Lukashenka’s Hold on Power in Belarus Unclear as Election Season Approaches

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Age: 5 hours

(Source: President.by)

Executive Summary:

  • This month marks 30 years since Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power. In the coming months, a new presidential campaign will begin, leaving many questioning whether he will run again due to his age and overall health.
  • Possible regime change and democratic reform in Belarus pose a threat to Russia. Providing for the controlled replacement of Lukashenka is not a priority for the Kremlin today as it was a few years ago before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the 2020 Belarusian presidential elections.
  • The opposition has minimal ability to influence internal processes from abroad, thus overcoming the political crisis to preserve Belarus’s independence likely requires both the opposition and the West to reevaluate their approach to unseating Lukashenka.

For many years, the issue of political transition in Belarus has been under discussion, much of which has been based on Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s age and health problems (see EDM, May 24, June 7, 2023). This month marks 30 years since he came to power, and, in August, he will celebrate his 70th birthday. The next presidential elections in Belarus are scheduled to occur no later than July 20, 2025 (Belta, June 20). With less than a year until the start of the election campaign, officials are actively preparing for all possibilities. The presidential elections in August 2020 sparked the largest protests in the country’s history, and the results were never recognized by the United States, the European Union, and many other countries (see EDM, August 10, 2020; DW, September 24, 2020). The Belarusian government ignored the protesters’ demands for new elections and intensified repression in the country. Quite markedly, illusions about the possibility of changing power in an authoritarian regime through free elections were dispelled. Lukashenka has made it clear that he will likely not relinquish power to anyone freely. Even so, the upcoming elections could still trigger some transition in power that leads Belarus closer to the West and potentially on the path to democratization. Nevertheless, if Lukashenka is once again “victorious, that could mean Belarus falls further into the Kremlin’s arms, leaving the country on its authoritarian course and possible absorption by Russia.

The 2020 protests alarmed the Kremlin, which feared the rise to power of someone supported by the people of Belarus rather than through prearranged agreements between Moscow and Minsk (see EDM, August 13, 2020). Russia immediately provided financial aid and resource assistance to Belarus. In a meeting between Lukashenka and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September 2020, the Kremlin leader demanded constitutional changes (Kommersant, September 14, 2020). Sources indicate that the main contours of the political transition in Belarus were outlined at that time. That same month, Lukashenka discussed possibly calling for early elections (Kommersant, September 20, 2020). In August 2021, he promised  again not to participate in the next presidential elections, which he did not follow through on (Interfax, September 9, 2021). With the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Lukashenka became Putin’s main ally, and pushing for his controlled replacement was not as appealing to the Kremlin as before.

At the same time, certain actions over the past four years have been taken in Belarus that indicate possible preparations for Lukashenka’s departure. In particular, the political field has been cleared, and all opposition political parties have been eliminated, leaving the Belarusian leader to “anoint” his successor. Additionally, thousands of public organizations and independent media have been shut down, a package of laws providing guarantees and immunity to the retired president and his family members have been adopted, and a new residence has been built in the center of Minsk (Zerkalo, October 1, 2023; Kommersant, January 4). In February 2022, amendments to the constitution were made in Belarus that created a new supreme representative body—the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly—with Lukashenka installed as chair in April 2024 (Interfax, April 24; see EDM, May 2, 8). The assembly has the authority to determine the legitimacy of elections and to decide on the president’s removal in cases of systematic or gross violations of the constitution.

If Lukashenka faces health problems in the next year, he might not participate in the next presidential elections and would prefer to support another candidate. External factors and the Kremlin’s position will almost certainly influence Lukashenka’s decision. His character, fear of subsequent persecution, the history of former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s loss of power, and other factors will all be considered. Still, Lukashenka is likely to cling to power until the end—in which case, a political transition will be delayed for some time.

In Belarus, if the head of state dies or is incapacitated, their powers transfer to the speaker of the upper house of parliament, the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly of Belarus, who is currently Natalia Kochanova (President.gov.by/, accessed July 16). This does not totally guarantee, however, that the mechanism prescribed in the constitution will be implemented, as a wider conflict with the power bloc over leadership is possible. Announcing a leader’s death could provoke protests, the imposition of a state of emergency or martial law, and even the deployment of Russian troops to control the situation. The Kremlin will support any systemic successor to ensure the loyalty of the Belarusian bureaucracy, the army, and law enforcement agencies. This scenario also appeals to China, which is interested in political stability to secure  the logistical route to EU countries under the Belt and Road Initiative, which passes through Belarus (see EDM, July 15).

The opposition currently has no real opportunities to seize power during a political transition. The main protest leaders are either in prison or exiled, and the country’s revolutionary potential has been suppressed (see EDM, December 14, 2022). Official Minsk continues to work systematically to eliminate threats, and the opposition operating abroad has no influence on internal processes (see EDM, December 12, 2023, March 6, April 23, May 30, June 13). At the same time, the risk of new protests remains, forcing the government to continue expanding repression.

A forceful scenario of removing the head of state is only theoretically possible. No structures within or outside Belarus could organize an armed coup. The issuance of an arrest warrant for Lukashenka by the International Criminal Court, however, might provide a significant push for him to leave power. Russia would nevertheless presumably intervene in any incidents to maintain control and influence over Belarus through Lukashenka and his loyalists.

The sanctions imposed on Minsk have increased Belarus’s dependence on Russia, strengthening the authoritarian regime and the Kremlin’s influence over political processes. If the Kremlin feels that its position in Belarus might be compromised, Putin could implement  a scenario of the essential elimination of Belarusian statehood through the full realization of the Union State  (Soyuz.by, December 8, 1999; TASS, July 13, 2021). Full implementation would mean unification into a confederation, in which Russia would play a dominant role and the powers of the Belarusian government would be limited. It might even reach the point where the Kremlin would appoint the leader in Belarus, as was the case in the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Outside observers see Belarus falling deeper into the Kremlin’s sphere of influence and does not see serious prospects for influencing internal processes. The political system in Belarus under Lukashenka is not endemic to opportunities for liberalization and political reforms. More conceptually, the key question is how Belarus will look after Lukashenka. Overcoming the deep political crisis, preserving independence, and democratizing Belarus requires a reevaluation of approaches by all interested external actors.