Russian Army Degrading in Ukraine, Threatening Moscow Both There and at Home

Executive Summary:

• The Russian military in Ukraine is suffering from various signs of degradation. The longer the war goes on, the more these trends are likely to intensify, threatening Moscow’s ability to conduct military operations and maintain order at home.
• The battlefield degradation is seeping back into Russia as veterans of the conflict return, with many behaving in a more criminal fashion than did the veterans of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and the Russian invasions of Chechnya in the 1990s and 2000s.
• The Kremlin is worried. Thus far, Moscow has thought it could keep the situation in check with carrots (e.g., massive payments to soldiers) and sticks (e.g., increased repression). At least some in Russia want the war to end lest a degraded military threaten the regime as it has in the past.
• The Putin regime fears that the veterans who are now returning home may not become the “new elite” the Kremlin leader has promised but rather become “guns for hire” or form their own criminal enterprises.

The degradation of the Russian army in Ukraine is intensifying with each passing month. Corruption is spreading, desertion is rising, and “fragging” is beginning to appear more (see EDM, June 27). These phenomena, however, have not blocked Moscow, which uses a combination of carrots and sticks, from continuing its war. Even so, these problems are already forcing commanders to behave differently, lest the rot spread. These developments, along with the rising death tolls that Moscow is working hard to conceal, are having an impact at home, further softening support for the war and exacerbating societal discontent (see EDM, July 16; Window on Eurasia, July 19). This reality is making it increasingly difficult for the Kremlin to raise the forces it needs to fill the depleted ranks of its military and calling into question Russian President Vladimir Putin’s frequent assertion that these veterans are going to become the “new Russian elite” (Interfax, February 29; see EDM, March 13; Svoboda, July 13).

Perhaps more than that, degradation in the Russian army in Ukraine is fueling crime inside Russia as veterans return (see EDM, April 1). That, in turn, is sparking fears that the new veterans will affect Russia, similar to the veterans of the Afghanistan and Chechen wars (Meduza, July 19). Fears are growing that this degradation could provoke a civil war or even become the basis for a challenge to the Putin regime itself. These worries are reflective of the degradation of the Russian imperial army in 1917, which led to the collapse of the Tsarist regime and the institution of the Provisional Government (T.me/v_pastukhov, June 5 reposted at Kasparov.ru, June 5). Such parallels might seem far-fetched at first, but they inform discussions currently taking place in Moscow.

Corruption, Desertion, and ‘Fragging’

Desertions and fragging are the most dramatic signs of the degradation of the Russian army in Ukraine. In both cases, however, at least up to now, these acts have involved relatively few soldiers and thus are crimes that the Russian authorities can cope with using the military’s various control mechanisms (Mediazona, April 12; Novaya Gazeta, June 14; see EDM, June 27). A far more significant problem is corruption, with soldiers buying their way out of being sent to the front or even being certified as wounded and allowed to return home. As this phenomenon does not have the drama that desertion or fragging do, commanders and Moscow officials want to cover up such acts because of their own complicity. As a result, these cases rarely receive much coverage. These issues have received more attention as they have intensified. With that trend, they deserve closer attention as they are fueling concerns in Moscow about the bad behavior of returning veterans.

Corruption in the Russian military has always been a problem. So much so that the Russian Defense Ministry has labeled it “one of the most serious” issues plaguing the army (Russian Ministry of Defense, accessed July 26). A mass army is a mirror of society. Before the beginning of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, Russians in uniform bribed their officers for promotion, reassignment, or leave. In a study of more than 1,000 cases in which Russian military prosecutors have charged Russian soldiers with corruption since February 2022, soldiers are now being charged for seeking preferment in various other ways (Verstka.media, January 30). The authors of the study acknowledge that the number of cases they examined understate the problem because officers have an interest in blocking such charges lest they be charged as well. They also have greater opportunities to take repressive action themselves in wartime than otherwise. The figures the Vyorstka news service has collected are striking. Even more than that, they are indicative of one of the major problems the Russian military faces in Ukraine.

The authors cite that “those who take bribes are judged more strictly than those who give them.” Since the start of the expanded war, Russian military judges “often sentenced commanders who took bribes to real terms” while letting the soldiers off with “fines and orders to return to the ranks” (Verstka.media, January 30). As a result, the risks for soldiers engaged in corruption are far lower than those for officers (see EDM, January 28, May 23, June 27). This largely explains why so many Russian soldiers are prepared to attempt to bribe their way out of difficulties and why Russian officers almost certainly will do everything they can to prevent military prosecutors from opening such cases.

The news service offers what can only be described as a price list for various “services” that those engaged in corruption seek. The prices are indicative of just how much Russian soldiers want these “services” and how much of a risk Russian officers assume by taking money and giving the soldiers what they want. According to Vyorstka, military court documents show that Russian soldiers were willing to pay from 150,000 to 1,000,000 rubles ($1,500 to $10,000) to be certified as having been wounded or even treated in the hospital, 500 to 60,000 rubles ($5 to $600) for leave, and 40,000 rubles ($400) to be excused from an order to go to the front. Soldiers have also been charged with paying bribes to be allowed to use cell phones despite the ban and live in better quarters than the army supplies (Ukrainska Pravda, July 25).

The report highlights those soldiers who are most susceptible to these actions. According to court documents and personal interviews, Vyorstka reports that cases of bribery and corruption were far more numerous among those who had signed up for service either because of enormous bonuses or because they wanted to use service in Ukraine as a way of avoiding prison time for earlier crimes (see EDM, April 13, October 31, 2023). This suggests that both the bonus system and the freeing of prisoners to fill the ranks in Ukraine—two central features of the Putin regime’s efforts to avoid having to declare a mass mobilization—are proving even more counterproductive than many have suggested (see EDM, April 1). Vyorstka’s investigation also helps explain why corruption in the ranks is exacerbating the concerns of Russian officials and ordinary Russians alike regarding the problems with returning veterans, especially those who had previously been convicts.

Returning Veterans Destabilize Russian Society

While domestic polls still show high levels of support for Putin’s war, ever more Russians are concerned about the war and the impact of returning veterans on their lives (see EDM, October 25, November 13, December 21, 2023). The disposition of Russian courts to let these veterans, whether convicted earlier or not, off with slaps on the wrist for serious crimes has further inflamed those worries (see EDM, January 19). The public’s fears have been exacerbated by recent increases in the number of such cases and by reports that the Russian government is utterly failing to treat the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that plagues a majority of Russian veterans returning from Ukraine (Window On Eurasia, December 7, 2022, July 15). The Russian population’s growing concerns have prompted some systemic opposition political figures to raise the alarm, and this past week forced a leader of the Russian Presidential Administration to address the issue in terms that will only spark more fears about a problem the Kremlin does not seem to have a handle on.

Last month, Nina Ostanina, a communist deputy in the Russian State Duma, declared that returning veterans are not the new elite Putin has promised. Rather, they represent “a danger for society.” She even called for draconian new laws to address what she described as “cancer” from metastasizing (Gazeta.ru; Meduza, June 19). In the days since, others have echoed her words—a clear sign that the Kremlin is worried. In the words of these commentators, Moscow has compelling reasons to be worried about this phenomenon and Russian attitudes toward it.

Sergey Kiriyenko, head of the Presidential Administration, gave a speech last week to the deputy governors responsible for domestic conditions in their federal subjects. He asserted that the Kremlin is worried that some of the returning veterans of the Ukrainian conflict are “poorly adapting” to life at home and that officials are calling them “the new Afgantsy,” a reference to the veterans of Afghanistan who formed criminal groups in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation 30 years ago. Moscow now feels that something must be done (see EDM, April 14, November 29, 2022, December 21, 2023, January 19).

According to Kiriyenko’s listeners, speaking anonymously, Kiriyenko offered no serious program for actually helping these veterans (Meduza, July 19). Two participants in the meeting told Meduza that Kiriyenko had indicated that handling veterans returning from Ukraine is “the main factor of political and social risk” in Putin’s new term. This is because these men are not only “poorly adapting” to social life, but many of them had earlier served time in Russian prisons and camps. Moreover, the total number of returning veterans is enormous and growing. That risks creating a situation in which the Russian people will grow increasingly hostile, not just to the veterans but to the Russian military as a whole. Kiriyenko was clear, the Meduza sources indicated, that for the Kremlin, this problem is not limited to former convicts alone but involves all veterans who have come home or will be coming home in the future.

One of the sources added, “In the case of the Afghan war, there were not as many killed and wounded; and after [World War II], the veterans returned to a country that had suffered from the war and knew it. They became involved in rebuilding and were respected and understood for what they had fought” (Meduza, July 19).

The situation is different now, he continued. “Veterans are returning to a country where a large part does not know what this war is about and has seen it only on television.” That makes society far less willing to accept and absorb the veterans from the war in Ukraine, especially since both groups have seen that “laws do not work.” Under the current circumstances, this deputy governor said, it is even more likely that the veterans will not seek to integrate but instead form criminal bands and try to take power over the population. As other reports have noted, that has already happened in a few places. Meanwhile,  Russians’ tolerance is increasing for the use of force against the veterans of Ukraine and others, making it more difficult for Moscow to find enough men to fill the depleted ranks of its military (Cherta.media, July 8; Novaya Gazeta, July 9; Svoboda, July 13).

Kiriyenko’s listeners found it odd that he described the problem in such dark terms but failed to suggest any real solution besides repeating Putin’s earlier suggestions that the returning veterans should be recruited to become part of the new political elite (see EDM, March 13). Only a few of these veterans, however, meet the educational level needed for that, Meduza points out (Meduza, July 19). The Kremlin is mistaken to think that recruiting people with criminal backgrounds or corrupted during service in Ukraine will help its reputation. Moscow will almost certainly lose out by further alienating a population that increasingly views the regime as something alien. Putting such veterans in positions of power might please the few, but the cost of doing so in terms of public support for the regime would be enormous (see EDM, April 1).

Given that danger, Meduza’s two sources concluded that “judging from [Kiriyeno’s] remarks, the higher leadership of the country still does not completely understand the extent of the risk Russia will have to deal with after the war” (Meduza, July 19). A third source close to the Kremlin added that coming to terms with those risks and designing a set of policies to deal with them will be “one of the missions” Moscow will have to take up in the coming months, whether it wants to or not.

Putin’s ‘New Elite’ Threaten Regime

Two commentators expand on these risks. One is a former Putin speechwriter who has become a Kremlin critic, and the second is a Russian analyst based in London. The first, Abbas Gallyamov, makes a dramatic but more general point. He argues that those Russians who have volunteered to fight for Putin in Ukraine either to escape prison or receive large bonuses represent a serious threat to the Kremlin leader. Their reasons for joining the war effort do not make them loyal to Putin but rather make them available for mobilization by those who oppose him (.Tochka, July 17). Based on interviews with some of these soldiers, Gallyamov says those who volunteered have done so because they suffer from low social status and low incomes and have never displayed much interest in politics. However, they see joining the military as a way to advance themselves and will be quite ready to turn on the country’s leadership if it fails to help them solve these problems.

The predecessors of such people, the masses in Italy and Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s, easily and quickly shifted from one extreme to another. American philosopher Eric Hoffer pointed this out in his 1951 classic, The True Believer. “If a people are ripe for mass movements,” Hoffer said, “this usually means that they are ready for any of them and not just for any one movement with a certain doctrine or program.” The leaders of both groups understood this. Hitler, for example, looked at German communists as potential Nazis. Soviet communist Karl Radek viewed the Nazi Brownshirts as a “reserve of future communists.” In the current context, this means those who take steps that seem to be acts of patriotism may very well become the most unpatriotic and revolutionary (see EDM, April 14, 2022, January 19). Thus, “it is quite possible to imagine these very people rebelling against the authorities. That is exactly how it was in 1917”—a warning to the current Russian regime.

Vladimir Pastukhov of London’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies focuses on the implications of what Putin has done or allowed to happen. He argues that the return of veterans in increasingly large numbers, especially in the event of a ceasefire or peace agreement, could trigger a civil war. This danger is especially real as veterans with a criminal past or experience of criminality in the Russian army will believe that they are immune from any severe punishments and can act with impunity (T.me/v_pastukhov, reposted at Kasparov.ru, June 5). Such an environment will pose a challenge to the Putin regime by creating “a situation like the cold summer of 1953 when thousands of criminals were amnestied all at once by [Head of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NVKD, Soviet Secret Police) under Stalin, Lavrentiy] Beria’s decree and in postwar Odesa where actual power was seized for a time by criminal groups.”

Pastukhov then suggests that “a stream of criminal rabble will simply pour into Russia. … Local communities will have to confront a situation in which the Kremlin will seek to position this criminal rabble as the new elite ‘like veterans of the Afghan and Chechen wars’” but in much larger numbers. The Russian expert says that this “will only add fuel to the fire and make the conflict even deeper,” as will “the connivance of the police who will try to avoid taking sides in what will increasingly appear to everyone to be a civil war between these criminal groups of returning soldiers, other criminal groups, and the population.” While these conflicts may not prove to be “the central battle in the looming civil war” in Russia, Pastukhov argues that it is “obvious they will not be its least important or noticeable features.” All the more so because this massive phenomenon is one that the Putin regime, by its decision to use criminals in the military in large numbers, has created (T.me/v_pastukhov, reposted at Kasparov.ru, June 5).

The London-based Russian expert does not say directly, but it is an equally obvious conclusion from his argument that many Russians may thus fear the end of the war even as they fear its continuation. Putin is likely relying on this growing worry to ensure that support for his war will remain relatively high. Many Russians remember that it was the dissolution of the Russian Imperial Army in 1916–17 that led first to the collapse of Tsardom and then to the overthrow of the Provisional Government. However, how long such fears will work in the Kremlin leader’s favor and not against him is very much an open question, one that Kiriyenko and other Putin advisors have not yet been willing to confront or come up with a serious program to block.