Many Russians Outraged by Government Promotion of Underage Pregnancy to Boost Birthrate

Executive Summary:

• Nearly half of Russia’s regional leaders have launched programs to give payments of up to 150,000 rubles ($1,600) to underage girls who become pregnant and give birth as a way to reverse Russia’s demographic decline and win favor from the Kremlin.
• This policy has been pushed as a way to significantly improve Russia’s falling birth rates and reverse decreasing fertility rates by lowering the age at which women give birth to their first children. 
• Russia’s moral authorities, demographers, and some senior officials are opposed to the policy because it is unlikely to be effective at increasing the birthrate and will undermine “traditional values” by encouraging pregnancy outside of marriage.

Russia’s longstanding demographic decline is accelerating, prompting the Kremlin to look for ways to slow or reverse the trend (see EDM, September 13, 2016, October 24, 2023, October 31, 2024). Each year, Russia sees more than half a million more deaths than births, meaning that any growth would come from immigration, which faces unpopularity among a rising tide of xenophobia in Russia (The Moscow Times, January 1; see EDM, May 15, October 22, 2024, April 10). Urbanization and social change mean that women are having their first child later or not having children at all (RBC; Kasparov.ru, July 26, 2024; Business Online, February 9). Demographic shortfalls are likely to constrain the Kremlin’s economic and military plans (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 18, 2024). The costs of changing demographic decline at its roots, by boosting incomes and improving economic prospects, are prohibitively high amid Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine (see EDM, October 31, 2024).

Putin and his government have been seeking ways to mitigate population decline without making fundamental or expensive changes. The Kremlin has restricted access to abortion—despite studies showing it does little to boost birthrates—and pushes the idea that having children is the duty of women to support Russia’s national security (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, July 28, 2023; see EDM, March 13; Nakanune.ru, April 17). Now, following the latest appeal to Russians to have more children, the government is pushing a new strategy. On February 11, the Kremlin called on the federal subjects to adopt programs to give one-time bonuses as large as 150,000 rubles ($1,600) to underage girls who get pregnant and carry their babies to term (Infox.ru, April 10). 

Following the Kremlin’s implicit and explicit promotion of this policy, nearly half of all the country’s federal subjects—a total of 41 as of last count—have adopted such programs. These programs are often established in place of long-standing programs to discourage underage pregnancies (Telegram/@horizontal_russia, December 25, 2024; Meduza, April 7; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 11; Says Not Moscow, April 14). Many regional leaders are resisting adopting such programs, either because they do not have the money to fund them or because they doubt that promoting childbirth among teenagers is a good idea (Infox.ru; RIA Novosti, April 10). Crucially, opposition to this policy has spread to Moscow. Leaders with moral authority in the Duma, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the media view state support for the births of children outside of marriage as undermining “traditional” values (Vechernyaya Moskva, 360.ru, March 24; Vedomosti, April 2; Readovka, April 9). Russian demographers also argue that the program will not actually increase birth rates as its backers claim. The program would instead give taxpayer money to underage girls who are already pregnant or who see pregnancy as a quick way to get money rather than to those who are genuinely interested in becoming mothers (Telegram/@rakshademography, March 28; Noviye Izvestiya, April 5). Opposition has spread to senior government officials, including reportedly at least two ministers, who appear to be affected by the moral financial arguments of others. These ministers and other government officials are working to reverse the policy, albeit behind closed doors, given Putin’s support for such programs (The Moscow Times; Telegram/@faridaily24, April 11). 

It is unclear whether this growing opposition will end this program or at least prevent its expansion. Russia’s birthrate is at an unprecedented low, with the lowest annual recorded births in 2024 since 1999 (1.222 million) (The Moscow Times, April 11). The public largely opposes increasing immigration to compensate for these low rates, creating tension with the Kremlin’s need for population growth to sustain the Russian economy, military, and law enforcement. While it appears unlikely that the government is ready to make payouts for pregnant teenagers a country-wide program given the scale of opposition to the policy, it is probably equally unlikely that the Kremlin will end all such programs, hoping they will yield at least a few more children and save face for the program’s regional supporters (Rosbalt, March 25). The program is likely to continue, although in fewer places and with less money, as yet another example of how the continued existence of Russian federal structures matter despite Putin’s attempts to gut federalism of its more familiar meanings.  

The impact of demographic policies on Russia’s ethnic makeup will affect the longevity of these policies. On the one hand, birthrates are declining in non-Russian republics of the North Caucasus, which had historically higher birthrates, meaning that Moscow can no longer count on the region to compensate for population decline in the rest of the country (Argumenty i fackty, December 20, 2024; Akcent.site, April 14). On the other hand, in the past, when Moscow had subsidized births through its maternal capital program, there was the unintended consequence of boosting birthrates in groups that the Kremlin was less interested in growing and not having an equivalent impact on the ethnic Russian population (Window on Eurasia, January 16). Given that ethnic Russians typically have children later, government subsidies to underage girls who have children will likely increase birth rates among minority groups more than among ethnic Russians. 

Unintended consequences of financial incentives for underage pregnancies may widen the argument over this specific policy into one about the government’s broader demographic policies, which up to now have not addressed many of the most important problems and typically made them worse (Window on Eurasia, January 26, 2024). Debates among governors, experts, legislators, and inside the federal government could expand further because the only way to address demographic problems successfully is to address an entire range of social and political issues. Consequently, despite the issue being seemingly piquant and marginal, paying government money to teenagers as a means of growing the population could quickly become a political discussion in the capital between Moscow and the federal subjects. This could ultimately shake the regime and even push Russia toward a very different future.