China and Russia Expand Strategic Cooperation in Arctic Against West

Executive Summary:

• China and Russia have agreed to form a strategic partnership in the Arctic for economic development, exploitation of mineral resources, increased use of the Northern Sea Route, and military cooperation against the West.
• In response to the signing of this strategic partnership, Canada and the countries of Northern Europe have formed a new security alliance in the Arctic, thus setting the stage for heightened tensions in the region.
• The probability of open conflict with the West in the Arctic likely depends on which of the two allies is the dominant player, but tensions between them in the Arctic are certain to shake their broader alliance.

At the end of September, senior Chinese and Russian officials met in Beijing to discuss strengthening their bilateral cooperation in the Arctic under what they called “the new political conditions” to form “a comprehensive strategic partnership” to advance their joint interests (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 26). They agreed to form this partnership in the Arctic to develop the region economically, exploit mineral resources, and promote the use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), but also to cooperate against the West, a commitment that almost certainly involves a military component, although none was explicitly stated. A few days later, Canada announced it had formed a defense alliance with its fellow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries in northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) to counter Chinese and Russian actions (Charter97, October 3). These two moves, the Chinese-Russian partnership and the NATO response, will intensify growing tensions in the Arctic and could lead to open conflict. Such a conflict, however, likely depends on whether Moscow or Beijing has the upper hand in its partnership, with Moscow ready to make sacrifices for short-term gains while Beijing focuses on long-term benefits. Divergent viewpoints on Arctic policy could hurt their broader alliance.   

Over the last decade, China’s role in the circumpolar North has grown rapidly, something Russia simultaneously welcomes and fears. On the one hand, Moscow welcomes Beijing’s growing presence, as it bolsters Moscow’s support in the region and compensates for the shift of resources to its war in Ukraine. Following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s expanded invasion of Ukraine, the Arctic Council was suspended, further isolating Russia (see EDM, September 28, 2023, September 5). On the other hand, Russian officials fear the possibility that, over time, China will push Russia aside in the Arctic and become the predominant power. This development would contradict the Kremlin’s thinking about Russia’s proper role in the world (see EDM, June 12, 2019, May 6, 2021, February 1, 2022, April 4, 2023). Until recently, these conflicting calculations explained why talks between the two on the Arctic were cautious for so long.

The September meeting in Beijing represented a breakthrough in Chinese-Russian Arctic cooperation (The Barents Observer, October 2). It also reflected two much broader developments, namely, China’s growing self-confidence and Russia’s increasing need to find allies wherever it can. This latter point was underlined by Russian concessions and its need to make up for mounting problems in its shipbuilding sector (see EDM, March 2, 2023, July 25; Kommersant, October 12, 2023; ISPIonline.it, June 25; Riddle, July 15). 

The meeting and the agreement it produced  built on a number of developments in recent months. These include a series of high-level bilateral meetings, joint Chinese-Russian naval exercises in the Northern Pacific, Beijing’s increasing involvement in the Northern Sea Route and resource sites, (such as lithium at its Western end), and even promises that Chinese ships would take part in Russia’s Ocean 2024 exercises (though these promises were not kept) (The Barents Observer, August 29, September 9, 17;  SCMP, September 9; WindowonEurasia2.blogspot.com, September 13).

China shows little signs of slowing its advance into the Arctic and Russia appears willing to continue to welcome an expansion in China’s role. This will likely remain the case for, at least as long as the war in Ukraine continues and relations with the West remain in a deep freeze.The fact that China did not send ships to take part in Russian naval exercises in the Northern Atlantic in August as it had previously promised suggests there are limits to its willingness to exacerbate tensions with the West. This is despite the apparent importance of the exercises to Putin personally, who attended the exercises’ opening.  As such, it would be a mistake to think that the new agreement has eliminated each side’s concerns, however. Differences across the broad relationship are likely to have uneven impacts on relations between Moscow and Beijing in the Arctic and elsewhere; and Western powers will need to navigate this minefield so as to not threaten Western interests in the Arctic region.

Fissures in the relationship could be exploited by Western actors. Pointing out tensions and mistrust between China and Russia are important both tactically and strategically in countering the countries’ emerging but still fragile Chinese-Russian partnership. Both parties are ready to make use of each other, but are concerned that they will be exploited if given the chance. For instance, Russia will not tolerate being marginalized while China becomes the dominant player in lithium mining in Murmansk oblast or in shipping in the NSR. Neither will Beijing accept Russia failing to recognize its growing power and seeing it as the junior partnership in the relationship.  

The two countries are also far apart in how they think. Russian thinking, especially under Putin, is short-term. The current Kremlin leader may not now be looking beyond the war in Ukraine and thus is prepared to provoke conflicts that might help his cause in the short term but could prove disastrous in the long term. The leadership in Beijing has tended to think in longer time horizons. Henry Kissinger famously recounted a story about Zhou Enlai, the former Premier of the People’s Republic of China, who claimed that it was “too soon to tell” what the effects of the French political tumult in the 1960s were. The story captures something that many in the West have forgotten. In contrast to Russia, China may be quite prepared to back away now if it thinks it will be advantageous in the long term. This suggests that there is an opportunity for the West to focus on keeping China from going too far in supporting Russia, provided China sees that as a means of achieving more later. If the West does not consider China’s long-term goals, it may have fewer chances of changing Chinese behavior—an approach that will drive Beijing into Moscow’s arms.