War Against Ukraine Leaving Russian Police State Without Enough Police

Executive Summary:

• The number of policemen in the Russian Federation has declined significantly since the start of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as many have gone to fight. Now, more than a third of the police positions in Russia are vacant.
• Lack of manpower has reduced the police’s ability to prevent and solve crimes, prompted Russians to take matters into their own hands, including with the use of firearms, and forced the police to use personnel from abroad or cooperate with independently organized law enforcement groups.
• Police personnel shortages have had little impact on Kremlin repression, which other agencies generally carry out, but it is corroding public confidence in Moscow’s ability to prevent crime from rising, especially as veterans return home.

Despite Russia having more police officers per capita than any other major country—almost twice as many per capita as the European Union and 2.5 times more than the United States—and having a well-earned reputation as a police state, the Russian Federation has long faced a crisis in putting enough policemen on the beat (see EDM, March 11). According to a new study by the outlet “To Be Precise” (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, Если Быть Точным), the situation is rapidly worsening (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, October 21). The independent investigative portal says that the number of policemen in Russia has declined by more than nine thousand since the start of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as poorly paid and overstretched police have left their posts for the army, where they can make far more money. Their departures mean that 36 percent of the roughly 40,000 police positions mandated by Russian law are now vacant. Many police stations are fully or partially empty, forcing policemen still at their posts to serve far more hours than they are supposed to (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, October 21).

Up to now, this personnel shortage has had relatively little impact on the regime’s repression, a strategy that relies primarily on other government agencies. The shortage of policemen, however, is corroding public confidence in Moscow’s ability to protect the population from crime during the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine, sparking fears that public safety will be even worse when the war ends and veterans return home (V Krizis.ru, March 5). The growing shortage of police officers has led some Russians to take matters into their own hands, forcing the police to lower hiring standards and prompting stations to recruit personnel from abroad (Govorit Nemoskva, June 19; Natsionalniy Aktsent, October 20; Vazhnie Istorii, October 21). Law enforcement has also started cooperating with independently organized militias, such as the Russian Community, which often have agendas at least nominally separate from those of the Kremlin (see EDM, October 3, 2024; V Krizis.ru, March 5; Mediazona; Meduza, May 30).   

To Be Precise’s study is especially valuable because Moscow is chary about releasing data about its security forces. The article documents the decline in the number of policemen on the beat over the past decade, and calls attention to the fact that today “in almost all Russian regions, there are not enough officers” (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, October 21). It notes that in distant villages poorly connected to district centers by road, there are now no police. Even in major cities, there are many cases where one officer is doing the work two had done in the past. In some “cities of Leningrad oblast, one officer on the beat is doing the work that seven did earlier” (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, October 21).  As a result, many crimes are never registered, and far fewer are solved.

According to St. Petersburg criminologist Ekaterina Khodzhayeva, policemen on the beat are “the workhorses of the [public safety] system,” responsible for monitoring the state of crime in their area:

The first representative of the state with whom an individual comes in contact regarding almost any problem … the first to go in the case of family scandals and street fights, to calm drunken neighbors, to keep track of those with suspended sentences, to help pensioners cope with fraudsters, to see young people of have gone missing, and to monitor places where alcohol is being sold (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, October 21).

When there is no policeman available, no one is effectively carrying out those tasks, which can transform small problems into much larger ones.

With each passing month, there are fewer policemen to meet these challenges. Between 2017 and 2022, the number of police officers on the beat decreased from 44,000 to just under 40,000. Since the start of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, their number has declined to 30,000 (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, October 21). Those figures, as bad as they are, reflect official government data. Khodzhayeva suggests that the real decline has been far larger because interior ministry officials often list men and women who work in central offices as police. All the unmet problems Khodzhayeva points to will almost certainly explode when veterans come back from Moscow’s war against Ukraine and return to the rural areas from which a large share of soldiers were drawn, and where there are no police to enforce the law (see EDM, February 25). Putin could then deploy military units, bring in additional foreign police, or rely more heavily on pro-Kremlin paramilitary groups to perform law enforcement, a move he has previously made in a limited capacity, but one that will certainly exacerbate popular anger (Window on Eurasia, March 7).

The problem with the Russian police force is closely linked to Putin’s war against Ukraine and how and when it will end. Khodzhayeva notes that “the main reasons for the shortage of police on the beat are low pay, overwork, excessive reporting requirements, and irregular hours” (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, October 21). Pay has always been low, “but this problem became clearer after the beginning of military actions in Ukraine” because pay for those who agreed to join the military and for those who worked at defense plants rose rapidly while pay for the police did not (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, October 21). Joining or remaining in the police force quickly became less attractive. Policemen on the beat have voted with their feet. 

Many senior officials in Moscow are worried, especially with the prospect of returning veterans, but they have not been willing to match their words with the kind of money that might successfully address the flight of Russian policemen from their jobs  (V Krizis.ru, March 5). According to a recent Levada Center poll, almost 40 percent of Russians expect the return of veterans to lead to a decline in law and order (Levada Center, October 14). Given that there will be far too few police to protect Russians in many places, fears about returning veterans could grow to the point of generating opposition to the regime.