Kadyrov’s Efforts to Create Chechen Muftiate in Ingushetia Threaten to Destabilize Region

Executive Summary:

• Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has made another move to subordinate Ingushetia (a neighboring republic within the Russian Federation) by organizing talks intended to create a Chechen-controlled muftiate in Ingushetia. 
• Kadyrov’s efforts to gain leverage over Ingushetia may be initially successful because of the current Ingush muftiate’s troubled relationship with Magas. At the same time, it is likely to spark new protests in Ingushetia not only against Grozny but also against Magas and Moscow.
• Kadyrov’s moves to gain the support of Muslims in Ingushetia have already triggered disputes and concerns in Moscow and across the North Caucasus that the Chechen leader will target them as well.  

Chechnya’s leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, has never made his hopes a secret to absorb Ingushetia (a neighboring republic within the Russian Federation) and perhaps portions of Dagestan into his republic, both of which were part of the Chechen-Ingush republic in the past (see EDM, September 27, 2018, February 28, 2023). In 2019, he compelled Magas to hand over 10 percent of Ingushetia to his control (see EDM, December 1, 2021). More recently, he has supported the Batal-Haji Sufi order in Ingushetia, a group that is now in open conflict not only with Magas but Moscow as well (Fortanga.org, November 4, 2022; Window on Eurasia, December 8, 2022, January 28; see EDM, January 24, 2023). Now, Kadyrov has launched an indirect effort to subordinate Ingushetia to himself and his republic through the use of Islam (see EDM, March 24, 2022). According to the independent Fortanga news agency, he has organized meetings in Cairo with Ingush Muslims to create a new muftiate for Ingushetia that will supervise Muslim parishes there, giving him yet another basis for exercising leverage over the government in Magas as well (Fortanga, January 31). 

On January 31, Fortanga reported, based on conversations with two informed sources, that Chechnya’s mufti, Salakh Mehiyev, with Kadyrov’s backing, began talks in Cairo with a group of instructors of the Ingush Islamic University about the possibility of forming a new muftiate in Ingushetia (Ibid). Many federal subjects of the Russian Federation have more than one such organization, also known as Muslim spiritual directorates (MSDs). The Chechen-backed move, however, appears intended not to become yet another of these institutions there but rather to replace the existing MSD with a Chechen-controlled one, something Fortanga  suggests has the support of some in the Magas government (Ibid).

According to one of Fortanga’s sources, participants in the talks have the support of Salakh Mezhiev, the chairman of the coordination center of Muslims of the North Caucasus Federal District, and Adam Shakhidov, an advisor to Kadyrov. Moreover, this source claims, “Mahmud-Ali Kalimatov [head of the Ingush Republic] is also aware of the plans. Representatives of the local clergy carry out consultations on further actions between the heads of the two regions. [But] participants in the process are afraid of leaks and public discontent and act as quietly as possible” (Fortanga, January 31). This is an indication of just how explosive such a development could be. 

Another sign of the sensitivity of these talks is how the most recent round occurred not in Magas or Grozny but in the Egyptian capital of Cairo. According to Fortanga’s second source, Grozny officials decided on this radical step after failing in their earlier efforts to win over Isa Khamkhoyev, the former mufti of Ingushetia (Ibid). Earlier, Chechen officials tried to win over the head of Ingushetia MSD. That failure highlights what is likely to be widespread opposition among Muslims in Ingushetia to what the Chechens are trying to do, however much money Grozny may be willing to spend and however much support those who go along with the Chechens may receive from Kalimatov. In Fortanga’s words, all this clearly indicates that “the goals being pursued by Ingushetia’s neighbor are power and the creation of their own team, which will give them influence over the republic and its internal processes” (Fortanga, January 31). 

Three aspects of this development make it far more significant than it might appear at first glance. First, the Chechen effort to create a new MSD in Ingushetia may very well succeed, at least initially, because the Ingush governor has long had a troubled relationship with the republic muftiate and now appears ready to work with the Chechens (APN.ru, November 26, 2021). Thiswill reduce the authority of the current governor and may even lead to a new round of protests against him if a new muftiate is created or even if Ingush residents become aware that Kalimatov is working with the Chechens. Many Ingush residents will likely view this as an act of betrayal, just as they viewed signing of an accord in 2019 by Kalimatov’s predecessor Yunus-Bek Yevkurov which transferred 10 percent of the smallest non-Russian republic to Chechen control when he  (see EDM, September 27, 2018, April 9, 2019). The accord  sparked the largest protests in Ingush history, with tens of thousands taking to the streets and numerous arrests, trials, and imprisonments that have lasted in some cases until now (Window on Eurasia, October 11, 2021, December 7, 2024).

Second, the border issue in Ingushetia is heating up again. On the one hand, members of the Ingush Seven, as the leaders of the protest became known, are now being released from prison. The Ingush are welcoming them as heroes, but some Russian officials want them to be drafted and sent to fight and possibly die in Ukraine, suggestions that have outraged many in Ingushetia (Fortanga.org, February 5). On the other hand, Moscow officials have expressed  support for further changing the border between Ingushetia and Chechnya in Grozny’s favor (Fortanga.org, December 11, 12, 2024). Many Ingush will view talk of a Chechnya-controlled muftiate in their republic through these optics, and some may decide that they need to take to the streets again lest their republic be further reduced to a shadow of its former self, something that is more likely if news of Chechnya’s role in creating a new muftiate spreads. One activist responded that Grozny will not stop until it controls all of the Ingush Republic (Fortanga.org, December 18, 2024).  

Third, Grozny’s move to create a muftiate in Ingushetia that Chechnya controls is going to echo across the North Caucasus, especially in Dagestan, where Kadyrov has also made territorial claims. The meeting of any of them in Dagestan would likely trigger more violence in what is rapidly becoming the most unstable republic in the Russian Federation (Window on Eurasia, March 13, October 12, 20, 2024; Kavkaz Uzel, August 12, 2024). The danger that what Kadyrov is doing will destabilize the North Caucasus more generally may cause Moscow to try to prevent Kadyrov from taking action on a new Ingush muftiate. In the past, however, the Kremlin has often found it hard to rein in the Chechen leader given his ability so far to keep Chechnya quiet and provide support for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s agenda. Both the dangers of more destabilization in the North Caucasus more generally, as well as the radicalization of Islam among Chechens in the Republic of Georgia and the revival of secular Chechen nationalism in the emigration and among Chechens fighting against Moscow in Ukraine, may lead some in Moscow to conclude that they need to rein in Kadyrov, despite the risks that any such moves would have (Window on Eurasia, January 24, February 12).

Consequently, what might appear to some as a minor administrative shift in the governance of the Muslims of Ingushetia could have enormous consequences not only in the North Caucasus but in Moscow as well.