Central Asian Countries Sending Migrant Workers to Asia Over Russia

Executive Summary:

• Facing increasing Russian hostility to Central Asian immigrants, Central Asian countries are instead encouraging their nationals to go to other Asian countries to ensure transfer payments and prevent domestic explosions.
• These moves are negatively impacting the Russian economy and forcing Moscow to seek migrant workers from other countries, such as India and Zimbabwe, who are much less culturally and linguistically attuned to Russia than Central Asian workers.
• These new migrant workers are also significantly reducing the influence of the Russian language in their respective regions and of Moscow on the local government’s policies.

Since the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow in March 2024, hostility among Russians toward Central Asian immigrants has increased dramatically (see EDM, March 26, 28).  Despite the Kremlin’s need for such workers to compensate for Russia’s demographic decline, Russian officials have adopted increasingly harsh policies toward immigrants, expelling some, leading others to leave on their own, and causing many Central Asians to consider going home or at least working somewhere other than Russia (Window on Eurasia, July 18, 2022; see EDM, May 9, 15, October 22). Moscow’s decision to try to force migrant workers into its invasion force in Ukraine has further exacerbated these feelings (see EDM November 8, 2023, October 31). The Kremlin has tried to hide the extent of this exodus by ending the publication of interior ministry data on departures and publishing only data on arrivals, figures that distort how many have left. This has even led some commentators to claim that there has been no population decline in the Central Asian migrant community in Russia and blame the West for the situation (Federalcity.ru, October 25; Ritmeurasia.ru, November 16). Reports from across Russia show, however, that such claims are baseless (e.g., Infopro54.ru, November 20; Novosibirsk MK.ru, November 21; Tvernews.ru, November 25).

This mass emigration has led to two policy shifts, one in Moscow and one in Central Asian capitals. In Moscow, the Russian government has sought to find replacements for the departed Central Asian migrant workers from elsewhere, turning to Zimbabwe and India, as well as to smaller countries in East Asia (Novopossiya, May 31; Versia.ru, October 10; see EDM, February 23, September 16, October 16; Tsargrad.tv, November 16). Appeals to these countries for migrant workers began even before the Crocus City Hall attack, but the recent intensification of Moscow’s efforts both highlights the significance of Central Asians’ departure and is fraught with danger for Russia (see EDM, February 6). On the one hand, migrant workers from these countries are far less likely to know Russian or be familiar with Russian norms than Central Asians whom the Soviet Union colonized and only in the past thirty years gained their independence with Russia continuing to influence their politics. The new migrant workers’ lack of cultural and linguistic knowledge seems certain to exacerbate ethnic tensions within the Russian Federation, even more radically in places where Central Asian workers’ absence of Russian language knowledge and sensitivity to Russian cultural norms have been significant causes of the current anti-migrant campaign. Turning away from the use of Central Asians as migrant workers will simultaneously undercut Moscow’s efforts to promote the revival and spread of the Russian language throughout Central Asia and is already reducing Moscow’s influence across the region.

Policy changes in Central Asian countries point to this development, which may ultimately have even more profound consequences. Until recently, Central Asian governments welcomed the role that their migrant workers in the Russian Federation play in helping the economies of their countries stay afloat. Transfer payments from the migrant workers have played a key role in that regard, especially in Tajikistan, and in other countries as well. These governments view sending such people to Russia as a kind of safety valve because even if radicalized by their experiences in Russia, they will not come home soon and threaten the regimes (see EDM, October 5, 2023). Consequently, when it became apparent that more migrant workers were returning from the Russian Federation, these governments focused on expanding the list of other countries where their nationals could go instead, which would help stabilize their homelands and prevent them from coming back and sparking unrest.

More than any other country in the region, Uzbekistan has been concerned about ensuring the continuation of sending its migrant workers abroad and is urged by experts to diversify the countries it sends people to (Window on Eurasia, June 24, 2021). Several years ago, under the rubric of promoting a balanced foreign policy, Tashkent sought to promote migration to countries other than Russia, including most prominently South Korea, where 100,000 of its citizens now work, becoming the largest diaspora community in that country (Gazeta.uz, February 5; MK.ru, July 17). At the end of October, taking its lead from Uzbekistan and fearing the consequences of losing remittances and the possible instability with migrant workers returning from Russia to Tajikistan, the poorest country in the region, Dushanbe signed an agreement with Seoul. This agreement paved the way for Tajiks to go to South Korea to learn Korean and work in Korean factories beginning in January 2025 (Ritmeurasia.ru, November 11; For background on the decision, see Window on Eurasia, April 3). The initial numbers may be small, as in the case of the Uzbeks, but will grow rapidly as it seems virtually certain that more Tajiks will return from Russia. This pattern will be repeated by other Central Asian countries as well, which, similarly to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, will seek to arrange for their nationals to go to other Pacific Rim countries.

Moscow commentators now say that such a maneuver will cost Russia dearly, and China, Russia’s ally, will not save Russia in Central Asia. Instead, Beijing is likely to exploit this new set of Russian losses. Beijing itself, however, will also find itself in competition with South Korea and other Pacific Rim countries because, unlike them, it is unlikely to be able to arrange for the dispatch of Central Asian workers to China. Consequently, Versia analyst Ruslan Gorevoy says anti-Central Asian immigrant actions and moves may mean that Moscow has now “lost” that region in much the way it has lost other regions of the former Soviet space (Versia.ru, April 15). Central Asian governments not only are denouncing Moscow for its anti-immigrant moves but are also supporting Ukraine and refusing to take part in many Russian-led activities—despite Moscow’s propagandistic efforts to claim the contrary (Krym.Realii, April 15; Kakaz-uzel.ru, April 12; Eurasia Today, April 16).

Moscow officials have only themselves to blame, Gorevoy concludes, due to their approach toward the Crocus City Hall terrorist act. Moscow played to the nationalist, even racist, attitudes of many Russians rather than pursuing Russia’s national interests, which include using Central Asian workers and expanding Moscow’s influence over their homelands. Reversing course now will be difficult if not impossible, he suggests and notes that this is just one more way in which the mishandling of a manageable ethnic issue leads to geopolitical catastrophe (For a useful discussion of how Moscow is now struggling with this, see Russian Council on International Affairs, November 20).