Belarus Faces Another Sham Election as Lukashenka Clings to Power

Executive Summary:

• Belarus’s presidential election on January 26 will likely hold no democratic legitimacy, with predetermined results ensuring Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s continued rule. Public disillusionment persists amid regime-led propaganda and repression, highlighting the ongoing struggle for democratic reform in Belarus.
•  Growing economic and political integration is deepening Minsk’s reliance on Moscow. The Kremlin’s support safeguards Lukashenka’s regime but limits his ability to engage with the West or assert greater independence.
• Opposition factions remain divided over how to combat the election, while Russia may exploit tensions to disrupt Belarus’s stability. Despite public resistance, crackdowns and propaganda solidify Lukashenka’s grip on power.

On January 26, Belarus will hold its seventh presidential election. Among the candidates is Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who celebrated 30 years in power last year (see EDM, January 16). Four other candidates are also participating, carefully chosen to create the appearance of competition. Elections in Belarus are fundamentally different from those held in the United States, Canada, EU countries, or other democratic nations. They more closely resemble elections in the Soviet Union, Assad-era Syria, or other authoritarian states. As such, the official results will hold no real significance. The electoral commission will announce predetermined results that bear no connection to the votes cast. Lukashenka himself has repeatedly admitted that elections in Belarus are falsified and that the results will be whatever he decides (Charter97, May 22, 2014; Interfax, February 21, 2021).

This campaign is considered the dullest in Belarusian history and has taken place against ongoing civil resistance to the regime since 2020 (see EDM, August 10, 2020). During the last presidential election in August 2020, Lukashenka failed to secure the majority of votes and resorted to electoral fraud (Novaya Gazeta, August 13, 2020). This sparked the largest protests in the country’s history, lasting for months, and inflicted significant psychological trauma on Lukashenka (see EDM, September 8, 14, 2020). In response, the regime launched unprecedented crackdowns. According to the latest data from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, as many as 300,000 people have fled Belarus since 2020 due to coordinated violence and repression (United Nations, March 20, 2024). As of January 17, human rights groups have documented 1,358 political prisoners in Belarus, including 169 women, around 40 journalists, several presidential candidates, and trade union leaders (Dissidentby, January 17).

Fearing Lukashenka’s potential loss of power, the Kremlin provided him with $1.5 billion in financial support to secure the loyalty of Belarusian law enforcement and government officials. At that time, officials in Belarus and Russia spoke about the possibility of early presidential elections, for example, at the end of 2020 or in the spring of 2021 (Interfax, September 1, 2020; Vedomosti, September 9, 2020). According to various assessments and insider information, an agreement was reached that Lukashenka would not participate in future elections, which he himself has mentioned several times (Interfax, August 9, 2021).

Between 2020 and 2024, Belarus enacted legislative reforms to facilitate a political transition. A new state body, the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, was established with unlimited powers, and Lukashenka was elected its leader. Additionally, the president received lifelong guarantees for himself and his family in the event of his resignation (see EDM, May 2, 8, 2024). In recent years, the 70-year-old has faced health issues. He has undergone several surgeries, gained significant weight, struggled with mobility, and has reduced the frequency of his public appearances (Zerkalo, May 10, 2023). It is highly likely that he has decided to remain in the presidential chair for life to shield himself from potential prosecution.

Lukashenka’s decision to participate in the upcoming elections contradicts previous agreements with the Kremlin. Russia’s ability to influence candidate registration is limited, but Russian officials are expected to be among the first to congratulate Lukashenka on his “resounding victory.” Since 2020, Belarus’s dependence on Russia has significantly increased, and the process of deepening economic and military-political integration between the two countries within the framework of the Union State is expected to continue (see EDM, February 7, June 17, August 7, November 27, 2024).

On December 23, 2024, Russian pro-government Telegram channels, allegedly linked to the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and other security agencies, began spreading rumors about an impending “state coup” in Belarus and protests planned for January 24–25 (Telegram/svarschiki; UDF, December 23, 2024). Subsequently, an anonymous channel connected to RT suggested that “Lukashenka might share Bashar al-Assad’s fate if the Kremlin withdraws its support” and alleged that the United States was preparing his overthrow for $380 million (X.com/peacemaket71, December 23, 2024). Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that “the West might organize a military adventure involving Ukraine’s armed forces ahead of the presidential election” (Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry; URA.ru, December 25, 2024). Notably, on December 18, the U.S. State Department immediately urged its citizens to leave Belarus (U.S. State Department, December 18, 2024).

Given these developments, certain forces, likely linked to Russia, might be preparing for violent actions in Belarus. The Kremlin has a vested interest in ensuring the elections do not proceed peacefully, as a smooth election could enable Lukashenka to open communication channels with the West. For Russia, keeping Belarus isolated is essential to prevent dialogue with the European Union and the United States. Hybrid tactics to provoke international outrage might be employed. In case of escalating tensions, Russia could exploit the situation to deploy its military or police forces, installing a government it fully controls.

The opposition forces, which are far from monolithic, have differing strategies regarding how to combat the elections. Some, such as former presidential candidates Zianon Pazniak, Andrei Sannikov, and Valery Tsepkalo, advocate for a complete boycott. Meanwhile, a group represented by the circles of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and Pavel Latushka calls for participation in the elections and voting against all candidates (Sotaproject, December 18, 2024). Given the lack of any oversight on vote counting, election participation appears meaningless and serves only to create the illusion of voter turnout, which benefits the regime.

The official results will be announced within a few hours after the election. The only question is how many votes will be attributed to Lukashenka. In his worldview, the percentage cannot be lower than before, so it must be at least 80 percent. It could even reach 97 percent, as he remains troubled by the popular meme “Sasha 3 percent” that highlights his actual support in the country (Meduza, June 23, 2020). In the run-up to election day, officials are staging a large-scale propaganda musical campaign called the “Unity Marathon,” directed by the dictator’s daughter-in-law, Anna Lukashenka, with his youngest son, Nikolai Lukashenka, playing piano (Belsat, January 16). Additionally, unified information sessions are being held across the country, during which citizens are lectured on the global situation and the importance of supporting Lukashenka’s course. Meanwhile, security services are conducting raids and issuing warnings to activists and dissenting citizens, urging them to refrain from participating in any protests (DW, January 3). Lukashenka aims to turn the page on 2020 and convince himself that he still has support in Belarus.