Lukashenka Balances Internal Challenges with External Dependencies

Executive Summary:

• Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has secured another five-year presidential term and now seeks to secure the country’s regional and international interests, including a role in peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia.
• Lukashenka’s first visit, as per tradition, was to Russia, where he sought support from Russian President Vladimir Putin despite breaking a gentleman’s agreement not to run in the elections.
• Lukashenka is unable to sever Belarus’s ties with Moscow due to economic and political dependence and views the Kremlin as a safeguard against the West. 
• Belarus has few options for diplomatic maneuver aside from seeking deals on the release of political prisoners because the People’s Republic of China (PRC) prioritizes its relationship with Moscow rather than Minsk and Lukashenka finds the West ideologically repellent. 

On January 26, official results of the presidential elections in Belarus claimed that Alyaksandr Lukashenka secured 86.82 percent of the vote (5,136,293 votes) (BelTa, February 3). The election took place under strict control, without real opposition, and against the backdrop of five years of ongoing repression (see EDM, January 29). At 70, Lukashenka has not said that he will not run in the 2030 elections, but speculations about his health persist (see EDM, May 24, June 7, 2023, July 16, 2024, January 22; Bne Intellinews, July 29, 2024; TASS, January 26). As Lukashenka continues to cling to power, he faces balancing internal challenges and external dependencies.

The Lukashenka regime has attempted to legitimize the election by labeling any protests or demonstrations against the results as extremist. On election day, the Investigative Committee identified 365 participants in protests abroad and threatened them with charges of “extremism” (BelTa, January 27). Rather than strengthen the regime’s legitimacy, however, such threats reveal Lukashenka’s fear of dissent. A politician with the overwhelming support he has claimed would have no reason to worry about opposition from a few hundred emigrants.

As per tradition, leaders of several countries, including Russia, the People’s Republic of China, and India, congratulated Lukashenka on his reelection. Behind the facade of “nationwide support,” however, lies the troubling reality of international isolation. The 2020 popular uprising, when hundreds of thousands of Belarusians took to the streets against election fraud, remains Lukashenka’s deepest trauma (see EDM, August 10, 2020, August 16, 2023; Euro News, September 27, 2020).  He publicly refers to protesters as “traitors” who chose prison or exile (BBC, November 22, 2021). Over the past five years, more than 300,000 people have left the country, a significant loss for a nation of just nine million (United Nations, March 20, 2024). Despite the absence of mass protests in 2025, Lukashenka understands that any spark could ignite a new fire.

According to unofficial sources, since 2020, there has been an agreement with the Kremlin that Lukashenka will not run for office again but instead hand over power to a successor (Interfax, August 9, 2021). His decision to break this promise was a personal humiliation for Russian President Vladimir Putin, though publicly, Putin limited himself to formal congratulations (Kremlin.ru, January 27). Moscow will likely capitalize on Lukashenka’s need for legitimacy by continuing to see deeper integration in economic and military cooperation, including the deployment of nuclear weapons, the establishment of military bases, and control over Belarus’s energy and information sectors (see EDM, May 9, November 27, 2024, February 12, March 13). New joint military exercises are planned for later in 2025, which will resemble the Zapad-2021 maneuvers that preceded the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (see EDM, September 9, 16, 2021; TASS, February 22). While an additional invasion seems unlikely for now, the risks remain.

As is tradition, Lukashenka’s first foreign visit after the election was to Moscow (President of the Republic of Belarus; President of Russia, March 13). This visit took place before Lukashenka’s formal inauguration and may have been deliberately timed to coincide with U.S. presidential envoy Steven Witkoff’s visit to Moscow (TASS, March 14). The deployment of Russia’s Oreshnik missile, nuclear weapons, or military forces in Belarus are all valid leverage that the Kremlin could in negotiations with the United States to begin peace talks  (see EDM, February 3, 13, March 13). 

During his visit, Lukashenka addressed the Federation Council, speaking about generational change in politics and justifying his election participation as a response to public demand (CTV.by, March 14). Lukashenka’s immediate goals include securing new loans, constructing a second nuclear power plant, and expanding logistics routes for access to Russian ports. These goals may be at risk as, shortly before his trip, Lukashenka was informed by the governor of Russia’s Primorsky Krai, Oleg Kozhemyako, that the Belarusian port project in the region had been postponed for financial reasons, though such decisions are made at the presidential or government level in Russia (President of Belarus; RBC, March 11). This may indicate both economic difficulties in Russia and a political decision to reduce Belarusian funding, in which case the Kremlin is likely to push for deepening integration under the “two countries, one economy” formula (RG.ru, June 6, 2024). If necessary, supranational bodies within the Union State and a common currency could be introduced, further increasing Belarus’s dependence and effectively restoring a mini-Soviet Union, something Lukashenka resists. 

Lukashenka is seeking external support to ease Russian pressure but has few bargaining chips for his partners. The West is interested in severing Minsk’s ties with Moscow and Beijing, while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) seeks guarantees for safe transit through Belarus (TASS, July 21, 2021; Belmarket, June 29, 2024; PlanB, February 17). 

Now that his presidency is secured for the next five years, one of the key issues Lukashenka must address is the fate of more than 1,400 political prisoners who have been behind bars since 2020 (see EDM, June 4, July 11, September 25, 2024, February 20). In February, 33 Nobel laureates once again appealed to world leaders, including U.S. President Donald Trump, urging immediate action for the release of Belarusian political prisoners  (Bolkunets.org, February 17). Decisive steps are necessary for these hostages to be freed, yet most world leaders have limited their policy to expressing statements of deep concern (European Parliament, September 19, 2024). For the new Trump administration in the United States, negotiating the release of these prisoners may afford a unique opportunity to solve a problem that others have failed to address and add to his achievements the historic case of freeing the remaining political hostages.

For Lukashenka, political prisoners are not a problem but a tool for pressure and survival. In early February, U.S. State Department representatives visited Minsk, where, according to media reports, a deal was discussed. This entailed the release of some prisoners in exchange for easing sanctions on Belarusian banks and the potash sector. Three prisoners, including a U.S. citizen, were freed (U.S. Embassy in Belarus, February 12; Meduza, February 16; see EDM, February 20). It is unclear whether this deal was a unilateral gesture by Minsk toward the West or a request from Moscow as part of a broader agreement between Putin and Trump. Either way, Lukashenka will attempt to win the favor of the new U.S. president despite having previously spoken negatively of him (Pozirk, October 23, 2024). Propagandists are even announcing a possible visit by the U.S. President to Belarus (Sputnik Belarus, March 18). A major benefit of positive U.S.-Belarus relations would be the removal of sanctions. Lifting U.S. sanctions would allow Belarus to become a transit hub for circumventing restrictions on Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Latvia, July 16, 2024). The Kremlin may support such a scenario if it aligns with a potential deal with the United States.

Lukashenka’s relations with the PRC are also complicated. The Belarusian President announced a visit to Beijing in early January before the elections, but the trip never occurred (BelTA, January 3). It is likely that the Kremlin insisted on postponing the trip, while the PRC, despite supporting Belarus, coordinated its actions with Russia, including over peace settlements in its war against Ukraine (President of Russia, January 21; PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs; TASS, February 24).

Lukashenka is seeking a seat at the negotiating table on a settled peace between Ukraine and Russia (BelTA, February 27, March 13; News.by, March 14; see EDM, March 18). This aligns with Lukashenka’s attempts to portray Belarus as a “bridge between the West and the East” (President of Belarus, November 15, 2010; Belarus.by, September 11, 2016; TASS, August 18, 2018). His chances of success, however, are minimal. Lukashenka’s reputation is tarnished by his role as Russia’s accomplice in the war against Ukraine, and trust in him among all negotiation participants is virtually nonexistent (RBC-Ukraine, January 28; Ukrainian National News, March 15). For many in the West, Lukashenka is merely a Kremlin puppet with nothing significant to offer (Politico, June 2, 2023). Most likely, Lukashenka will remain sidelined in the negotiations or be invited at the last moment to rubber-stamp a multilateral agreement if needed.

In addition to diplomatic relations, the next five years will require Lukashenka to foster positive economic relations abroad. Minsk has been actively searching for markets to sell its products, primarily agricultural machinery, in African countries (BelTA, January 28). This is part of Lukashenka’s strategy to diversify exports after losing Western markets due to sanctions. These markets, however, remain insignificant and have a low margin. The main profits from these deals do not go to the state budget but instead end up in offshore accounts (Zerkalo, January 25, 2023; Belsat, July 10, 2024). The money flows through intermediary firms, often registered in tax havens and linked to Lukashenka’s inner circle (Belarusian Investigative Center, October 11, 2022; Belarusian Investigative Center, November 21, 2024). As a result, agricultural machinery exports are less about economic development and more about enriching Lukashenka’s family.

Not only is Lukashenka unable to sever ties with Moscow due to economic and political dependence, but he also has no desire to do so, viewing the Kremlin as a safeguard against the West. His behavior demonstrates an aim to balance external forces to preserve his family’s status and control, particularly of key economic sectors of the country. In this, Lukashenka resembles the late-stage rule of the Ceaușescu family in Romania or the Assad clan in Syria. Holding power in such regimes, however, does not guarantee long-term security, as everything can collapse suddenly. The question of political transition in Belarus has been postponed indefinitely. The fate of Lukashenka will most likely be decided in Moscow, possibly considering the opinions of the PRC and the United States.