Russia Increasing Military Buildup Ahead of Negotiations

Executive Summary:

• Russia is ramping up its military efforts—despite discussions of a ceasefire—with speculation about a second wave of mobilization. New Cossack battalions and expanded funding suggest a growing paramilitary force, indirectly increasing Russia’s mobilization potential.
• Several recent developments indicate that Moscow is preparing for a prolonged conflict. Among these are an increase in reservist training, difficulties in ending military contracts, and discussions about converting drone units into a separate branch of the Russian military.
• Moscow’s military buildup suggests that Putin’s goals of the complete destruction of Ukraine as a viable democratic and independent country have not changed. Russia’s expressed willingness to participate in talks—as opposed to requesting talks themselves—probably is not a genuine peace signal.

Russia is increasing its military preparedness despite discussions in February about a possible ceasefire after more than three years since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine  (Gazeta.ua.org, February 13). Russian society is discussing the possibility of a second wave of mobilization, even though Moscow has denied this. A member of the State Duma Defense Committee, Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev, claimed, “There are no grounds for a new wave of mobilization … It is only necessary to knock out the fascists who occupied Ukraine from the territory of our subjects” (This News!, February 3). Other indicators suggest that, if not a second wave of conscription, there are at least some new units currently being prepared for battle.

Ataman of the All-Russian Cossack Society Vitaly Kuznetsov announced the formation of the 26th Cossack volunteer battalion, underlining that there are currently 18,500 Cossacks on the line of contact, including over 250 Atamans and 9,000  from the Kuban Cossack army (VSKO.ru, February 6). Cossack units operate under the Combat Army Reserves, or BARS (Боевой Армейский Резерв Страны; Boyevoy Armeyskiy Rezerv Strany), and have been involved in some of the fiercest fighting in Moscow’s war against Ukraine (see EDM, October 10, 2023, January 16, September 30, 2024). At the same time, and in line with previously announced funding increases for the Cossacks, the funding for the Kuban Cossacks increased from 1.4 billion to 1.7 billion rubles (~$15.9 million to ~$19.4 million), expanding the potential reach of BARS as well as money devoted to cadet education and other youth outreach (see EDM, October 17, 2022, November 8, 2023, February 27, November 27, 2024; Kavkaz.realii, February 7). Further, in 2024 Cossacks were obliged to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense enlisting them in the “mobilizational reserve” with fewer constraints on being called to war (see EDM, September 16, 2024; Kavkaz.realii, February 7). These actions indirectly increase Russia’s mobilization force even if no formal mobilization is declared.

Russia’s approach to preparing soldiers to fight in the military has also changed. On January 16, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree “On Military Duty and Military Service” calling Russian citizens who are in reserve for the Russian Armed Forces and other security services into training (Publication.pravo.gov.ru, January 16). This comes as Russian military training practically became year-round rather than seasonal, as had previously been the case before Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Such a move was ostensibly to “improve the combat training of reservists,” but Russian social media users were alarmed by the presence of two clauses in the decree obscured “for official use” (DW, January 17). This included speculation that the clauses were meant to facilitate a second mobilization. Lawyer Artem Klyga opined that such reservists called up for training may be more easily pressured into signing up for tours at the front (DW, January 17). This combined with the difficulties some who signed up for the military are facing in ending their “perpetual” contracts implies that the Kremlin is prepared for the war to stretch well into the future (TV Dozhd, February 12). This comes amid speculation that Russia is preparing for a future conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or at least what would be left of NATO if it abandons Ukraine.

Mobilization and military reform are extending beyond the terms of regular and irregular troops. Drones have been an important part of the war used by both Ukrainians and Russians, signaling the importance drones will have in exerting military power now and in the future (see EDM, April 18, October 8, 16, 2024). NATO, moreover, is rumored to be considering a fleet of sea drones to protect vulnerable underwater cables (Euronews, December 19, 2024). Russia also began using drones named “Prince Vandal of Novgorod” controlled using fiber-optic cable in the spring of 2024. Some claim the technology is impervious to electronic warfare and produces little noise, although they have limited range (Fedpress.ru, January 21).

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov proposed the formation of troops of unmanned drones of the Russian Federation in the third quarter of 2025 (Lenta.ru, December 16, 2024). Putin had previously declared that there were discussions about making such drone troops a separate branch of the military, accompanied by the creation of necessary logistical centers to provide support for the drones (Lenta.ru, November 28, 2024). On the new drone force, military expert Vladislav Shurygin claims, “The troops will gain a status analogous to that of the air defense forces … Their units will be part of the ground forces, the air wing, as well as the navy where, along with other duties, they will develop unmanned boats” (MK.ru, January 3). An associate professor at the National Research Nuclear University, Anton Trutze, also endorsed the move, claiming that a special branch of the armed forces is needed for technologies that have their own intricacies. The move, however, does not mean only the drone force would use the battlefield technology, but instead there would be the creation of a dedicated training center for special units equipped with drones, as well as provide adequate funding (MK.ru, January 3). One might infer that the new equipment delivered to the other branches of the armed forces will be ready to be integrated with the new technology.

The development of new brigades and the addition of new technologies to the existing army comes in contrast with talks about a possible ceasefire. While it is plausibly directed at securing a better deal by demonstrating Moscow’s resolve and capability to continue the conflict, it is also just as plausible that it assumes such talks will fail or imply continued Russian plans for war elsewhere in Europe. Moscow’s military buildup while also claiming to be willing to engage in talks for a genuine peace signal that Putin’s goals of the complete destruction of Ukraine as a viable democratic and independent country have not changed (see EDM, February 13).