Russian Black Sea Fleet Intends to Establish Base in Abkhazia

Executive Summary:

• Badra Gunba, president of the breakaway Republic of Abkhazia, has reiterated the region’s intentions to establish a Russian naval base at the Port of Ochamchire on the eastern coast of the Black Sea.
• Moscow sees this move as essential due to successful Ukrainian strikes that have made the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Sevastopol base and the area around Crimea largely untenable.
• Construction of the base falls in line with Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin’s recent approval of a new naval doctrine that seeks to re-establish Russia as one of the world’s preeminent maritime powers.
• The de facto Abkhazian government hopes that expanded cooperation with Moscow could lead to official inclusion in the Union State of Russia and Belarus, as well as heightened international recognition for the republic’s independence.

Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin’s three-year war against Ukraine has battered the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF). Ukrainian successes have largely forced the fleet to abandon its traditional Sevastopol base in Crimea for safer anchorage in the Sea of Azov and Novorossiysk on the Black Sea’s eastern coast (see EDM, November 8, 2022, November 15, 2023, January 17, March 26, August 13, 2024, June 27).

Now, the BSF will broaden its basing options by establishing a material and technical base in Georgia’s self-proclaimed Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. Badra Gunba, president of the mostly unrecognized entity, announced that the facility will be built in the city of Ochamchire. Since 2017, patrol ships from the Coast Guard of the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Border Service have been based at this port (see EDM, May 1, October 11, 2023). The 7th Russian Military Base is also located on the republic’s territory (The Moscow Times, May 31). Moscow hopes that with the creation of an additional BSF base in Abkhazia, the fleet will be able to effectively regroup while still projecting power across the Black Sea and throughout the Caucasus. For Abkhazian officials, future engagement with the Kremlin could open the door to potential participation in the Union State of Russia and Belarus as well as more widespread recognition of its independence.

Ochamchire is a former Soviet BSF naval base created and developed in the late 1980s that was abandoned after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. In 1997, the fleet based in Sevastopol was partitioned between Russia and Ukraine. Subsequent plans to create a base for Russian BSF ships in Ochamchire were discussed as early as 2009, and, in October 2023, Russia and Abkhazia signed an agreement to establish a permanent base for the Russian Navy (Kommersant, October 5, 2023).  

Russia’s interest in Abkhazia is not limited to Ochamchire. On May 10, during a meeting with Gunba in the Kremlin, Putin remarked, “Today our relations are built on the basis of the 2014 treaty on alliance, a good, solid contractual and legal basis has been created … We are ready to continue cooperation in both the economic and humanitarian spheres: this includes education and healthcare” (President of Russia, May 10).

Expanded cooperation has also included the reopening of the Sukhumi airport, which had not been functioning for 32 years (see EDM, November 20, 2023, March 5, 25). On May 1, the first regular flight from Moscow landed in Sukhumi. Georgia was quick to respond. Georgian Economic Minister Levan Davitashvili argued that the resumption of air traffic between Russia and Abkhazia is a violation of international norms. He said, “Carrying out such flights is a violation of the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization … We are talking about Russian airlines that are under international sanctions” (1tv.ge, May 1) 

Abkhazia, in northwestern Georgia, was a protectorate of the Ottoman Empire since the late 16th century. In February 1810, Tsar Alexander I issued a manifesto annexing the Abkhazian Principality to the Russian Empire, a status it would retain for the next 183 years, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Gazeta.ru, March 1, 2020).

In 1992, Abkhazian separatists began an armed uprising with the goal of secession and independence from Georgia. The following year, the insurrectionists defeated Georgian forces and established control over Abkhazia. They then declared the entity’s independence, following which a ceasefire was negotiated in May 1994 (Sputnik Abkhazia, August 26, 2024). Despite the truce, Moscow still dispatched Russian peacekeepers to the region, and conflict continued. In 2008, Abkhazia formally declared independence, and the Russian invasion of Georgia ensued. Today, Abkhazia remains de facto independent, though that status is largely unrecognized by the international community.

Abkhazia has since sought the advantages of closer ties with larger regional states. Nevertheless, the issue of Abkhazia potentially joining the Union State of Russia and Belarus was first discussed in 2020 during the initial meeting between Putin and Abkhazia’s self-declared president, Aslan Bzhania. The idea itself was raised with the Russian president on Bzhania’s initiative. In October 2023, Bzhania met with Putin yet again. In a subsequent interview with Izvestiya, the Abkhazian leader once again mentioned that Abkhazia was considering joining the Russia-Belarus union state in the foreseeable future (Ekho Kavkaza; Izvestiya, October 5, 2023). Abkhazia’s potential inclusion into the Union State may run into some difficulties, however. Belarus has yet to recognize the region’s independence.

The occupied territory is also seeking broader international recognition of its independence. On June 8, Oleg Bartsits, Abkhazia’s foreign minister, spoke on his government’s goal to increase its global standing. He stated, “Today we are receiving signals from a number of countries from various regions that there is interest in dialogue with us” (RIA Novosti, June 8). To date, only Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Syria have officially recognized Abkhazia’s independence.

Abkhazia continues to attempt to normalize its relationship with Tbilisi, which regards the region as a breakaway republic whose independence was obtained illegally. On April 22, Bartsits stated that Georgia must repeal its law on occupied territories and sign an agreement with secessionist Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the non-use of force. He asserted:

Statements by the Georgian leadership that they would like to improve relations with their main neighbors—Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the Russian Federation—do not go unnoticed by us, but at the same time, practical confirmations and real steps are needed. From my point of view, there may be several of them, including the repeal of the law on occupied territories, which does not withstand any criticism or test of time … The second thing … is the signing of an agreement on the renunciation of the use of military force (TASS, April 22).

The separatist government is growing increasingly nervous about possible aggression from Georgia. Thus, granting Russia a naval base in Ochamchire can be viewed as a wise insurance policy in positioning Moscow as an effective deterrent against the potential use of force. Sergei Shamba, former foreign minister and a prominent member of the People’s Assembly of Abkhazia, bolstered this interpretation on February 28. He stated, “The agreements that we have with Russia give us security guarantees, because, in the event of a threat, Russia would act as an ally in defense of our independence and statehood” (Denresp.ru, February 28).

The future of the BSF will largely be determined by the new naval doctrine Putin approved in May, “The Strategy for the Development of the Russian Navy up to 2050.” While details have not yet been released, according to Putin aide and Chairman of the Russian Maritime Collegium Nikolai Patrushev, the new policy is intended to restore Russia’s position as one of the world’s leading maritime powers (PortNews, June 9). The acquisition of a naval base in Abkhazia would accordingly bolster the restoration of the BSF’s regional presence.

On June 6, Bartsits visited Moscow for negotiations with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Summarizing their discussions, Bartsits commented, “We touched upon almost the entire spectrum of issues that exist in our strategic alliance … First of all, these are issues of security, the formation of a common space, a common security contour in the region of the South Caucasus, the Eastern Black Sea region” (Izvestiya, June 8). Regarding the Ochamchire base, Bartsits added, “Today, in such an important and sensitive geostrategic place … the deployment of such a point, where ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet can be promptly serviced, we regard as an additional factor of stability and an opportunity to ensure high standards of security in the region.”

Russia is pressuring Tbilisi to bolster Abkhazia’s hardline demands by insisting that Georgia accept legal obligations for the non-use of force against Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Kremlin has also begun a definitive demarcation of the Georgian–Abkhazian and Georgian–South Ossetian state borders (EurAsia Daily, June 9).

Both Bartsits and Putin define security as the top priority in Russian-Abkhazian relations. Despite the republic’s distance from the frontlines in Ukraine, the conflict has still had an impact there. On October 4, 2023, after meeting Putin in Moscow, Bzhania announced:

On the day of our celebration [commemorating the 30th anniversary of Victory Day in the Georgian-Abkhazian War and Independence Day, celebrated on September 30], a small missile ship came to us, we boarded it … We signed an agreement, and in the near future, the Ochamchire region will be the permanent base of the Russian Navy (Izvestiya, October 5, 2023). 

On October 24, 2023, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy put Moscow on notice about its decision to reopen the base at Ochamchire. He stated that Ukraine would strike the Russian fleet if it were to be based in Abkhazia. The Ukrainian president emphasized that a major naval transition was occurring in the Black Sea, pointing out that the Russian military fleet is no longer able to operate in the western part of the Black Sea and is gradually retreating from Crimea. He stated, “Recently, the Russian leadership was forced to announce the creation of a new base for the Black Sea Fleet—or what’s left of it—on the occupied territory of Georgia, in the southeastern part of the sea, as far as possible from Ukrainian missiles and naval drones. But we will reach them everywhere” (Ukrainska Pravda, October 24, 2023). 

On June 10, it was reported that the Abkhazian State Security Service (SGB) detained a 45-year-old Russian construction engineer. The man was allegedly recruited by the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense to plan a terrorist attack at the newly reopened Sukhumi airport (TASS, June 10). After making contact with Ukrainian intelligence operatives, the engineer was given directions to plant and detonate a bomb in June that would cause a large number of casualties. The detainee sent his Ukrainian handlers an engineering plan of the Sukhumi airport, marking possible locations for explosive devices. 

The SGB posted a video of the saboteur’s interrogation and confession. He stated:

An unknown person contacted me on the Telegram messenger and introduced himself as an employee of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine. He explained that he had found me in anti-war and anti-Russian groups on the Internet. And he suggested that we fight the regime together. I agreed. I took the initiative to suggest that we organize an explosion at the VIP parking lot of the Sukhumi airport (Sputnik Abkhazia; TASS, June 10).

Following his interrogation, the SGB’s Investigative Department opened a criminal case against the detainee under Article 274 (Espionage) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Abkhazia.

In 2008, Russia’s cynical manipulation of separatism in Georgia prior to its brief and violent two-week war saw both Abkhazia and South Ossetia declare independence. Seventeen years later, both republics are economically impoverished regions under a de facto indifferent Russian protectorate, with Abkhazian independence officially recognized by only a select few. It is difficult to see how Abkhazia, with a population of less than 300,000 people, can further establish a fully independent republic when Russian tourists’ rubles largely underwrite its agrarian economy. At least Abkhazia can provide Russian tourists with sandy semi-tropical beaches as their access to the usual European Mediterranean destinations grows more constricted from Western sanctions on Moscow. Beyond that, a more prosperous liberation scenario for Abkhazia is difficult to discern, and the Kremlin is likely to use the breakaway republic for its own military designs.