Russia Uses Educational Institutions to Bolster Future Mobilization Capacity

Executive Summary:

• Russia is accelerating societal militarization through aggressive conscription tactics and the rapid expansion of military training in civilian education, aiming to create a long-term, competent force while limiting civilian access to higher education.
• Russia is opening more Military Training Centers and reopening command academies, demonstrating a strategic effort to replenish officer and non-commissioned ranks and reinforce centralized military control amid heavy losses in Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s experience in Russia’s war demonstrates the crucial role of trained reservists, leading Kyiv to implement comprehensive reforms such as providing universal military training for all students and military departments in universities and enhancing reserve mobilization structures.
• Russia’s intensified militarization signals preparation for a prolonged confrontation, but Europe’s lack of preparation risks leaving it underprepared if tensions with Russia continue to rise.

On March 30, Russian riot police and military enlistment officers conducted a raid on a Spirit Fitness club in Moscow to search for people evading military registration. Officers forced those in the club to put their faces to the floor and separated them by ethnicity while checking their passports to verify their military registration. This raid occurred just days before Russia’s spring draft held on April 1 (Telegram/msk1_news, March 30; The Moscow Times, March 31). The Kremlin is directing its efforts toward the full-fledged militarization of society by expanding its military training programs for universities in a way that ensures the long-term competence of its fighting forces (see EDM, November 8, 2023, September 19, 2024). Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has been undergoing “reverse industrialization,” which has led to limited, if any, access to higher education for a substantial portion of the population. The Kremlin is actively limiting access to higher education, instead promoting vocational training, factory work, and, crucially, military service. Those who do access Russian higher education institutions encounter new mobilization and military training programs promoted by the Kremlin (see EDM, March 4).

One key aspect of this strategy is the expansion of military training programs within civilian educational institutions. Russia inherited the concept of military training programs within civilian educational institutions from the Soviet Union’s “military departments,” where university students could undergo military training as a means of avoiding conscription (Armyhelp.ru, September 13, 2023). In 2019, however, the Russian government issued a resolution that consolidated all military departments and faculties into Military Training Centers (Военно-учебный центр, Voenno-uchebnyi tsentr, or VUC) (Government of the Russian Federation, July 3, 2019). According to the resolution, the consolidation would increase the efficiency of higher education institutions in supporting Russia’s defense and security.

In 2019, a total of 93 VUCs were established. This increased to 109 VUCs in 2021 and 137 VUCs in 2024 (Pravo.gov.ru, March 15, 2019; Rossiiskaya Gazeta, May 21, 2021). The latest reports indicate there are more than  60,000 students undergoing training at Russian VUCs (Bulletin of Military Education, January/February). The steady increase in the number of VUCs demonstrates the prioritization of military training in Russia’s education system. Training is not limited to future officers as it also includes enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers. Given the scale of Russia’s losses in its war against Ukraine and the need for a continuous flow of trained reserves, this system plays a crucial role in sustaining the country’s military capabilities (Bulletin of Military Education, January/February; see EDM, March).

In addition to VUCs, which primarily train reserve officers, the Russian Ministry of Defense is reviving military schools that were closed in the 1990s and 2000s. This includes the Novocherkasskoye Command School of Communications, the Saratov Command Artillery School, the Saratov Command School for Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense, and the Ulyanovsk Flight School of Long-Range Aviation. There are also plans underway to create a command school of ground forces in the Irkutsk oblast, along with further planned reinforcements of the Russian Armed Forces (Donland.ru, December 3, 2024; IRK.ru, January 18; 164.ru, February 6; 173.ru, March 3; Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 4)

One of the priorities in creating more military schools is the need for junior and mid-level commanders in Russia’s armed forces. The Russian Armed Forces have traditionally been characterized by a high degree of centralization and top-down control, partly due to the low level of education among troops, and also because the country has, for the most part, been a dictatorship with authoritarian forms of control (Poulsen and Staun, 2021). Junior and mid-level commanders, therefore, are a core part of ensuring Befehlstaktik (execution of detailed orders) in the lower levels of the armed forces.

European countries do not have the equivalent training programs to Russia’s VUC initiative.  Poland is the only country that has implemented a comparable program, Legia Akademicka, but it remains far smaller in scope than the VUC initiative (Warsaw University of Life Sciences, accessed March 28). Legia Akademicka has steadily expanded since its launch as a pilot program in 2017, adapting to evolving security challenges. Initially, around 5,000 university students expressed interest in the program, but only 3,000–3,500 successfully completed all training stages, obtaining reserve private status. Many dropped out due to the rigorous physical training requirements. By 2022, more than 16,000 students had completed practical training (Radio Maryja, February 27, 2022; Central Military Recruiting Center, accessed March 27).

By 2019, the program had evolved to three tiers of training, including Basic, Non-Commissioned Officer (Sergeant), and Officer. The Polish Ministry of National Defense reported an annual participation rate of around 10,000 students, indicating a growing interest in the program (University of Silesia in Katowice, February 12, 2021; Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa, January 31, 2023). Despite its progress, Legia Akademicka is still limited in scale compared to Russia’s VUC system. While Poland is actively working to expand its military reserves, most European nations have been slow to implement similar programs.

Concerns in Germany over Russia’s military ambitions have led to calls for a reassessment of German defense strategies that have long been shaped by post-World War II pacifism and reliance on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Bavaria’s Christian Social Union has proposed reinstating conscription, a move that would mark a major shift in German military policy (Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 4).

Germany suspended compulsory military service in 2011, transitioning to a fully professional army (Buzer Legal Register, August 15, 2011). While this decision aligned with the broader European trend of downsizing armed forces, it has left Germany with a severe personnel shortage, totaling 260,000 people (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, September 2024; Bundeswehr, January 31). The Bundeswehr currently struggles to meet its recruitment targets, and reports indicate that military readiness is below sufficient levels (DW, February 2, 2024). Reinstating conscription in Germany could significantly enhance its defensive capabilities, but the process of reintroducing and implementing such a system would take years.

Until 2025, Ukraine had numerous military training departments, similar to VUCs, but they did not undergo a full-fledged reform (Verkhovna Rada, last updated March 27). These departments resemble the Soviet system of training reserve officers. The quality of training of such officers, however, leaves much to be desired. The Ukrainian government has recently amended the Law of Ukraine on Military Duty and Military Service to provide for basic military training for university students (Verkhovna Rada, January 9). Starting in September 2025, Ukraine will provide universal military training for all students and military departments in all universities. Not all of them will receive officer training, but all of them will undergo appropriate training to acquire the skills of a soldier (Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, January 17).

The military reserve system in Ukraine began developing in 2006. Volunteers signed contracts, underwent training, and participated in exercises as part of regular units. By 2013, however, the number of reservists did not exceed 2,000 people (Ukrainian Military Pages, May 19, 2016). With the onset of hostilities in the Donbas region of Ukraine, reservists were mobilized to bolster combat units. In 2015, a law was passed to create the operational military reserve of the first category, to which discharged military personnel were automatically enrolled (Ukrainian Military Pages, March 25, 2015). This significantly strengthened the country’s mobilization potential.

Ukraine planned to have up to 50,000 reservists by the end of 2020 who would undergo training for up to 60 days per year (Ukrainian Military Pages, May 19, 2016; Verkhovna Rada, June 17, 2020). A second reserve category was also introduced to form new brigades. The reform also envisioned dividing the military reserve into operational, mobilization, and civic categories, making the system more effective (Verkhovna Rada, June 17, 2020). Ukraine values an efficient reserve corps because it was essential in the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, along with a combination of Soviet and Western mobilization systems. A functioning reserve force has also provided the foundation for further training of newly formed brigades as Russia continues its war (Ukrainian Military Pages, July 3, 2020; see EDM, June 14, 2022).

Russia’s war against Ukraine has clearly demonstrated the importance of a trained reserve. Ukraine’s experience in this war demonstrates how the availability of trained personnel can be an effective asset in ensuring national defense. The recent policy shifts in Lithuania, Poland, and Germany reflect growing recognition of the need for enhanced military preparedness (Lituanistika.lt, March 10, 2023; Militarnyi, December 11, 2024). The pace of these changes, however, remains slow compared to the rapid militarization efforts in Russia.

By expanding its VUC system, reopening command academies, and intensifying conscription efforts, Russia appears to be preparing for a long-term confrontation with the West. While Eastern European nations have taken proactive steps to bolster their military readiness, much of Western Europe remains reluctant to embrace significant defense reforms. The slow response raises concerns about whether European states will be adequately prepared should tensions with Russia escalate further.