they govern, though the chances of environmental protests spurring widespread changes are remote.

In her book on Sakha-Yakutia, Buryatia, and Tuva, Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer discusses how ecological problems, some of which are caused by climate change, have driven separatist movements (Balzer, Galvanizing Nostalgia, 2021). For instance, the Independent Congress of the Sakha People, established in 1992, held its third meeting in 2019, which was solely focused on ecology. While the meeting focused on exposing energy industry disasters on the Viliu River and diamond industry accidents, some of the sessions included “land, ecology, and control” (Balzer, Galvanizing Nostalgia, 2021, p. 46). Though issues connected to the local environment and climate change can strengthen local movements, Moscow suppresses such processes. The Kremlin resists localized environmental groups, utilizing government-organized social groups, such as the Cossacks, to address environmental issues, including floods in Krasnodar (VsKO, July 17, 2023). It remains an open question whether such responses are sufficient to quell local demands for assistance during environmental crises.

Climate change will affect Russia’s future trajectory in wide-ranging ways. Viruses that have been trapped in the permafrost from earlier eras, as well as the widening range of insect-borne illnesses, such as West Nile Virus, are potential threats (Euro News, March 10, 2023; Sib.fm, May 3). Russia will need to adapt its crops to grow at higher latitudes and in diverse soil types, and a warming climate will drive migrants closer to Russia as the equator heats up. Climate scientist Aleksei Korkorin warns that whereas people used to go to Krasnodar for warm weather when they retired, the region is “too hot” as temperatures may exceed 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) (RBC, June 2, 2023). One thing is certain—climate change will shape Russian politics in the coming decades.