Guns For Hire: Private Security and Mercenary Industries in China and Russia

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(Source: Topwar.ru and RT, compiled on Canva)

Executive Summary:

  • Mercenaries have existed since ancient times but have evolved into modern private military and security companies (PMSCs) focusing on training, logistics, and protection, especially in Western practices. Russian private military companies (PMCs) and Chinese private security companies (PSCs), however, operate differently from both each other and Western mercenaries.
  • Russian PMCs are designed for complex military missions and are fully state-dependent but operate illegally in Russia. In contrast, while Chinese PSCs are legal, regulated, and focused on non-combat missions, they lack operational sophistication and autonomy.
  • Russia has used PMCs to jointly serve the state’s geoeconomic and geopolitical objectives without direct military involvement, likely to avoid Soviet mistakes, reliance on conscripts and regular armed forces, Western blunders, and exposure to media scrutiny.
  • Russian PMCs are heavily supported by state resources and succeed due to firepower, collaboration with local forces, and tactical approaches but face challenges in unfamiliar terrains and against technologically advanced opponents.
  • China’s PSCs support the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, focusing on protecting assets and infrastructure in unstable areas but lack the skills, combat experience, and autonomy for complex security missions.
  • Political reluctance from the Chinese Communist Party to relinquish control and resistance from host nations further limit their effectiveness.
  • Russia’s PMC industry is likely to persist despite its setbacks but the growing influence of PMCs and paramilitary groups could destabilize Russia internally, especially in a post-war scenario.
  • China is unlikely to adopt a similar model to Russia. Instead, Beijing might strengthen PSC professionalism and pursue a middle path, avoiding risks of paramilitarization while collaborating with local security providers in host countries.

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Guns for hire are not a new phenomenon. The origins of mercenaries date back to the times of the ancient world. Over time, however, the essence of mercenary groups has changed substantially. Today, private military and security companies (PMSCs) from the West rarely directly participate in military hostilities akin to regular armed forces (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, October 14, 2022). Their main roles include rendering services related to training, providing logistical support, performing auxiliary functions, providing physical security and protection to individuals and groups, and conducting valuable projects, such as developing infrastructure (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, March 20, 2019).

PMSCs in Russia, such as the Wagner Group or the African Corp, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), such as Huaxin Zhongan (HXZA; 华新中安), China Security Technology Group (中国安保技术集团), or Frontier Services Group (先丰服务), however, operate differently. Russia’s involvement in the civil wars in Syria and Libya and creating regional conflicts and crises, such as its war in Ukraine, has changed this trend. Guns for hire employed by the Russian government appear to be a peculiar combination of the outdated Western private military and security practices and Russia’s own experience of using irregular formations from the Soviet period. In contrast, the PRC’s interest in private security has been less driven by geopolitics. It focuses more on the country’s mounting economic and trade interests in the Global South, where the security climate presents many serious challenges (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, November 20, 2023). This report examines the differences and similarities between Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Chinese Private Security Companies (PSCs).

 

Russian Mercenary Industry: From Marginals to All-Russia Phenomenon

Russia’s use of irregular formations has a long and sophisticated history that goes back to the pre-1917 interim. During the Soviet times, irregular formations, usually military on active service working covertly, would be employed by Moscow for various operations and different capacities, including solving important geopolitical issues in countries of the developing world, especially during the decolonization process (see War by Other Means, April 12, 2019). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the development of Russia’s private security (mercenary) industry took an unsystematic form, with the state playing a marginal role in the process (see War by Other Means June 25, 2019). Russian PMCs are designed for complex military missions and are fully state-dependent but operate illegally in Russia. In Russia’s criminal code established in 1996, mercenaries are defined as:

A person who acts for the purpose of receiving material compensation and is not a citizen of a state participating in an armed conflict or military operations, who does not reside permanently in its territory, or who is not a person sent to perform official duties (Legalacts.ru, accessed January 31).

This loose definition demonstrates the ambiguities of how Russian mercenaries and mercenary formations operate within Russia, particularly pertaining to the distinction between a mercenary as an individual and a PMC.

Major transformations in the Russian PMC industry started to take shape in the period between 2003 and 2013 due to a combination of the following factors:

  • The growing conviction of PMSCs being a foreign policy tool for Western countries. Among Russian PMSC experts, this conviction grew only stronger under the influence of regional developments such as the Syrian and Libyan civil wars and, rather surprisingly, the Euromaidan in Ukraine in late 2013–early 2014 (ru, March 11, 2016; TASS, December 27, 2023);
  • The increasing presence of Russian corporations, primarily in the hydrocarbons industry, and state-related structures and agencies in politically unstable regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa;
  • The demand for physical protection of Russian personnel and material valuables. Russia could not rely on regular armed forces to achieve these objectives to avoid direct involvement from Russian state forces abroad; and
  • Russia’s increasingly assertive foreign policy. This called for the presence of PMCs in some of the regional conflicts without the Kremlin’s direct participation (Sukhankin, Hurska, Russia’s Private Military Contractors: Cause for Worry?, 2021).

These factors contributed to Russia’s experimental use of PMCs, also known as mercenary formations, to jointly serve the state’s geoeconomic and geopolitical objectives without direct military involvement. Russia’s decision to rely on shadow and illegal formations stemmed from the determination to avoid Soviet mistakes, reliance on conscripts and regular armed forces, Western blunders, and exposure to media scrutiny. The Wagner Group is a prime example of this utilization. Since 2014, Wagner has influenced the Russian state both externally and domestically.

The use of PMCs outside of Russia’s borders has brought mixed results. Between 2013 and 2024, Russian PMCs took part in numerous proven paramilitary missions and open combat engagements in the Middle East, in Libya and Syria; Sub-Saharan Africa, in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mozambique, and Sudan; Latin America, in Venezuela; and Eastern Europe, in Ukraine.

Long-term analysis of Russian PMCs, particularly the Wagner Group, highlights numerous facets of Russian PMC operations. The successes of Russian mercenaries have almost never resulted from individual actions or the presence of any exclusive or unique competencies showcased by Russian mercenaries. Victories on the battlefield in Syria and Ukraine between 2014–2015 and 2023 and intermediary successes in Libya were secured due to:

  • Support rendered to Russian mercenaries by regular Russian armed forces in the form of precision strikes;
  • Collaboration with regional paramilitary structures and groups that complemented Russian mercenaries with unique skills and competencies critical for waging warfare in local conditions;
  • Employment of detrimental yet situationally effective tactics that allowed Russian mercenaries to overwhelm the opponent; and
  • The ability to employ massive resources, such as firepower and personnel, granted to the mercenary formations for achieving specific goals by the Russian state (Meduza, May 21, 2023; BBC Russian Service, August 11, 2021, June 10).

From an operational point of view, Russian mercenary formations inherited a Soviet operational weakness. While successfully organizing guerilla/partisan-style operations in geographically and culturally proximate areas/regions, conducting anti-guerilla campaigns in more challenging operational areas brought mixed results (see War by Other Means, January 10, 2020). For instance, since succeeding in Ukraine in 2014–2016, Russian mercenaries have suffered notable defeats in Mozambique and, most recently, Mali, where their main task was to confront local militarized rebel groups conducting guerilla-style operations (see EDM, July 31, 2024). Additionally, in Sudan, when confronting Ukrainian special forces that also acted asymmetrically against Wagner forces, Russian mercenaries suffered notable setbacks (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, March 6, 2024).

Russian mercenaries have demonstrated multiple weaknesses when confronting technologically more developed opponents. In addition to the decimation at Deir ez-Zor, Syria in early 2018 at the hands of US-led coalition forces, Wagner reportedly got battered by Turkish forces in Libya that were utilizing killer drones. Even in Ukraine, after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Wagner’s successes were minimal and largely stemmed from large resources earmarked to the group by the state (Meduza, October 6, 2019; see War by Other Means, December 18, 2019; Radio Svoboda, June 10).

Russian PMCs, sometimes summoned by incumbent regimes as a stabilization force, have failed to secure long-term stability or security for the hosting regime itself. Perhaps the best depiction of this is the situation in Syria as of late 2024. On December 8, 2024, the Asad regime fell after oppositionist forces captured Damascus, demonstrating Russian military formations’ falling capacity to sustain influence abroad. Since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Moscow’s focus on and firepower in Syria decreased, creating an opening for rebel forces to gain a foothold in the country. Following the fall of Damascus, Asad and his family fled Syria and went to Moscow for asylum (TASS, December 8 [1], [2], 2024; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 8, 2024; Meduza, December 9, 2024).

Domestically, the image of PMCs has undergone a remarkable transformation. Until 2022, the Russian state not only refused to legalize PMCs or acknowledge their existence but would severely punish individuals attempting to cover the activities of these groups (The Insider, August 1, 2018). When the Wagner Group openly joined Russia’s war in Ukraine and videos of then-Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin touring Russia’s penitentiary institutions in search of recruits became publicly available, Russian state media and pro-Kremlin propagandists praised PMCs (Radio Svoboda, September 14, 2022). Banners with the Wagner Group’s “recruitment campaigns” appeared in all major Russian cities, and the group soon became a subject of talk shows, publications, and even popular culture.

Following Prigozhin’s unsuccessful mutiny in the summer of 2023 and his subsequent death, the Wagner Group was essentially erased from the public information space, burials of the fighters became vandalized, and many were denied payment and veteran status (see EDM, March 3, 2024). This did not, however, end the Russian mercenary industry. The Wagner Group was rebranded, and many of its fighters either joined other PMCs or continued working for the remaining parts of the group, while Russia’s mercenary industry regained its shadow status with next-to-no mention of their activities in Russia’s public information space.

The fall of the Wagner Group has given a powerful impetus to several parallel processes in the private security sector inside Russia. Russian society has experienced a notable growth in (para)militarization, which gained momentum after February 2022. This is primarily reflected in thriving militarism, glorification of brute force, and even praise of the penitentiary system and its “laws” (poniatiya, понятия), which are, according to stalwarts of such ideas, frequently more just than official norms, principles, and laws (see EDM, March 3, 2024).

The process of “privatization of force” has gained momentum on three levels. On the regional level, heads of some Russian regions have formed (para)military formations of their own under the pretext of securing their regions. On the corporate level, many large Russian companies and corporations have acquired “private armies” of their own, which is justified by their declarative determination to send those fighters to the frontlines of Russia’s war in Ukraine, but the actual goals are unclear and are most likely related to the need to protect their leadership and their interests. Russia’s state power structures (siloviye struktury, силовие структуры), such as the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Rosgvardia, are actively hiring former members of the Wagner Group, who, because they are essentially mercenaries, are still outlawed in the country (see EDM, March 3, 2024). Additionally, there has also been a rapid spread of ethnic (para)military and mercenary formations in Russia. From a legal point of view, it is difficult to clearly define these groups, with their official status being “volunteers,” which operate under the umbrella of the Russian MoD but whose ultimate allegiance remains somewhat blurred (see EDM, April 4, 9, 16, 30, 2024).

The internal and external factors of how Russian PMCs operate highlight general features intrinsic to their formation. Russian PMCs and mercenary formations have mixed effects on the battlefield. First, their effectiveness is contingent on the use of other forces. When operating in an unfamiliar environment, their capabilities become drastically reduced. Second, they cannot fully become a factor of domestic stabilization. While effective in the short run, their ability to contribute to long-term stability is questionable when prompting an incumbent regime. Conversely, their use as a company outside the regime may contribute to growing destabilization and intensifying civil unrest.

Using PMCs, mercenary, and paramilitary formations may pose an extremely perilous challenge for the Russian state. Such risk was visible in Prigozhin’s mutiny, which could have resulted in a much more serious (para)military conflict between mercenaries and the state, potentially leading to a civil war. Russian PMCs and mercenaries have contributed to the exacerbation of existing security challenges, such as smuggling and illicit mining, which in turn further aggravates the already unstable security environment. With Russia’s growing and inevitable decline, combat-hardened (para)military groups with blurred allegiance could become a factor in the Russian power struggle.

 

Chinese PSCs: The Sleeping Giant

The PRC’s global economic expansion, which was profoundly boosted after the launch of the One Belt One Road (OBOR; 一带一路)” initiative in 2013, now known as the Belt and Road Initiative, led Beijing to consider paying more attention to the physical protection of Chinese nationals and material assets abroad. As the OBOR Initiative has grown, so has the Chinese “security for hire” industry. For OBOR, land-based operations are the most critical aspect, and the majority of these projects are located in the “arc of crisis” area from the Indian Ocean to the Horn of Africa, increasing the number of security incidents involving Chinese nationals and assets (Asia Times, November 1, 2022; see Guardians of the Belt and Road, January 3, 2023). The Chinese Ministry of State Security noted over 350 serious security incidents involving Chinese enterprises between 2015 and 2017 (Asia Times, November 1, 2022). The increased number of security incidents among Chinese state-owned enterprises has created an issue for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As argued by Alessandro Arduino, an expert on Chinese private security, safeguarding nationals across the world for China has become a cornerstone of the PRC’s foreign policy (Arduino, “Testimony before the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission,” April 19, 2024). It has also created a unique market for overseas Chinese PSCs to enter and provide security services.

Historically, the deployment of Chinese armed forces abroad has not been an option, which leaves the state with three viable alternatives: (a) reliance on local security providers, through state mandate or the private sector. Given the OBOR regions’ political and economic climate and the severity of threats posed, however, this is not always realistically possible; (b) reliance on its own private security forces to render protection for Chinese nationals and assets abroad; or (c) reliance on a combination of the two approaches, which appears to be the most realistic option.

The PRC is currently unable to rely substantially on its own private security providers, and this is based on three main factors. First, there has been an inadequate level of preparation. Despite its relatively long history and massive size as things currently stand, Chinese PSCs do not possess the skills and qualifications comparable to either Western PMSCs or Russian mercenary formations necessary for rendering high-quality protective services in areas and regions plagued by challenges such as international terrorism (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, January 3, 2023). These issues are largely due to a need for more educational training, especially since only a handful of Chinese universities offer security programs, a lack of combat experience, and the inability of most to carry weapons abroad, due to legal restrictions and as a means of avoiding deadly incidents involving Chinese security providers. Nonetheless, even Russian PMCs, battle-hardened and composed of professional military with solid backgrounds in regional combat operations, have showcased notable failures in Sub-Saharan Africa, where Chinese PSCs are also operating. Chinese PSCs whose members have not participated in regional conflicts or combat operations cannot effectively perform duties in such an environment. In this regard, using Chinese PSCs on the ground may become counterproductive. If they lack the necessary skills, they themselves could become a target of militants, tainting China’s reputation.

Second, the position of the Chinese state does not allow it to rely on PSCs. In effect, the inadequate level of preparedness of Chinese PSCs for foreign missions may also be attributed to the reluctance of the CCP to cede its monopoly on violence to private paramilitary structures and formations, which would change “the party controls the gun (党指挥枪)” policy (The Security Distillery, March 15). Additionally, the PRC is unwilling to repeat Western mistakes with the use of PMSCs. Similarly, Prigozhin’s unsuccessful mutiny in Russia might have discouraged the PRC from following the Russian model in its pre-2023 form. Prigozhin’s unsuccessful mutiny demonstrated how serious a challenge uncontrollable para-militarization poses and how easy it is for the state to lose control over such formations. This could make Beijing even more hesitant to empower its PSCs and turn them into either Western or Russia-type paramilitary structures. It appears that, as of now, the CCP does not want to let go of the gun, leading to the continual slowing down of Chinese PSC expansion capabilities, which they could be granted if they have greater autonomy from the party. Chinese political leadership has yet to decide how to use PSCs most effectively in a way that will also be less harmful to party and state interests.

Third, the issue is highly sensitive in regional relations. For example, Chinese PSCs in Central Asia focus on protecting and continuing business interests and are not being used as “military-political tools or instruments of geopolitical competition” like PMCs deployed in the area from Russia (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, February 22, 2023). Nonetheless, the military violence of the Middle East affects the greater region, and the radicalization continues to pose a threat to foreign investments by China in the area. Furthermore, Sinophobia has continued to grow significantly as China discriminates against its own Muslims. The news of Xinjiang’s forced labor has “triggered protests in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, accompanied by demands to rid these countries of Chinese influence” (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, February 22, 2023).

Pakistan’s reluctance to host Chinese PSCs suggests that even China-dependent countries are not proactive in welcoming Chinese paramilitaries on their soil, despite Islamabad’s strategic and overarching economic dependency on China and the building of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, February 23, July 14, 2023). Both Pakistan and Kazakhstan have high legal barriers to prevent Chinese PSCs from working on their territory. In effect, PRC efforts to place PSCs in those countries only contribute to the rise of Sinophobia in these regions, an outcome Beijing seeks to avoid.

In other areas, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, deployment of Chinese PSCs is often met in a hostile manner by the local population, which still frequently associates foreign paramilitary formations with colonialism and the civil wars that erupted during the decolonization process (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, May 19, June 6, 2023). Furthermore, most OBOR projects in Africa are in high-risk regions, such as Nigeria and the Sahel, which are hotspots for extremist violence (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, May 19, 2023). The largest threat to Chinese nationals in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is kidnapping for ransom. Nigeria is where Chinese nationals are most frequently kidnapped, yet it remains the area in Africa where most Chinese foreign direct investment goes. Even though Chinese PSCs are not supposed to be armed on the continent, they often collaborate with local security groups to provide armed protection to assets, leading many Africans to still have a negative image of them.

On the continent, there have been controversies with Chinese PSCs, such as incidents in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, and Uganda, where PSCs have been accused of conducting unauthorized military activities and possessing military-grade equipment on foreign soil (Asia Times, November 1, 2022; Military Africa, December 1, 2023). As noted by Paul Nantulya, an expert on Chinese PSCs in Africa, African nations have yet to heal from the wounds left by mercenary activities on the continent during the Cold War. Moreover, multiple human rights violations by both African and foreign PMCs, such as Executive Outcomes, Sandline International, and Wagner Group, in addition to the horrors of the civil wars in Algeria, Angola, Liberia, Libya, and Sierra Leone, where PMCs and mercenary formations took an active role, further taints the image of private security providers, rendering them unwanted on African soil. On top of that, investigative reports have claimed that large Chinese corporations, such as China National Petroleum Corporation, are involved in regional conflicts by providing material support to pro-government militias, resulting in atrocities and violence against civilians (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, May 19, 2023).

These controversies, however, do not mean that the PRC has abandoned the idea of using Chinese PSCs abroad. Conversely, Chinese PSCs are actively working in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, November 20, 2023). Some Chinese PSCs include:

Chinese PSCs in Sub-Saharan Africa

  • HuaXin Zhong An (HXZA; 华信中安集团)
  • Frontier Services Group (FSG; 先丰服务集团)
  • China Security Technology Group (CSTG; 中国安保技术集团有限公司)
  • Overseas Security Guardians (OSG; 中军军弘保安服务有限公司), established by the ZhongJun JunHong Group (中军军弘保安服务有限公司)
  • Beijing DeWe Security Service Group (DeWe; 德威国际安保集团)

Chinese PSCs in Central Asia

  • Zhongjun Junhong (中军军弘保安服务有限公司)
  • Huaxin ZhongAn (HXZA; 华新中安)
  • Frontier Services Group (FSG; 先丰服务)
  • China Security Technology Group (CSTG; 中国安保技术集团)
  • China Security and Protection Group (中国安全保护集团有限公司)

Chinese PSCs in MENA

  • VSS Security Group (伟之杰保安服务有限公司)
  • Beijing DeWe Security Services (DeWe; 德威国际安保集团)

Chinese PSCs in Southeast Asia

  • Huaxin Zhongan (HXZA; 华新中安)
  • Frontier Services Group (FSG; 先丰服务)
  • China Security Technology Group (CSTG; 中国安保技术集团)
  • China Overseas Security Group (COSG; 中国海外保安集团)
  • Shandong Huawei Security Group (山东华威保安集团)
  • Hanwei International Security Services (汉卫国际安全护卫有限公司)

Chinese PSCs in Latin America:

  • China Security Technology Group (CSTG; 中国安保技术集团)
  • Beijing Dujie Security Technology (北京都杰安防科技有限公司)
  • China Overseas Security Group (中国海外保安集团)
  • ZhongBao HuaAn (中保华安)
  • TieShen BaoBiao (贴身保镖)
  • Mexico-Chinese Security Council (墨西哥华人安全 委员会)

See the Note below for an image providing visual information about selected Chinese PSCs [1].

Despite serious structural weaknesses inherent to the PRC private security industry and the CCP’s hesitations regarding the autonomy issue for domestic private security contractors, Beijing may decide to move toward strengthening its domestic and overseas PSCs by increasing their level of professionalism. The prospect of regional conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region and the apparent inability of local authorities, such as in Pakistan, to provide security to Chinese nationals and material assets on their territory could prompt Beijing to pursue PSCs further. On October 22, 2024, the PRC reportedly proposed establishing a joint security company to protect Chinese investments and personnel in Myanmar as a part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor to the Myanmar military junta. This led some experts to believe that the PRC might go ahead with testing the “Russian model” of protection for the paramilitary presence in the country and the ability to use local resources in Myanmar, creating a “Chinese Wagner” (Geopolitical Monitor, November 28, 2024). Local experts have stated, however, “[T]he public perceives it as a breach of sovereignty, and even the junta would be uncomfortable with such overt Chinese involvement” (Voice of America, November 20, 2024).

Russian PMCs vs. Chinese PSCs: a Comparative Analysis

Although many analysts use the terms private military company (PMC) and private security company (PSC) interchangeably, these are separate entities, and especially when discussing the private security industries in China and Russia, the distinction should be clear. When China refers to overseas security companies, it refers to PSCs, not PMCs, while Russia’s overseas security companies concern PMCs or paramilitary groups. Most Chinese PSCs fall into two categories, “security companies” (保安服务公司) and “security companies engaged in armed escorting services” (“从事武装护送服务的保安公司”) (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, January 3, 2023). The makeup of these companies includes a majority of employees and leadership, which are former PLA, People’s Armed Police Officers, and public security officers (The Security Distillery, March 2024).

The primary similarity between Russia and the PRC’s security providers is their close ties with the state. After years of silence and denial, in 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin openly admitted that the Wagner Group was “fully financed by the state,” which confirmed the findings of previous investigations (see Russia in the Middle East, July 31, 2018; Kommersant.ru, June 27, 2023). In the case of the PRC, the “private” aspect is not truly private. Being fully in line with the saying “as the state advances, the private sector retreats (国进民退),” all Chinese PSCs should be considered “quasi-government security actors” (Asia Times, November 1, 2022). This is mainly because the “2018 Security Management Guideline for Overseas Chinese-Funded Companies, Institutions and Personnel (境外中资企业机构和人员安全管理指南)” states that overseas Chinese PSCs have to be either wholly state-owned or 51 percent state-owned (Com.gd.gov.cn, November 16, 2023). The main difference between Russian PMCs and Chinese PSCs lies in the issue of their legal status. Russian PMCs unaffiliated with the Russian government remain illegal in Russia, while domestic and overseas PSCs in the PRC are legal and regulated by domestic law (Gd.gov.cn, July 2, 2019).

The nature of missions performed by Russian PMCs and Chinese PSCs differ drastically. Unlike Russian PMCs, Chinese PSCs have not performed complex security tasks or military engagements in a hostile security environment. In contrast, Russian PMCs were designed by the state to perform such missions. It is hardly a secret that Russian mercenaries, acting together with or in lieu of regular armed forces, have evolved into a tool of power projection used by the Russian state to achieve its security, geoeconomic, and geopolitical goals. Chinese PSCs, however, have yet to acquire such a status. Overseas Chinese PSCs focus on securing and safeguarding Chinese business interests, particularly those related to OBOR. Chinese PSCs, such as Beijing DeWe Security Services (德威国际安保集团) and Huaxin Zhongan (华新中安), employ 35,000 contractors across numerous OBOR-affiliated countries, including 50 African nations (Africa Center, June 15, 2021; Military.Africa, December 1, 2023). In contrast, Russian PMCs such as Wagner serve a broader range of clients and engage in paramilitary or mercenary activity (Voice of America, December 12, 2024).

The number of employees between Russian PMCs and Chinese PSCs differs greatly, a markedly evolved criterion since 2022. The PRC presents a diverse, overinflated, and quite cumbersome employment pool. Chinese PSCs employ millions of Chinese nationals, ranging from army and police veterans to members of sporting clubs. Its domestic PSC industry boasts a handful of genuinely capable private security providers, which makes the industry’s size deceptive when measured against its actual capabilities (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, January 3, 2023). Its overseas PSCs’ C2 structure struggles, however, in most international environments and lacks professional skills. The root of this issue is that Chinese PSCs focus on hiring veterans. As of 2023, there were 57 million veterans employed across domestic and overseas PSCs. These veterans in the market negatively impact the sophistication of Chinese PSCs since these veterans may have the physical abilities to work in combat environments but need more professional security training and skills. Most veteran employees struggle with tasks such as creating risk assessment reports, writing new company security policies, or communicating with the locals (see Guardians of the Belt and Road, January 3, 2023; War on the Rocks, December 1, 2023).

The case of Russia’s mercenary industry appears to be more complex. Before 2022, the industry’s members were counted in the thousands and were a compact core of battle-hardened professionals with an extensive military background and vast (para)military experience. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine changed this. Given a very high volume of losses and the state’s lack of interest in mass mobilization, the industry rapidly increased in size, encompassing tens of thousands of mercenaries, whose median level of professionalism plummeted drastically based on the nature of tasks they were to perform participation in so-called “meat assaults” (miasnyje shturmy, мясные штурмы). Furthermore, the boundary between a PMC member, a “volunteer” (dobrovolets, доброволец), and a member of a “territorial defense unit” (otriady territorialnoii oboroni, отряды территориальной обороны), a member of regional or corporation-hired paramilitary formation, blurred even further. In Russia’s current conditions and realities, it is extremely difficult not only to calculate the number of mercenaries but also to define what a mercenary or a member of PMC is, given the state’s position on mercenaries who have now (almost) fully become integrated into Russian armed forces and enjoy the same privileges as do members of MOD (Kommersant, December 19, 2024).

The operational regions are perhaps the only criterion where Chinese PSCs manage to demonstrate more impressive results than their Russian counterparts. Contrary to Russian mercenaries, Chinese PSCs’ operational areas primarily span gray zones, areas of armed conflict, and countries frequently defined as “failed states,” and they often collaborate with local security providers.

The table below summarizes the comparative analysis of Chinese PSCs and Russian PMCS in a visual form.

Chinese PSCs
Huaxin Zhongan (HXZA; 华新中安) Frontier Services Group (FSG; 先丰服务) China Security Technology Group (CSTG; 中国安保技术集团)
Date Established 2004 1990 2016
Legal Status Legal. Legal. Legal.
Top Leadership Yin Weihong (殷卫宏), Founder. Chang Zhenming (常振明), Chairman of the Board and non-executive Director. Tan Feng (谭锋), Founder.
Missions Provides security and human defense services, security technology prevention, security consulting, security risk assessment, maritime armed escort, and training. Provides protective services such as threat and risk assessments, close protection, occupational health, environmental and safety management, policy development, physical and technical security, IT security, aviation, and specialized training. Provides risk assessment and investment programs for enterprises and trains local personnel, implements security services, conducts financial accounting and comprehensive security services.
Number of Employees 30,000. 1,000-2,000. Unknown.
Operational Areas Arabian Sea, China, Egypt, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Guinea, High Seas, Indian Ocean, Malacca Straits, Nigeria, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Singapore Straits, Sri Lanka, and Uganda. East Africa, Middle East and North Africa, (MENA) Southwest Asia, and Central Asia. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Kenya, Latin America, and the Caribbean.
Ownership 51% state owned. CITIC Group 49%; 51% state owned. 51% state owned.
Relationship with the Party HXZA mentions “party building” and has a “political work” section on its website which states, “the company has set up the post of general political commissar, the posts of political and ideological work instructors in each division of the Security Management Department, and the backbone of ideological work in the grass-roots squads (teams).” CITIC Group is a Chinese state-owned enterprise owned in whole by the Chinese Ministry of Finance. Chang Zhengming (常振明) is the former chairman of CITIC Group Corporation and CITIC Corporation Limited. Unknown. However, founder Tan Feng stated their main mission is “guarding the personal and property safety of Chinese-funded enterprises,” along BRI routes.

 

Russian PMCs
Wagner Group African Corp
Date Established 2013/2014 2023
Legal Status Illegal. Illegal.
Top Leadership Yevgeny Prigozhin, Dmitry Utkin (killed in 2023), Alexander Kuznetsov, Andrey Bogatov, Andrey Troshev, Anton Yelizarov, Valery Chekalov, (allegedly) Sergey Surovikin, and Mikhail Mizintsev. Prior to Prigozhin’s unsuccessful coup, the group might have been led by up to 30 people who were responsible for various sides of the Group’s activities. After 2023: Pavel Prigozhin, Anton Yelizarov. Unknown. However, Andrey Averyanov and Yunus-bek Yevkurov are rumored to be among the top leaders.
Selected Missions Ukraine: sabotage; provocations; participation in small-to-mid scale military operations.

The Central African Republic (CAR): protection of material infrastructure and political leadership; skirmishes with local militants.

Mali: skirmishes with local militants.

Mozambique: skirmishes with local militants; promoting Russia’s economic interests.

Syria: small-scale military operations; promotion/protection of Russia’s (public and private sectors) economic interests; training local military and security-enforcing personnel; protection of political leadership.

Venezuela: protection of incumbent political regime; promotion of Russia’s economic interests.

Niger: training and consultancy; promotion of Russia’s geo-economic/political interests.

 Ukraine: limited participation in Russia’s Kharkiv offensive (2024) alongside Russia’s regular armed forces.

Africa: Mali (likely in a conjuncture with remnants of the Wagner Group) and Burkina Faso. The main focus is providing military support, training, and participation in small-scale military operations against local rebel groups. The group is actively involved in rendering protection services to local political elite (especially the case in Burkina Faso).
Number of Employees Up to 1,500 (the exact number remains unknown) Unknown (likely between several hundred to up to 1,000 fighters).
Operational Areas Mali, the CAR, Mozambique, Madagascar Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Burundi, Syria, Libya, Lebanon (allegedly), Ukraine, Belarus, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Venezuela, Nicaragua (allegedly). Mali, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger, CAR (as of early 2025, the operational focus seems to be on the Sahel region but could expand to other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa).
Ownership The Russian state (MOD, GU, Rosgvardia) and the African Corps. The Ministry of Defense and the GU.
Relationship with the State Subordinate to the Russian state. Subordinate to the Russian state.

 

Conclusion

In the case of Russian PMCs, despite the apparent setbacks suffered by Russian mercenaries both at home and abroad, there is every reason to believe that the industry will neither weaken nor disappear even if the war in Ukraine ends (ICoCA, April 11, 2024). Russian society has been experiencing an uncontrollable (para)militarization, with the state ceding the monopoly on violence to semi-criminal groups and formations driven by, among others, ideology and hatred toward the weak. This might become a very serious challenge to the Russian ruling elite should its war in Ukraine end in terms unfavorable to Russian nationalists (see EDM, March 20, 27, 2024). Furthermore, with the economic crisis booming, social malaises and frustration related to the poor state of infrastructure could lead to a social implosion in which the (para)military formations could become active participants (see EDM, August 20, October 16, 2024).

In the case of Chinese PSCs, the PRC’s political leadership closely monitors the foreign experience in private security. As of now, it seems that Beijing is unwilling to follow either Russian or Western methods, especially in countries of the Global South that play a very important economic role for the PRC, and any incidents or further pressure to deploy Chinese PSCs could cause a rise in Sinophobia or paint China in a neo-colonialist light. Simultaneously, Beijing’s actions in pursuit of guaranteeing security for its nationals and valuables in countries of the Global South (along the OBOR in particular), given the worsening security environment, especially in parts of MENA and the India-Pacific region, will give insight into the future trajectory of Chinese PSCs. This said, the likeliest scenario Beijing would follow would be using a middle path. It does not seem as though Chinese officials would opt to follow the Russian approach in dealing with PMCs. In addition to structural issues that would be challenging to deal with overnight, the PRC is unlikely to be interested in breeding mercenary formations that would drastically degrade its international image and cause problems domestically. More likely, the PRC may continue with the approach that some of its PSCs take in Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA, and Central Asia by operating under the umbrella of the Chinese state and extensively collaborating with local security providers abroad to get around legal restrictions (Africa Center, June 15, 2021).

The Chinese and Russian models for private military and security formations underscore the challenges of balancing state control, international perception, and operational effectiveness in utilizing private security forces for national interests. As global security landscapes evolve, the future of these industries will depend on their adaptability and alignment with Russia and the PRC’s broader strategic priorities.

 

Notes:

[1]

Companies: Huaxin Zhongan (华新中安) Shandong Huawei Security Group (山东华威保安集团) Frontier Services Group (先丰服务) Beijing DeWe Security Services (德威国际安保集团) Dingtai Anyuan Security(北京鼎泰安元安全防范技术研究院有限公司) Hanwei International Security Services （汉卫国际安全护卫有限公司) China Security Technology Group (中国安保技术集团) Veterans Security Services (VSS Security Group) (北京伟之杰保安服务有限公司) Zhongjun Junhong Security Group (中军军弘集团) Xinjiang Shamo Tewei (新疆沙漠特卫) China Security Co. Ltd (ZhongAn Ke) (中安科股份有限公司)
Date Established 2004 1993 1990 2011 2011 2014 2016 2007 1987 2013 1987
Top Leadership Yin Weihong (殷卫宏), Founder Xun Jinqing (荀金庆), Chairman and General Manager Chang Zhenming (常振明), Chairman of the Board and non-executive Director Li Xiaopeng (李晓鹏), Chairman Unknown Unknown Tan Feng (谭锋), Founder Unknown Wu Guohua (吴国华) Han Hao (韩昊), Founder Wu Bowen (吴博文), Chairman
No. of Employees 30,000 2,000 1,000-2,000 350 domestic employees Total unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 2,000 32,000 200 11,000
Services Provided Provides security and human defense services, security technology prevention, security consulting, security risk assessment, maritime armed escort, and training Provides general security guards, business security guards, canine guard services, security engineering, security consulting, driver training, and insurance agency Provides protective services such as threat and risk assessments, close protection, occupational health, environmental, and safety management, policy development, physical and technical security, IT security, aviation, and specialized training Provides training in public safety and onsite protection, developing security plans and advisory plans, operates in overseas site security management, as well as technology guarantee, risk management, janitorial, patrol, guarding, security checks, and security technology prevention Provides safety management system construction, safety training, risk management consulting, project site safety management, public safety training, public safety services, maritime security, and risk management consulting Provides professional international security services, including but not limited to security protection for cruise yachts, ocean-going vessels, overseas institutions and businessmen or Chinese business groups who invest overseas, to safeguard the personal safety and property of Chinese citizens Provides risk assessment and investment programs for enterprises and trains local personnel, implements security services, conducts financial accounting and comprehensive security services Provides safety training, consulting, and assessments, personnel protection, technical protection, and equipment protection Provides global coverage of security, maritime escort, and fishing services Provides bodyguard services, risk assessments, corporate security, business accompaniment, crisis management, technical prevention, risk assessment, legal rights, skills training, video networking, combat capture, martial arts tournaments, enterprises, and institutions training Provides smart city system integration and comprehensive security service services, and it also provides customers with coverage of industrial security, information security, personal security
Operational Regions Arabian Sea, China, Egypt, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Guinea, High Seas, Indian Ocean, Malacca Straits, Nigeria, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Singapore straits, Sri Lanka, and Uganda South Africa, Russia and Sri Lanka East Africa, Southwest Asia, Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa. (MENA) Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, and MENA Middle East Gulf of Aden, Iraq, Malacca Straits, South Africa, and Sri Lanka Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Kenya, Latin America, and the Carribbean. MENA Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and has escort bases and port rights in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Djibouti, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Comoros, Fujairah, Muscat, Durban, Madagascar, UAE, Oman Central Asia Hong Kong, Macao, Thailand and Oceania
In the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA)? (Y/N) Yes No No No No No No No No No No
Ownership 51% State Owned 51% State Owned CITC Group; State Owned Frontier Services Group; 51% State Owned 51% State Owened 51% State Owned 51% State Owned 51% State Owned 51% State Owned Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC); 51% State owned 51% State Owned
Relationship to Party The website mentions “party building” and has a “political work” section which states, “the company has set up the post of general political commissar, the posts of political and ideological work instructors in each division of the Security Management Department, and the backbone of ideological work in the grass-roots squads (teams) Claims to be “China’s first company to go from the state-owned system into a private security company.” It also has a party branch led by Li Xiaohu (李晓虎), General Secretary of the Party Branch, which states it adheres to Confucian values, and to the leadership of the party branch to cultivate corporate culture at Huwawei CITIC Group is a Chinese state-owned enterprise owned in whole by the Chinese Minsitry of Finance. Chang Zhengming (常振明) is the former chairman of CITIC Group Corporation and CITIC Corporation Limited Unknown Unknown Registered in China State Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) which is “the competent authority of ministerial level directly under the State Council in charge of market supervision/regulation and related law enforcement through administrative means.” The official relationship to the party is unknown. However, Tan Feng stated their main mission is “guarding the personal and property safety of Chinese-funded enterprises,” along BRI routes Unknown The CCP branch committee was established in 2013 with 3 branch members and 12 current party members. Yao Na (姚娜) is the Party Branch General Secretary and the compaby founder Wu Guohua (吴国华) joined the CCP in 1974 The website states that the company engages in party-building work, but the details are unknown The website mentions that the company engages in “party and mass work” but offers no further details