Five Key Factors Behind Irregular Leadership Changes in the People’s Liberation Army

Executive Summary:

• The year 2024 witnessed sudden removals of high-level People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commanders, a continuation of the purge of 15 defense industry leaders and military commanders in 2023.
• Xi Jinping’s possible motivations include combating corruption, managing factional conflicts, asserting dominance as an aging autocrat, overcoming limited military service experience, and following successful historical precedents for control.
• The leadership disruption is expected to result in loyalty-based appointments, impair the PLA’s combat effectiveness, and generate insecurity among officers, weakening morale and operational readiness.

Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), continues to purge top commanders in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In 2024, this purge targeted those at the pinnacle of the PLA—current and former CMC members who worked with Xi on a regular basis (PLA Daily, January 8). [1] This constitutes a step up from 2023, when Xi’s anti-corruption campaign led to the downfall of 15 defense industry leaders and military commanders from the Rocket Force, Navy, Air Force, and CMC Equipment Development Department. The upheaval from the dismissals is expected to impair the PLA’s effectiveness as a military force.

Five Perspectives for Understanding the Purge

Five possible explanations lie behind the purge of top PLA commanders: a genuine desire to eradicate corruption from the PLA, a need to resolve factional conflicts, Xi’s paranoid psychology as an aging autocrat, insecurities stemming from the “peace disease,” [2] and the success of previous purges. The first is the most common explanation for the abrupt removal of PLA leaders. Both corruption and factional infighting are endemic to the military. As is typical of autocrats, Xi is paranoid about threats to his power, which not only heightens fears for his own position but also concerns about the PLA’s capabilities to deal with perceived mounting threats, which informs the third and fourth reasons. Finally, past precedents give him the confidence to execute his policies and remove high-level officers (China Brief, December 10, 2019).

The Anti-Corruption Angle

Corruption in the Chinese military is a decades-old problem. While it existed during the Mao Zedong era, matters worsened when the PLA began engaging in commercial activities, starting under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. It persisted in tandem with the rapid economic growth experienced under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, with the large amounts of cash creating additional opportunities for corruption to manifest. When Xi first came to power in late 2012, he made a concerted effort to curb military corruption with mass arrests (China Brief, July 3, 2014; February 4, 2015; The Diplomat, November 21, 2014). Nevertheless, corruption endured, albeit less blatantly. The constant flow of state funding for new military modernization projects only prompted more opportunities for graft. In recent years, corruption cases in the Navy and the Rocket Force indicate malfeasance is present at all levels of the PLA and has permeated the country’s most sensitive defense projects (The Diplomat, May 19, 2020; China Brief, September 20, 2023).

The secretive nature of the PLA and the fact that it is shielded from public scrutiny makes the persistent corruption problem inevitable. Despite Xi’s tough stance, his proclivity for promoting loyalists over talented officers has exacerbated the problem (Nikkei Asia, October 26, 2017). In addition to public transparency, professionalization of the officer corps is critical to eradicating corruption; yet under Xi, the PLA is becoming increasingly politicized (The Wire China, May 19, 2024).

Autocrats also tend to tolerate a degree of corruption in order to maintain their military chiefs’ loyalty. This is often referred to as “coup-proofing,” and helps explain why, if corruption were the sole basis for arrests, far fewer officers have been detained than one might expect (Hoover Institution, March 24, 2015). [3] Thus, corruption is unlikely the only reason for the purges of recent years. Historically, autocrats have used it as a pretext to eliminate rivals, and in this case, political considerations likely outweigh corruption concerns.

The Factional Conflict Angle

Control of the military is essential to an autocrat’s survival. However, the process of controlling the military inevitably leads to the politicization of the officer corps and the introduction of factional politics. When Xi first took power, a majority of the CMC was composed of holdover generals from the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao factions. Xi had to struggle against both Jiang and Hu’s men—imprisoning them in the name of fighting corruption—to assert control. Xi’s military faction had taken shape by 2017, and by the 20th Party Congress five years later, Xi had established factional dominance at the CMC with his loyalists controlling key offices (Nikkei Asia, October 26, 2017; CNN, December 15, 2024; China Brief, February 13, 2018; January 17).

All factions experience fragmentation, despite initial unity. This problem has likely occurred within the Xi faction, as various CMC members had begun to develop “independent kingdoms” (独立王国) in the departments under their control (Xinhua, June 27, 2024). Xi continues to maintain control over the CMC and retains the loyalty of its members, labeled the “key few (关键少数)” in a recently initiated loyalty campaign (South China Morning Post, February 8). However, it is likely that his purge is in part due to factional considerations, as he has sought to head off developing fiefdoms. It is also possible that conflicts emerged between CMC members, which Xi had to resolve. Ultimately, factional fragmentation and intra-elite conflict—persistent features of Chinese politics—posed a threat to Xi’s authority, prompting drastic measures to check the influence of some PLA commanders (ORCA, October 5, 2022).

The Aging Autocrat Angle

Authoritarian politics is full of intrigue and one misstep can lead to dire consequences. A lack of robust institutions regulating conduct leads to a preponderance of strongmen who seek to project an image of physical prowess. Compared to photos from 12 years ago when he first came into office, Xi has clearly aged (YouTube/udn video, November 15, 2012; YouTube/华人风采CN, December 5, 2024). Now 71, he has entered a period of gradual yet certain physical decline. Any existing health problems are only going to worsen with time. Like any other autocrat, as his physical fitness fades, his sense of insecurity will rise.

As a student of Chinese history, Xi is aware of times when power-hungry schemers manipulated and even overthrew once formidable monarchs in their advanced years—Duke Huan of Qi (齐桓公), Emperor Wu of Liang (梁武帝), or Emperor Xuanzong of Tang (唐玄宗) all suffered such a fate. In more recent times, the lightning collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024 and Putin’s struggle to put down the Prigozhin mutiny in the summer of 2023 only highlighted the fragility of a weakened authoritarian leader and the potential threats ambitious subordinates pose (Eurasia Daily Monitor, August 3, 2023; January 13).

Xi likely worries about similar opposition emerging from individuals surrounding him. Old age has inevitably exacerbated this fear, as it may embolden potential contenders. Previous Communist despots such as Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, who held on to power until their dying days, managed to do so using terror, frequently launching campaigns against real and imagined enemies. [4] Xi probably feels a need to act similarly. Apprehension toward the military, the most fearsome organization in the PRC, in part has motivated an increase in promoting loyalty to the CCP within the military, as well as the flattening of its force structure to centralize more control to the CMC (China Brief, April 26, 2024). By periodically intimidating PLA leaders, Xi probably hopes to prevent potential challengers from exploiting perceived vulnerabilities.

The Limited Military Experience Angle

Xi’s connections in the PLA are not as deep as he might desire. Xi has key allies at the top of the organization, including his childhood friend Zhang Youxia (张又侠) and He Weidong (何卫东), a colleague from his time serving as Fujian’s deputy party secretary and governor. Both are serving concurrently as vice chairs of the CMC. However, he lacks enduring relationships with PLA officers, and his own time spent in the military was brief—he used his father Xi Zhongxun’s (习仲勋) connections to spend three years serving as a secretary to then-Defense Minister Geng Biao (耿飚) (Global People, Issue 24, 2015; China Brief, May 11, 2017). However, despite Xi Zhongxun’s sterling military career, his association with Peng Dehuai (彭德怀)—who met his downfall opposing Mao in 1959—limited his influence. [5]

Xi’s lack of enduring relationships with PLA officers therefore creates anxiety. As he visits military installations and gives prepared speeches to poker-faced generals, Xi must wonder if they truly respect him and whether they will come to his aid in a crisis (Foreign Affairs, September 26, 2023). Xi is not unusual in this regard—both of his predecessors suffered from a lack of military experience. In Jiang’s case, Deng Xiaoping had to intervene and force senior commanders to support Jiang, while Hu never got the due respect (The New York Times [NYT], October 29, 1992; RUSI, March 18, 2005). Xi’s forcefulness in his approach to reforming the military did gain him respect, but such admiration may crumble quickly if he appears vulnerable.

The Successful Precedents Angle

Every generation of Chinese leaders has used purges to tame the military. Mao initiated purges every few years until he launched the Cultural Revolution that devastated the PLA leadership. When Deng controlled the CMC, he also instigated campaigns to purge military officers affiliated with the Gang of Four (四人帮) that had risen to power during the Cultural Revolution (PRC History, October 19, 2013). [6] In 1992, Jiang Zemin convinced Deng Xiaoping to help him remove the powerful CMC General Secretary Yang Baibing (杨白冰) (China Brief, September 5, 2018; BBC, January 16, 2013). At the end of his term, Hu initiated anti-corruption investigations against Jiang’s allies at the CMC (NYT, November 15, 2012).

All these purges turned out positively for their respective instigators, elevating the CMC chairman’s standing. The medium-risk, high-return outcomes of these campaigns have likely reinforced Xi’s confidence in using force to strengthen his position as commander-in-chief.

Leadership Instability Likely Weakens Readiness

Irregular personnel changes at the high and middle ranks of the military have frequently contributed to deteriorations in readiness. Stalin’s “Great Purge” in the late 1930s were a key factor in the Red Army’s initial failures in the Second World War (University of Chicago, February 4). In the PRC, turmoil stemming from the effects of the Cultural Revolution brought about the mediocre PLA performance in the Sino-Vietnamese War (RAND, January 27). More recently, Putin’s 2024 purge of the Russian defense ministry barely improved the Russian army’s operational efficiency in the country’s ongoing war against Ukraine (Carnegie, January 31). And in the United States, some analysts have argued that the ongoing leadership shake-up in the U.S. military is expected to negatively impact preparedness (Foreign Affairs, January 10). It is reasonable to infer from these examples that the PLA today is no exception when it comes to the effects of leadership instability on readiness.

Purges within the PLA will only worsen matters. With its officer corps already burdened by problems typical of an authoritarian regime’s military—such as corruption and cronyism—these purges will further centralization, politicization, and distrust between Xi and his commanders. Compared to ten years ago, when information on PLA personnel’s physical and mental readiness was available, nowadays such information is difficult to come by (China Brief, July 31, 2019). However, a 2013 study on morale among PLA Navy personnel found that the atmosphere and culture of the unit (单位的风气), the leadership style of the superiors (领导的作风), and commanders’ leadership skills (指挥员的领导能力) were the top three factors influencing morale—highlighting the importance of officers in PLA readiness. [7] Irregular personnel changes hinder the development of a capable officer corps, as the fall of one officer inevitably intimidates others, generates uncertainty, and even leads to the shirking of responsibilities.

In addition to leadership and morale, the PLA’s equipment, training and exercises, and joint operations capability are equally important to readiness. The downfall of top managers at PRC defense state-owned enterprises and leaders in the Equipment Development Department (装备发展部) indicates serious problems in PLA supply chains (War on the Rocks, January 23, 2024). These purges are continuing as of February 2025 (South China Morning Post, February 8; February 12). However, without meaningful institutional reforms, purges offer little as a lasting solution to ongoing problems.

Over the past two years, the abrupt removal of three former PLA service chiefs, four of their deputies, and three deputy theater command commanders—key figures in shaping training and exercise strategies—has raised doubts about military preparedness (DoD, December 18, 2024). The PLA’s joint operations capability may also be affected, as the purges aim to atomize the officer corps. Fearing accusations of forming factions (拉帮结派), commanders of different services will likely be wary of forging close relationships, sharing information, and building rapport—all essential to enhancing jointness (PLA Daily, May 13, 2024).

Conclusion

Current trendlines are expected to continue. Loyalty rather than merit will be the main criterion for promotions (China Brief, February 2, 2024). Further purges, including of those considered close to Xi, should be anticipated, as the state-controlled press again sounds the bugle for the party to conduct “self-revolution” (自我革命). The intention will be to eliminate possible threats or to sow fear among the officer corps (China Brief, January 19, 2024; China Media Project, August 20, 2024; Qiushi; December 15, 2024). This in turn will reinforce the PLA’s obedience to Xi. Officers will strictly follow his party line and be forced to devote more time to ideological work that supposedly enhances troop loyalty. The chances of officers collectively pushing back is slim due to the PLA’s high degree of centralization and numerous coup-proofing mechanisms (War on the Rocks, May 1, 2023).

Irregular leadership changes will spread anxiety and insecurity to middle-ranking officers as they worry for their personal safety. The fall of one high-ranking officer, such as Miao Hua, will expose all of their associates to the risk of investigation; and the higher officers rise in the chain of command, the more likely they are to be implicated in the next purge. As with the mounting bureaucratic inertia or incentivized conformity that now exist in other sectors of the party-state, operating under an environment of increasing pressure will reduce incentives for PLA personnel to innovate, challenge established beliefs, and stand out among their peers. An officer corps continuously on edge will also adversely influence morale and combat capability. Ultimately, autocrats must choose between a professional or personally loyal military. Having both is rarely an option; and, as is increasingly the case under Xi, loyalty often comes out on top.

[1] The following is an overview of recently purged officials:

• Former Defense Minister Li Shangfu (李尚福) (Xinhua, June 27, 2024)
• Former Defense Minister Wei Fenghe (魏凤和) (Xinhua, June 27, 2024).
• Current Defense Minister Dong Jun (董军) (reportedly under investigation in November) (Financial Times, November 26, 2024).
• Director of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Political Work Department Admiral Miao Hua (苗华) (PRC MND, November 28; China Brief, December 3).
• Former deputy commander of the Army Lieutenant General You Haitao (尤海涛) (NPC, December 25, 2024).
• Former commander of the Southern Theater Command Navy Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng (李鹏程) (NPC, December 25, 2024).

[2] The “peace disease (和平病)” refers to the fear that the PLA lacks combat readiness as it has not engaged in active conflict for a long time.

[3] See also, SZAKONYI D. “Corruption and Co-Optation in Autocracy: Evidence from Russia.” American Political Science Review. 2025;119(1):402–419. doi:10.1017/S0003055424000340; Buckley-Farlee, Noah. Calculating Corruption: Political Competition and Bribery under Authoritarianism. PhD diss., Columbia University, 2019. https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8N308BR.

[4] For example, the Doctors’ Plot, the Leningrad Affair, the Mingrelian Affair, and the numerous campaigns during the Cultural Revolution.

[5] Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋) rose to the post of deputy political commissar of the First Field Army that vanquished Kuomintang control of Northwest China and Xinjiang. Yet, by the late 1950s, officers of the First Field Army were driven out of the PLA’s leadership core due to the fall of its leader Peng Dehuai (彭德怀) after he opposed Mao’s radical policies that led to the Great Leap Forward policies (Springer, May 12, 2024). First Field Army officers subsequently never regained the same level of influence within the PLA and Xi’s father also suffered from persecution because of his ties with the pre-Mao Northern Shaanxi base area (The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, January 1992).

[6] The Gang of Four was a radical Maoist faction of the CCP led by Mao’s fourth wife, Jiang Qing. They came to prominence during the Cultural Revolution and were later charged with treason, as a result of which they spent decades in prison. After Deng Xiaoping came to power, he initiated a purge against Gang of Four affiliates, labeled as the “Three Types of People” (三种人).

[7] Xiaopeng Liu et al., “影响海军舰艇部队官兵士气的心理因素调查 [Investigation of Psychological Factors Affecting the Morale of Naval Ship Crews],” Military Medical Journal of South China. 2013; 27(8): 609–10.