Deepening Drought in Southern Russia Threatening Moscow’s Relations with Neighbors

Executive Summary:

• The deepening drought in southern Russia is threatening the region and its food production, as well as Moscow’s relationship with neighboring states harmed by the reduced flow of the Volga River into the Caspian Sea.
• Southern Russia’s drought is having a serious negative impact on Moscow’s relationship with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan—a trend the Kremlin has responded to with a mix of bluster and attempts to calm the situation.
• The impact of southern Russia’s drought on bordering countries demonstrates how problems within Russia and Moscow’s response to them can undermine Moscow’s relations with its neighbors.

The deepening drought in the center and south of Russia is having serious consequences, including limiting the use of rivers for transportation, threatening water shortages, and undermining Moscow’s relations with neighboring countries such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Despite the annual spring flooding in Siberia and the Russian Far East attracting more attention this year, the south’s drought is having greater and longer-term effects. The environmental situation inside the Russian Federation is already dire. According to one Russian commentator, the current drought has reduced the flow of the Volga to a level not seen since 1895, forcing cutbacks in the draft of ships traveling along it, threatening agricultural production, and leading to water shortages that affect industry and the population alike (Versia, May 27). The drought is also affecting the Don River and its littoral, with water levels there significantly lower than in previous decades.

The impact of the drought on Russia’s relations with its southern neighbors, especially Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, may be as serious as its direct effects on Russia. Astana and Baku are angered by Moscow’s failure to address its drought, which is leading to lowering water levels in the Caspian Sea. Low water levels in the Caspian lead to the sea’s siltation, the destruction of essential bio-resources, and full use of seaports (see EDM, November 16, 2023, March 18; Kaspiiskii Vestnik, May 28). Some Russian commentators have responded to Kazakh anger by denouncing Kazakhstan for focusing on how the Russian drought affects Kazakhstan rather than paying closer attention to the impacts of Astana’s water policies on the Caspian (Voenno-Politicheskaia Analitika, May 29). At the same time, Russian officials have gone out of their way to reassure Azerbaijan that Moscow is doing everything possible to address the low water levels in the Caspian. Russia has also expressed its willingness to grant Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan expanded access to the Volga-Don waterways and asserted that any solution will necessitate increased international cooperation (Sea News, March 7, 2023; Kaspiiskii Vestnik, July 13, 2023, May 24, 28).

The impact of changes in the flow of trans-border rivers is already a widely recognized problem in international relations, in particular between the post-Soviet states, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China (Ritm Evrazii, November 23, 2021; Voenno-Politicheskaia Analitika, December 1, 2024). The Russian drought’s extensive impact on Moscow’s relations with its neighbors, however, suggests that the issue is becoming broader, and other climatic shifts should also be taken into consideration. These tensions are no longer just a war of words among experts, commentators, and officials, but are acquiring a military dimension, demonstrated by Kazakhstan’s naval buildup on the Caspian and, most recently, by the announcement of joint Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan naval maneuvers near the Russian shoreline of the Caspian (see EDM, November 16, 2023, January 21, April 24).

The Russian drought’s dramatic reduction of the size of the Volga’s flow into the Caspian, the most important source of water for the sea, is a significant reason for the new naval maneuvers. Historically, 80 percent of the Volga’s flow has gone into the Caspian, keeping the water levels there from declining at a more rapid rate despite filtration, evaporation, and expanded human use (Window on Eurasia, August 29, September 21, 2024). The drought in southern Russia, however, has reduced the downstream flow of the river into the Caspian by more than 15 percent of its total volume earlier in this decade. Seriously compromised Caspian water levels, especially in its northern portions, have prompted Kazakhstan to express concern (Versia, May 27). Instead of acknowledging how their drought is impacting the Caspian, however, Moscow is criticizing Astana for not considering how Kazakhstan’s water policies have reduced the flows of Kazakhstani rivers that feed the Caspian (Telegram/@Politnavigator, May 28). If the Volga were a trans-border river located in both Russia and Kazakhstan, Astana could take up the issue more directly. Because it is not, Kazakhstan is raising the issue in conjunction with partners (Ritm Evrazii, June 2).   

Astana is receiving increasing support from Baku. Many commentators in Baku are demanding that Moscow respond to Kazakhstan’s concerns about declining water levels on the Caspian, which also impact Azerbaijan (APA, May 23). The Kremlin has responded by holding meetings with Azerbaijani officials, suggesting that the best way forward is for all the littoral states to cooperate against what Moscow views as a natural trend rather than assigning blame (Kaspiiskii Vestnik, May 28). The meetings have not been enough to quiet Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan’s concerns.

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have responded by building up their navies and merchant marine fleets, which are increasing in size relative to Russia’s Caspian Flotilla (see EDM,  January 21, April 24). Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan’s fleets are more effective than Russia’s because their ships are smaller and thereby able to operate in the ever-shallowing waters of the Caspian, and because of collaboration between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (see EDM, June 24, 2021, April 25, 2023, April 24). Naval buildup does not mean that these countries are about to go to war, but it does complicate Russia’s plans to use the Caspian for north-south and east-west trade while keeping other countries, especially Türkiye, from expanding their presence there (see EDM, April 11, August 1, September 5, 2023, March 18). Moscow thus has a vested interest in keeping the conflict over the Volga’s water flow into the Caspian from escalating, at least while its attention is focused primarily on Ukraine, giving the other littoral states leverage.

There is a larger lesson here, one that is often overlooked. Developments such as the drought in the southern portions of the Russian Federation, which observers typically view as a domestic Russian problem, often have a substantial international dimension. In many cases, the international dimension may overshadow domestic aspects in their importance for Russia and neighboring countries. Moscow’s response to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan combines carrots and sticks, demonstrating that it is very much aware of the potential scale of a rift over the Volga’s flows.