Chechen Leader Ramzan Kadyrov Requests Resignation

Executive Summary:

• Ramzan Kadyrov declared this week that he wants to retire from his position as head of the Chechen Republic but acknowledged that only Russian President Vladimir Putin could release him. Putin agreed to meet with him and appears to have turned down his request. 
• Putin’s approval of Kadyrov’s request the day before Victory Day (May 9) would have marred the celebration and put at even greater risk the combination of policies Kadyrov has long pursued.
• Such a shift would spark a power struggle in Chechnya itself that would involve not only the Kremlin but the entire North Caucasus and trigger a larger conflict in the region than any since the second post-Soviet Chechen war through which Putin rose to power in 2000.
• Putin will almost certainly be forced to later accept Kadyrov’s resignation, which will induce uncertainty surrounding his own position as President of Russia.  

Ramzan Kadyrov requested that Russian President Vladimir Putin grant him leave from his position as the leader of the Chechen Republic in Russia. Kadyrov has been the leader of the Chechen Republic since 2007 and has been the dominant power there since the death of his father, Akhmed, the previous Chechen president, in 2004. Kadyrov has requested to resign at least three times prior to this case (see EDM, January 21, 2020, March 9, 2023, June 12, 2024). On May 5, Kadyrov said that he had personally “asked to be relieved” of his position, expressing the hope that this time his “request will be supported” and that someone else will take his place with “their own initiatives and vision” (66.ru, May 6; Chechnya Segodnya, May 7). 

Kadyrov says that only Putin can make the decision to grant his resignation. As of this writing, Putin has not publicly commented on this latest request (Gazeta.ru, May 6). When he met with Kadyrov on May 7, the Kremlin leader turned him down before the Victory Day holiday on May 9 (see EDM, May 6; Smotrim, May 7). Putin’s rejection surprised few in the Russian capital, given that Moscow commentators suspect that Kadyrov may only be seeking a reaffirmation of Putin’s support and that he will remain in his post, one that he has held longer than any other leader of a Russian Federal subject (MK.ru, May 6).  Kadyrov made his request at a time when it is being reported that he has been in poor health and even frequently hospitalized for pancreatic necrosis, which has a 79.1 percent one-year mortality rate in Russia (Russian Open Medical Journal, October 5, 2020; see EDM, March 9, 2023, June 12, 2024; The Moscow Times, April 22, 2024; Novaya Gazeta Evropa, May 5). These factors mean that, this time, there may be more to Kadyrov’s words than there were in the past and that Putin may ultimately choose to replace him. 

Russian analysts are already discussing who might succeed Kadyrov and will likely continue to do so despite Putin’s refusal in the immediate term. Among potential replacements named most often in Russian media are Apti Alautdinov, aged 39, who now works as the deputy head of the Main Administration for Military-Political Work in the Russian Armed Forces. Also named are Kadyrov’s own children, given that he came to office largely on the strength of family ties to an earlier Chechen president (Lenta.ru, Novie Izvestia, May 6). In addition, Kadyrov himself has added fuel to this fire by placing his children and other close loyalists into ever more positions in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya (Prodolzhenie Sleduet, May 5). 

Any individual chosen to replace Kadyrov, regardless of who they are, would have to build up an independent power base. Doing this would take time and possibly require the introduction of Russian troops to stabilize the situation. During that period, a few groups could be expected to try to exploit the uncertainty of the situation. These groups would include those close to Kadyrov who will not have been chosen as the new leader of Chechnya. They may also include the Chechen political opposition located in the mountains as well as the opposition abroad who enjoys the support of the Ukrainian government (On the Chechen opposition and its ties to Ukraine (see EDM, July 28; Kavkaz Realii, October 19; see EDM, November 1, 2022; Window on Eurasia, January 24). After all, Kadyrov took several years to achieve the near-unlimited power he has enjoyed recently, and any successor would likely require at least as long to accomplish the same.

A scenario of Kadyrov resigning and a power struggle emerging means that Chechnya itself would be mired in conflict for some time, which almost certainly would turn violent. Conflict is especially likely between the opposition at home and abroad, which is generally secularist, and the more Islamist groups Kadyrov has supported (see EDM, August 6, 2024; Kavkaz.Realii, January 20). Perhaps far more significantly, these struggles and the likely weakening of the Grozny regime would have an impact on the neighboring republics of the North Caucasus and on the Russian Federation as a whole, where many are focusing on who will become Putin’s successor and what that transition will look like. Kadyrov has been heavily involved not only in seizing territory from Ingushetia but also in raising the issue of what he sees as Chechen lands within Dagestan (see EDM, September 27, 2018, December 1, 2021; Window on Eurasia, October 20, December 20, 2024). Some groups in both those republics are likely to view any change in Grozny as the occasion for retaking land lost or solidifying their control over territories Chechnya has claimed (Kavkaz.Realii, January 20). Other North Caucasus republics also have issues with Chechen aspirations that Kadyrov has promoted and are likely to be reopened during the interregnum (Window on Eurasia, August 10, 2019, March 27). In almost every case, these disputes could become violent, possibly forcing Moscow to intervene in ways that could further spread any such conflict.

Moscow will be unable to avoid the immediate consequences of a possible transition of Chechen power from Kadyrov to a new successor. For some time, Russians have speculated when Putin will retire as Russia’s president and how a transition to his successor may take place. They also speculate whether any such succession will be peaceful or violent. If the latter, it is unclear whether violence would occur immediately or as various parties conclude that an interregnum is the best time for them to try to advance their own positions.  It is easy to imagine that such observers will look at what may happen in Grozny once Kadyrov leaves office as an indication of how such developments might proceed in their own country.  

As no decision has been made, or at least announced, in Moscow about Kadyrov’s request, all of these situations are potential scenarios of how the coming days are likely to unfold. The more often the Chechen leader talks about seeking retirement, the more often he promotes his children or his closest allies to positions of power. As more evidence appears that Kadyrov is ill and unlikely to recover soon, it becomes more probable that Putin, however reluctantly, will have to replace him. 

A wild card in this mix, one that so far has attracted little attention, is the potential appointment of an ethnic Russian, rather than Chechen, to lead Chechnya. This could change the game in ways that would almost certainly lead to a spiraling out of Moscow’s and Grozny’s control of the situation. Some in the Chechen opposition are now saying that Kadyrov has been such a horrific leader that the only hope Chechens may have for a better future is if an ethnic Russian were to be appointed to replace him. That argument has been made by Musa Lomayaev, a prominent Chechen human rights activist and blogger, who claims that “after Ramzan Kadyrov will come not a Chechen or even a Caucasian but an ethnic Russian who will first of all save the Chechen people” from Kadyrov’s repressions and “give them the chance to more or less breathe for a time” (Poligon Media, February 12). At that time, Lomayev continues, “all the crimes which have been committed and are being committed now on the territory of the Chechen Republic will be attributed to Ramzan Kadyrov.” 

Moscow’s appointment of an ethnic Russian to head Chechnya, however, would spread fears throughout the non-Russian republics that they would likely suffer the same fate. In that event, the Kremlin would be confronted by a much larger problem than just the Chechen one.