Russia Facing Loss of Icebreaker Dominance in Arctic

Executive Summary:

• Russia currently has the largest fleet of icebreakers in the Arctic. Its lead over others, however, is somewhat deceptive as most are small and devoted to clearing ice from harbors rather than keeping the Northern Sea Route open.
• The United States, Canada, and Finland, with much smaller fleets, have now committed to building 90 icebreakers by 2030. This, along with global warming and an expanding Chinese fleet, will dash Moscow’s hopes of dominating the region and its resources.
• Moscow may decide to act in the Arctic before losing its overwhelming advantage, setting the stage for possible moves that could trigger a dramatic expansion in East-West tensions. 

Moscow has long counted on its large fleet of icebreakers—containing 41 ships, seven of which are nuclear—to ensure its control not only of the Northern Sea Route but also of access to the natural resources in and under the Arctic Sea (Russian Transportation Ministry, February 20). The Kremlin apparently sees this as a reasonable assumption given the role of such ships in that ice-bound ocean and the much smaller icebreaker fleets other countries have fielded, as no other country has more than a handful of icebreakers (Rosbalt, July 15). However, three developments now call this dominance into question:

1. Global warming has left more, but far from all, of the Arctic ice-free. This has allowed more ships to transit without icebreaker support and even creates the possibility of opening alternative routes and reducing the importance of Russia’s current advantage (see EDM, October 3, 2017; The Barents Observer, July 12).
2. Outside powers have become increasingly active in the Arctic. China, which now defines itself as “a near Arctic” country, has been rapidly expanding its icebreaker fleet. Earlier this month, the United States, Canada, and Finland committed themselves to building as many as 90 icebreakers by 2030 (The White House; CTV News; Reuters, July 11; The Barent Observer, July 12).
3. Problems in Russia’s shipyards and its inability to make use of those in other countries due to sanctions means that Moscow has little hope of countering these challenges and thus will likely lose its advantages in the north (Window on Eurasia, November 18, 2022, April 4).

As a result, despite continuing Russian claims that Western and even Chinese efforts to catch and surpass Moscow’s icebreaker fleet in the Arctic will not succeed, the Kremlin can clearly see the writing on the wall (Portnews.ru, March 8). Moscow may very well decide to take action in the Arctic before it loses its current advantages over both China and the West—a decision that would make an expanded conflict there more likely in the short term (see EDM, March 30).

Russia has the longest Arctic coastline of any country in the world and has viewed the Arctic both as an east-west transit route via the Northern Sea Route and as a source of natural resources. Moscow also sees the region as its own territory from which others should be excluded. Russia has long had the largest icebreaker fleet in the world. The size of its fleet, while enormous relative to all others, even taken together, is frequently overstated. Most of its 41 icebreakers are small and devoted to keeping ports and adjoining rivers navigable rather than being able to project Russian power further into the Arctic. Only seven of its ships are nuclear-powered, and many are aging and now forced to undergo significant repairs that keep them off-duty for months or even years at a time (Sudostroenie.info, July 22). Until recently, Moscow had sought to compensate for its longstanding domestic difficulties by relying on shipyards in other countries. However, in addition to depriving Russia of the much-needed parts it requires to repair or modernize existing ships, Western sanctions have largely made that impossible (The Barents Observer, January 19, 2022, June 24). Having lost those options, Moscow has increasingly turned to China in hopes that the growing number of Chinese icebreakers will work with, rather than against, Russian interests. Some in Russia, however, fear that China will help now only to turn against Russia in the future, when Beijing, rather than Moscow, could become the paramount power in the north (see EDM, May 6, 2021; The Barents Observer, July 10).

The deterioration of Russian relations with the West has not only cost it access to Western shipyards and spare parts. It has also prompted Western countries to focus more on the Arctic as well as other regions and take steps to ensure that Moscow will not be in a position to threaten Western interests there. The new US Arctic strategy document released earlier this year highlights the need for the West to build up its icebreaker fleet to counter threats from Moscow (see EDM, April 4). At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Washington earlier this month, the United States, Canada, and Finland signed an agreement committing themselves to build 70 to 90 new icebreakers by 2030. If this commitment is met, Russia, even together with China, will lose its advantages in this sector well before that time (The Barents Observer, July 12). Russian and some Western commentators have expressed skepticism about the ability of these countries to bring such ships online so quickly, as icebreakers typically take five or more years to construct. In Russia, this timeline is even longer (Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, July 21). The sharing of expertise among the three countries, however, gives reason to believe that they—now all NATO allies—will be able to do so.

A bigger problem is that many in both Russia and the West believe that global warming may soon make all such construction irrelevant by leaving the Arctic free of ice. This will not be the case, however, for at least the next decade or more. On the one hand, while global warming has affected the Arctic profoundly overall, it has left some regions and routes more at risk of ice than others. Warmer winds have sent icebergs in those directions, requiring cargo ships to be accompanied by icebreakers. That is especially the case in the eastern portions of the Northern Sea Route, meaning that icebreakers will be required for some years to come (Profile.ru, May 31, 2022). On the other hand, if global warming does allow others to open alternative routes or expand mining elsewhere in the northern ocean, those countries involved will want the defensive capacity icebreakers give them to defend against any threats to their interests in the Arctic. That is certainly the case with the United States and Canada, but it is also true for other Arctic states. (On alternative routes that may open up, see the map provided at The Barents Observer, July 12.)

Some Russian commentators are counting on Western countries to find it technically or politically impossible to construct 70 to 90 new icebreakers by the end of this decade. They have even proclaimed that “the United States has lost the icebreaker race to Russia,” even snidely adding that “to paraphrase an ancient author, NATO’s ice-breaking tortoise will never catch up with Russia’s icebreaking Achilles” (Fond Strategicheskoi Kul’tury, July 21). It is true that icebreakers are not the only military asset in the North, but unless the West backs away from its new commitments, it will be Russia and not the West that will lose this race.