Strategic Snapshot: Three Years Since the Start of Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

Today, February 24, marks the third anniversary of the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Ukrainian people and their military, with support from allies and partners, have withstood Russia’s unjustified, unprovoked, and brutal assault on Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Today, Russia occupies about 20 percent of Ukrainian territory. According to the most recent official statistics available, since February 24, 2022, a total of 45,100 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed, although some databases have reported this number is much higher (approximately 62,000). In addition to military personnel, 12,605 Ukrainian civilians have been killed since Russia’s full-scale invasion. About 3.7 million Ukrainians have been internally displaced, and 6.9 million are refugees abroad. An estimated 160,000–165,000 Russian military personnel have been killed (according to analysis of confirmed casualty lists by Meduza and Mediazona) since February 2022 out of 868,230 total casualties, as reported by the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces. As of last December, more than half of the reported Russian military deaths occurred in 2024 alone, according to Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi.

On February 18, a first round of peace talks was held in Riyadh between the United States and Russia—without Ukraine. U.S. President Donald Trump announced that a second round of peace talks will be held on February 25 in the same location. Preparations are also underway for a meeting between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, according to a statement on February 22 by Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov.

As these discussions take place, it is essential to understand the demands, conditions, and concessions that Russia and Ukraine have expressed with regard to any negotiated settlement. The following is a compilation of these conditions and concessions, as stated publicly by Moscow and Kyiv.

Ukraine:

No Frozen Conflict: Freezing the conflict along the current frontlines is not acceptable to Ukraine’s military or civil society. Zelenskyy recently stated that agreeing to a ceasefire based on the current position of troops would depend on security guarantees.
Real Security Guarantees: Any peace agreements must contain security guarantees for Ukraine. Kyiv has also added this as a precondition to any potential agreements on Ukrainian rare earth minerals. According to statements made by Zelenskyy prior to the U.S.-Russia talks, the United States must be involved as a security guarantor because “security guarantees without America are not real security guarantees.”
Prospective Trade of Zelenskyy Presidency for NATO Membership: Zelenskyy stated on February 23 that if “to achieve peace you really need me to give up my post—I’m ready. I can trade it for NATO membership, if there are such conditions.”
Kyiv Must Have a Seat at the Negotiating Table: Ukraine refuses to recognize any peace deal made without its representatives being present at the negotiating table. According to Zelenskyy, Kyiv will “never accept any decisions between the United States and Russia about Ukraine.”
Lost Territories Must Be Returned: Kyiv demands that Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia must be returned. Ukrainian officials have not mentioned a specific timeline by which this must occur. Zelenskyy recently stated, “I don’t know when it will happen, but we must return them through diplomacy” (implying that the return of occupied territories may not be immediate). Zelenskyy indicated on February 11 that “We will swap one territory for another,” referring to an exchange of the Ukrainian-occupied portion of Kursk oblast without specifying which Russian-occupied territories Kyiv would demand back in return.

Russia:

“Root Causes” Must Be Addressed: Putin has repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian radicals and Neo-Nazis—sometimes with Western backing—have created a “harsh and artificial division of Russians and Ukrainians.” Essentially, the so-called root cause is the Kremlin’s perception of what Ukraine really is: an artificial state that “actually never had stable traditions of real statehood” and is an “inalienable part of [Russia’s] history, culture and spiritual space.”
No Frozen Conflict: Moscow officially rejects a ceasefire along current lines. In a speech on June 14, 2022, Putin stated that “we are not discussing freezing the conflict, but its definitive resolution.” This speech in particular is important because it is consistently referred to by Russian officials as the point of reference for Russian conditions on negotiations because, according to Putin, “Everything is said there, no point in repeating myself.”
Treaty Must Adhere to the Istanbul Communiqué of 2022: According to Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, a peace deal must be based on the 2022 draft Treaty on Permanent Neutrality and Security Guarantees for Ukraine, which was summarized in the private Istanbul Communiqué released on March 29, 2022.[1] The draft treaty entailed the following conditions, among others:
- Ukraine’s permanent neutrality (including not joining military alliances such as NATO);
- The stipulation of guarantor states (the United Kingdom, China, the Russian Federation, the United States, the French Republic, the Republic of Belarus [position of Russia, not agreed by Ukraine], the Republic of Turkey [position of Ukraine, not agreed by Russia]); and
- Criteria in which Ukraine would be justified in defending itself against any aggression violating its neutrality.
Zelenskyy Must Be Replaced: Russia considers Zelenskyy’s signature on any peace agreements to be void and insists that Ukraine hold presidential elections. Ukraine’s constitution does not allow for elections while martial law remains in effect.
Ukrainian Withdrawal From Territories Claimed by Russia: In addition to withdrawing from Russia itself, Ukrainian forces must withdraw from the territories Russia officially annexed in 2022, but does not fully control: Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
Special Protection for Russian-Speaking Citizens in Ukraine: Moscow demands that the rights, freedoms, and interests of Russian-speaking citizens (an undefined, highly elastic category) in Ukraine must be fully protected in a future peace treaty. For years, Russia has complained about the alleged “policy of de-russification and forced assimilation” pursued by the government of Ukraine following the overthrow of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014.
Recognition of Russia’s Annexation of Occupied Territories: In his June 2024 speech, Putin added that international agreements must officially recognize Russia’s annexation of the Russian-occupied territories of Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk, and Luhansk as people’s republics and Kherson and Zaporizhzhia as part of Russia.
Removal of Sanctions: All Western sanctions against Russia must be removed. The West and its partners have sanctioned 6,902 Russian entities and 11,088 Russian individuals.

Conclusion

Today may mark the third anniversary of the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but later this week we will enter the twelfth year of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Even when ceasefires quieted the fighting, Moscow’s Russification campaign in occupied territories meant that Ukrainian civilians still suffered from Russia’s aggression. The breakdown of the Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 Agreements following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 demonstrates the difference between a ceasefire and a genuine peace. The gulf between Kyiv and Moscow’s stated conditions will require one or both sides to change their positions. Until that happens, a real peace will remain beyond reach.

Note:

[1] Negotiations on this treaty failed at the time largely due to Russia’s insertion of a clause that all of the guarantor states, including Russia, would have to agree that Ukraine would be justified in defending itself against any aggression violating its neutrality. If Russia were to violate Ukraine’s neutrality, Russia would also have the power to veto Ukraine’s ability to respond to any attacks. The other main reason for the failure of these negotiations was the discovery of war crimes conducted by Russia in the Ukrainian suburb of Bucha.

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