Africa Corps Maintains Russia’s Presence in Africa After Wagner’s Departure From Mali

Executive Summary:

• The Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) announced its departure from Mali on June 6. The PMC’s operations in Africa enabled Russia to establish a network of influence on the continent and secure access to natural resources.
• Late-Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed rebellion in 2023 led to Wagner’s operations in Africa being largely taken over by the Africa Corps, a paramilitary group entirely subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense.
• The Africa Corps’ operations in place of Wagner sustain Russia’s presence in Africa but take away the Kremlin’s ability to distance itself from any crimes Russian paramilitary operations may commit on the continent.

On June 6, the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) announced that its mercenaries would withdraw from Mali after a three-and-a-half-year presence in the country (see EDM, July 9). Russia’s military presence in Mali is not ending, however, but is transitioning to another paramilitary formation under the Russian Armed Forces—the Africa Corps. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the late leader of Wagner, turned his private army against the Russian Ministry of Defense on June 23, 2023. The Wagner leader aimed to confront then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, whom he accused of attacking the mercenaries’ rear positions (Meduza, June 23, 2023). Prigozhin’s personal accusations against Russia’s top military leadership quickly became politicized, prompting a response not only from state media but also from Russian President Vladimir Putin himself (President of Russia, June 24, 2023). Additionally, regular army units and law enforcement agencies refused to resist in areas where the “rebels” were active, raising broader questions about the central government’s authority in federal districts, which could cause concern for the Kremlin (see EDM, June 27, July 11, 24, August 3, 2023). The rebellion fizzled out as quickly as it began, but Wagner continues to reap its fruits two years later, gradually ceding its spheres of influence in Africa to other Russian paramilitary structures. Despite Wagner’s departure, the Kremlin aims to maintain its influence in Africa, but through a military structure directly under the control of the Ministry of Defense.

Prigozhin’s rebellion launched long-term transformation processes in both Wagner’s operations and its role within Russia’s military system. The Kremlin recognized the need to eliminate independent centers of power, such as Prigozhin, and began redistributing Wagner’s foreign operations, a process that has not yet been fully shaped (see EDM, August 16, October 12, 2023, March 3, 27, July 31, 2024; see Jamestown Perspectives, February 3).

Largely, thanks to Prigozhin’s entrepreneurial and organizational skills, Wagner has begun establishing a network of influence in Africa since 2017 (see EDM, April 30, November 13, 2018, January 21, 2020; see Russia in the Middle East, July 13, 2018). This suited the Kremlin as a tool of foreign policy, enabling Russia to gain access to the resources and strategic assets in African countries. Wagner’s influence had different forms and extended to the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mozambique, and Mali (see EDM, March 18, 2024). For years, authorities had been turning a blind eye to the explicit legal prohibition on PMCs, as Wagner’s operations in Africa were so beneficial for Moscow.

Russian legislation bans the use of PMCs abroad and in Russia (see EDM, March 3, 2024; see Jamestown Perspectives, February 3; Legalacts.ru, accessed July 15). This did not prevent Wagner from steadily expanding its influence across the African continent, however. In the CAR, for instance, at least a thousand Wagner mercenaries were responsible for the security of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra and key facilities. The PMC also controlled gold and diamond deposits, securing Russia’s access to the country’s natural resources (see EDM, February 7, 2024). Wagner became so entrenched in the CAR that its representative, Valery Zakharov, even became a security advisor to the president (Gazeta.ru, September 20, 2024).

In countries such as Sudan, Burkina Faso, Mali, and others, Wagner mercenaries provided security for local regimes, often in exchange for access to natural resources (see EDM, March 18, 2024). A complex network of mutually beneficial relationships with local authorities on resource extraction has been established. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the export of African gold through these links has generated over $2.5 billion for the Russian leadership, funds that have been used, among other things, to fuel Russia’s sanctioned war machine (Doxa, June 30).

At the same time, Wagner’s presence in African countries has been accompanied by reports of torture and killings of local residents, as repeatedly confirmed by journalistic investigations (Mediazona, September 11, 2023). One such probe uncovered evidence that Wagner established a network of secret prisons to detain hundreds of people suspected of collaborating with Islamist militants or Tuareg separatists in Mali. In these makeshift prisons, Russian mercenaries tortured local residents. Additionally, abductions for ransom were a common practice (Vazhniye Istorii, June 12).

The publication of the investigation into the atrocities committed by Wagner in Mali coincided with the group’s announcement of its withdrawal from the region, as reported by Wagner’s press service and affiliated Telegram channels on June 6 (Telegram/razgruzka_vagnera; News.ru, June 6). Wagner’s exit from Mali is not primarily linked to the journalistic exposés on torture, however, but rather reflects the ongoing process of restructuring the group’s activities in Africa following Prigozhin’s death in August 2023. Since August 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU)—through the newly established Africa Corps—have been in control of Wagner’s overseas operations. Wagner’s armed units were integrated into Russian state security agencies, though Prigozhin’s main regional business schemes remained unchanged (Doxa, June 30).

The creation of the Africa Corps marked the end of the Wagner era in Africa, but not the end of Russian influence in the region. Moreover, having learned from past mistakes, the Kremlin has sought to make its operations on the African continent more manageable and less associated with the controversial Prigozhin.

Moscow is now counting on the Africa Corps to revive its influence in the region and remove the Western presence. Primarily, recruits and former Wagner mercenaries are being deployed to Russia-friendly countries, such as the CAR, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Niger (Ukrainska Pravda, January 30, 2024). In Mali, for instance, the Africa Corps has been involved in clashes with the Azawad Liberation Front alongside government forces. According to the rebels, 21 units of military equipment were destroyed, and dozens of Africa Corps fighters were killed in clashes in northern Mali (Novaya Gazeta, June 22).

Moscow has likely opened a flow of weapons to the region to strengthen its presence, particularly in West Africa. According to an AP investigation, sanctioned cargo ships flying Russian flags are delivering military equipment to West African ports. These shipments include tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and electronic warfare systems. Such an arsenal could significantly escalate local conflicts (AP, June 10).

While Wagner’s activities in Africa previously allowed the Kremlin to distance itself from events and avoid direct responsibility for its actions, the Africa Corps is now an official paramilitary structure directly subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense. The geopolitical and economic benefits for Moscow from strengthening its presence in Africa evidently outweigh reputational risks.