The Evolution of Political Survival: from Syria to Russia
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Executive Summary:
- As regimes change, politicians often change their political stances to survive and fit the shifting political climate. This has been seen most recently in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime and the transformation of de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa’s image.
- Numerous Russian politicians’ stances changed dramatically from totalitarian dogmas to democratic ideas at the end of the Soviet era and the beginning of the Russian Federation, including Boris Yeltsin.
- This trend holds implications in countries such as Russia, where any weakening of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s power or his departure will likely result in a mass transformation of politicians and public figures into “democrats” or some other suitable identity that enables them to survive in their political careers.
The art of political survival is a necessary skill that many politicians rely upon at some point in their careers. When political climates undergo significant restructuring, however, this skill becomes even more indicative of the longevity of state leaders and elites when facing new domestic and international challenges to their legitimacy. A recent case of this has been the international acceptance of the new Syrian government following the collapse of Bashir al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024. State leaders around the world soon acknowledged the legitimacy of the new government and restored previously frozen relations. On January 2, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the restoration of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Syria, which had been severed in 2022 when Assad’s regime supported Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (President of Ukraine, January 2; Svoboda.org, January 2). Following this development, the heads of the German and French Foreign Ministries visited Damascus in what became the first visit of high-ranking European representatives to Syria in many years (Kommersant.ru, January 3). These improved relations follow de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa’s reinvented image to bolster his legitimacy. He was previously known under his jihadist nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, and his turn toward the West following the Syrian revolution’s victory has altered many people’s perceptions of what a leader looks like (BBC Russian Service, December 10, 2024).
Al-Sharaa has not always held a reputation as a promising, reliable partner, as Zelenskyy suggested in the announcement to restore diplomatic relations last month (President of Ukraine, January 2). In the 2000s, al-Sharaa collaborated with al-Qaeda and was arrested by the U.S. Army in Iraq, serving a five-year prison sentence. He publicly broke with this terrorist organization in 2016, however, and created his own movement, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (see Terrorism Monitor, April 18, 2023). In the Syrian province of Idlib, where it was based, and later in the city of Aleppo, which it occupied, complete religious tolerance was established with Christian churches, among others, operating freely (see Militant Leadership Monitor, January 4, 2019). Al-Sharaa found a common language with the opposition, the Free Syrian (National) Army, and created a shared command. As a result, a relatively powerful military group was formed. It was able to defeat Assad’s state army, which Russia and Iran actively armed. Paradoxically, one of al-Sharaa’s Islamists’ first actions after the capture of Damascus on December 8, 2024, was the destruction of the embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the Tehran military advisers of the Assad regime had previously been located.
Today’s “Islamism” is far from a unified movement. Al-Sharaa, for example, participated in an interview with a female CNN journalist (CNN, December 6, 2024). This likely would have never occurred with Osama bin Laden. Unlike other “Islamic” regimes in the region, the rebels claimed that Syrian women would have the right to decide for themselves how to dress and what to do in life. They called the introduction of any kind of “morality police” unacceptable (Svoboda.org, December 10, 2024). The victorious revolutionaries have been conducting a mass release of Assad-era political prisoners. Al-Sharaa promised to develop a new, democratic constitution for Syria that considers the interests of all national and religious groups, and then hold a census and free elections (Svoboda.org, December 29, 2024). He also intends to disband all armed groups, including his own Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, so that weapons remain only in the hands of the new legally elected government (RBC, December 14, 2024). He declared his preference for diplomatic relations with all countries (including Israel) for any military adventures (RBC, December 15, 2024).
Prior to Assad’s fall, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s tone had already changed significantly. Before the rebels’ victory, they were referred to as “terrorists,” but after Assad’s fall, they began to be called an “armed opposition” (RIA Novosti, December 6, 2024; TASS, December 10, 2024). Syria does not intend to completely sever relations with Russia, despite Russia’s support for the Assad regime and the fact that Assad himself received asylum in Moscow (BBC Russian Service, December 29, 2024). The fate of Russian military bases in Syria, however, remains unclear. Many Syrians remember that Russian aircraft bombed their cities under Assad, so they are likely to oppose the continued presence of these bases if a truly democratic order is established in Syria.
Syrian leaders are not the only ones who adopt seemingly more desirable identities to survive drastic political change. There are several striking historical examples of how the worldview of various Russian leaders changed dramatically from totalitarian dogmas to democratic ideas in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev evolved from a typical party apparatchik (аппаратчик) to a global reformer (Brown, 2023). He replaced the official ideology of communism with his policy of glasnost (гласность) and “new thinking.” He effectively transferred power from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to freely elected Supreme Councils in all the republics.
The first secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional committee of the CPSU, Boris Yeltsin, delivered a tribute to “dear comrade [Soviet leader Leonid] Brezhnev” from the rostrum at the 26th Congress of the CPSU in 1981 (Youtube/@gtrftv, February 18, 2021). Ten years later, however, he became the Russian Federation’s first president and suppressed the August putsch of the party conservatives. Journalist and politician Yegor Gaidar worked for the newspaper Pravda and the magazine Communist, both until 1990 but then carried out a liberal economic reform in Russia, known as “shock therapy,” and became acting Prime Minister from June to December 1992 (Pravda, December 16, 2009).
This evolution of politicians concerned not only Russia but also other post-Soviet countries. For example, Arnold Rüütel, former President of Estonia, had been the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Estonia since 1983 and a loyal communist. Gorbachev’s perestroika (перестройка), however, significantly adjusted his views (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 25, 2001). In 1988, Estonia was the first of the Soviet republics to adopt a Declaration of State Sovereignty, and in August 1991, it proclaimed the restoration of independence. Rüütel signed both documents, for which Estonians today remember him after his recent passing with gratitude as a leader of the “restoration of [Estonia’s] independence” (President.ee, December 31, 2024; Rus.Postimees.ee, January 3).
More recently in Russian history, politicians have evolved in the opposite direction—from democratic freedoms to a new authoritarianism. The parallel between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Assad is noteworthy. They both became presidents in 2000 and, although they were initially viewed as reformers, both soon led their countries into authoritarianism and engaged in wars (Vedomosti, August 9, 2019; DW, July 17, 2020). Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council and former President Dmitry Medvedev, who claimed that “freedom is better than unfreedom,” contradicts this sentiment today (RG.ru, February 21, 2008). During his time as president (2008–2012), Medvedev tried to maintain a “liberal” image, but in more recent times he has contributed to the international isolation of Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. (see EDM, March 24, 2011, October 13, 2021). This is particularly evident in his regular threats of the use of nuclear weapons against Western targets, including Ukraine (Kyiv Independent, July 30, 2023, February 18, 2024).
Many Russian regional politicians have undergone a corresponding evolution. In the early 1990s, the then-President of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev was considered a “father of Tatarstan’s sovereignty” (Business Gazeta, December 12, 2021). He fought for maximum self-government for his republic and even held a successful referendum on it becoming a subject of international law (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 4, 2002). Just ten years later, however, he became one of the leaders of the United Russia Party and, as State Counselor of the Republic of Tatarstan, has been a confidant to Putin (see The Monitor, March 12, 2002; Tatar-congress.org, May 24, 2023; Adyrna, February 21, 2024; Business-gazeta.ru, February 23, 2024). During the first Chechen war, a young Ramzan Kadyrov fought on the side of the fighters for the independence of Ichkeria. Today, he has become one of the leading figures in the Russian imperial nomenklatura (номенклатура) (see North Caucasus Weekly, May 8, 2009; see EDM, June 5, 2009, October 6, 2009). The paradox is that today’s Chechnya, under the totalitarian rule of Kadyrov, has achieved de facto independence from Russian laws, but is loyal to Putin and enjoys significant financial support from the Kremlin (see North Caucasus Weekly, June 3, 2008; see EDM, April 22, 2010).
As political leaders and elites continue to adapt to changing domestic and international conditions to maintain their positions and survive any challenges to their legitimacy, it is important to consider potentially new scenarios where this behavior may arise. In Russia, where the weakening of Putin’s power or his departure are foreseeable possibilities, there will likely be another mass transformation of politicians and public figures into “democrats”—as in the era of perestroika. The nature of the current regime may also enable them to excuse any past behavior that may be contrary to their new positions, claiming that they did not know the full truth of Moscow’s injustices or that exceptional circumstances warranted such behavior. Whether or not the people believe them this time around is much less certain.
