Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan Cooperation Transforms Eurasia’s Geopolitical Map

Executive Summary:

• Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have expanded their diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation to the point that some in the region have begun to speak of them as a kind of “bloc” in opposition to those led by Moscow and Tehran.
• The trend reflects their joint support for the Middle Corridor transit route, bypassing Russia, their interests in the Caspian, and the integration of Azerbaijan into Central Asia and Kazakhstan into the Turkic world.
• The growing ties between Baku and Astana are rapidly redrawing the geopolitical map of Eurasia, limiting Moscow’s ability to control the region and forcing other countries to take the new relationship into account.

At a meeting in Astana on October 20–21—the 13th such summit in the previous five years—Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev took steps to further their countries’ economic and security cooperation. Some have already identified their growing and continuing cooperation as turning into a kind of regional “bloc” in opposition to others led by Moscow and Tehran (Times of Central Asia, July 24; APA, October 22; Eurasia Today, October 24). Baku and Astana did not declare the formation of such a bloc, but their actions regarding support for the Middle Corridor route bypassing Russia, their recognition of Azerbaijan as part of a greater Central Asia, and their inclusion of Kazakhstan as part of an expanded Turkic world highlights how ties between Baku and Astana are moving to redraw the geopolitical map of that part of the world. At the very least, their declarations at their latest meeting could dispel the idea that the two are simply pursuing a multi-vector policy with each other. They are expanding their cooperation beyond this perception (see EDM, May 8, 2024, October 8). This new map means that Moscow’s ability to dominate the region as it has in the past has been severely compromised, and other powers such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the West must also take these changes into account.

Even before Aliyev and Tokayev’s meeting, their cooperation has been moving far beyond what either has done with anyone else in their multi-vector foreign policy. They have long worked to promote the Middle Corridor despite Russian opposition (see EDM, April 20, 2023; Times of Central Asia, October 22). They have acted jointly on the Caspian by expanding their fleets, conducting joint naval exercises near the Russian border, and demanding actions from Moscow to prevent the sea’s further decline in depth and size (see EDM, April 24; Window on Eurasia, June 19; August 8;  September 13). They have talked about the need to include Azerbaijan in Central Asian forums and Kazakhstan in Turkic world projects (APA, October 22). Their comments and announced plans at the latest Astana meeting, however, reflected how relations between the two with Moscow have significantly deteriorated since Russian President Vladimir Putin began his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (Zakon.kz, October 21).

When Putin visited Astana at the end of 2024 to attend the Collective Security Treaty Organization summit, the Russian leader called Kazakhstan “a Russian-speaking land.” Tokayev, who spoke next, responded in Kazakh, forcing Putin and his entourage to seek translations. This interaction reflects both Putin’s clumsiness in dealing with Kazakhstan and Central Asia more generally, and Kazakhstan’s displeasure at Moscow’s assumption that it should be acknowledged as the paramount power regardless of what it does or how it acts, however offensive (Window on Eurasia, December 1, 2024). Astana has been pragmatic in its official dealings with Moscow, but it has not backed down from its own positions. Moscow has failed to rein in its arrogance, which has likely only driven the Kazakhstan government and population further away from its influence (Versia; Svobodnaya Press, August 4). Consequently, the Kremlin has only itself to blame for Kazakhstan’s growing distance from Moscow.

The deterioration of Moscow’s relations with Baku ever since the downing of an Azerbaijani airline by Russian guns at the end of 2024 is more widely known (see EDM,  January 15, May 20). It explains why Azerbaijan has taken an increasingly hard line against Moscow and has been interested in working with others, such as Kazakhstan, that have done the same (see EDM, September 9). The Azerbaijani case provides an additional clue on why closer cooperation between Baku and Astana is such a problem for the Kremlin. Because of the settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the latest war in Karabakh, Russia has lost the ability to use its traditional divide-and-rule tactics. Most recently, Aliyev announced the lifting of travel bans on Armenians during the Astana summit (President of Azerbaijan, October 21). Before Baku and Yerevan moved toward settling the Karabakh dispute, Moscow played the same divide-and-rule game over and over again. Now that a settlement is near, however, a leading Russian commentator says the Kremlin no longer has that opportunity (Telegram/@kremlebezBashennik, July 3; reposted at Kasparov.ru, July 5). Something very similar, and potentially even more significant, has now arisen in Moscow’s relations with Baku and Astana. On Caspian issues in particular, Moscow cannot tilt toward one or the other because, as is already the case with Baku and Yerevan, the two are in accord—and thus taking action against one is sure to spark a negative reaction in the other.

Moscow has little chance for success unless it changes its approach. Two other aspects of the developing cooperation between Baku and Astana, however, leave it with even fewer. On the one hand, Astana’s support for Azerbaijan assuming a larger and more tightly integrated role in Central Asia not only increases the region’s international importance but also means that any steps the Kremlin takes against it, as it is currently doing with migrants, are likely to have a far larger negative effect (see EDM, May 15, November 21, 2024, July 7). As Azerbaijani experts have noted, with Azerbaijan considered part of Central Asia, that region becomes larger and more important as an economic and political actor, one that neither Russia nor the rest of the world can ignore (Eurasia Today, October 24). On the other hand, Baku’s promotion of Kazakhstan as part of the Turkic world and Tokayev’s enthusiastic response to that idea only increase the problems Moscow faces in dealing with these two countries and those around them, something Russia has long worried about (see EDM, November 16, 2021; Window on Eurasia, November 3).

For Russia, what is taking place in the relationship between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is yet another example of the way in which, in the words of one influential Russian telegram channel, Putin’s expanded invasion of Ukraine has “destroyed what had been left of Russian influence in the near abroad” (Telegram/@sytosokrata, April 28, 2024; reposted at Charter97, April 29, 2024). This change in the region’s geopolitical map has important consequences for others with interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus—including the PRC, Iran, India, Europe, and the United States. As these countries expand their cooperation, as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are doing, actors from further afield will have to take into account the interests not only of the country they are focusing on but also of other countries with which it is closely linked. If these countries do not do so, they will be fated to suffer losses in the region analogous to those Moscow has been taking, and thus fail to achieve not only their immediate goals but also larger ones.